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ABSTRACT 
 In most markets, competition induces efficiency by ensuring that goods are priced 
according to their marginal cost. This is not the case in health insurance markets. This is 
due to the fact that the cost of a health insurance policy depends on the characteristics of 
the consumer purchasing it, and asymmetric information or regulation often precludes an 
insurer from matching the price an individual pays to her expected cost. This disconnect 
between cost and price causes inefficiency: When the premiums paid by consumers do 
not match their expected costs, consumers may sort inefficiently across plans. In this 
dissertation, I study the effects of policies used to alleviate selection problems. In Chapter 
1, I develop a model to study the effects of risk adjustment on equilibrium prices and 
sorting. I simulate consumer choice and welfare with and without risk adjustment in the 
context of a Health Insurance Exchange. I find that when there is no risk adjustment, the 
market I study unravels and everyone enrolls in the less comprehensive plan. However, 
diagnosis-based risk adjustment causes over 80 percent of market participants to enroll in 
the more comprehensive plan. In Chapter 2, we study an unintended consequence of risk 
adjustment: upcoding. When payments are risk adjusted based on potentially manipulable 
  viii 
risk scores, insurers have incentives to maximize those risk scores. We study upcoding in 
the context of Medicare, where private Medicare Advantage plans are paid via risk 
adjustment but Traditional Medicare is not. We find that when the same individual 
enrolls in a private plan her risk score is 5% higher than if she would have enrolled in 
Traditional Medicare. In Chapter 3, we study two forms of insurance for insurers: 
Reinsurance and risk corridors. Protecting insurers from risk can lower prices and 
improve competition by inducing entry into risky markets. It can also induce 
inefficiencies by causing insurers to manage risk less carefully. We use simulations to 
compare the power of reinsurance and risk corridors to protect insurers against risk while 
limiting efficiency losses. We find that risk corridors are always able to limit insurer risk 
with the lowest efficiency cost. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
IMPERFECT RISK ADJUSTMENT, RISK PREFERENCES, AND SORTING 
IN COMPETITIVE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 The question of whether competition improves efficiency in health insurance 
markets is at the center of the recent reform of the US health care system. Efficiency is 
achieved when consumers purchase goods that they value more than the cost of those 
goods. In most markets, competition induces efficiency by insuring that goods are priced 
according to their marginal cost. In many health insurance markets, however, competition 
does not ensure that the price of a product (an insurance plan) is equal to its cost. This is 
due to the fact that the cost of the product depends on the characteristics of the consumer 
purchasing it, and asymmetric information or regulation often precludes an insurer from 
matching the price an individual pays to her expected cost.
1
 This disconnect between cost 
and price results in two kinds of inefficiency. On the supply side, when an insurer’s 
revenues and costs for enrolling an individual do not match in predictable ways, insurers 
are incentivized to inefficiently manipulate their contracts in order to “cream-skim” 
consumers with lower expected costs (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Glazer and McGuire 
2000, Ellis and McGuire 2007). On the demand side, when the premiums paid by 
consumers do not match their expected costs, consumers may sort inefficiently across 
plans (Akerlof 1970, Einav et al. 2010). Due to competitive pressures and a relatively 
unrestricted contract space, the Health Insurance Exchanges (Exchanges) established by 
                                                        
1 In fact, in the US the Affordable Care Act (ACA) prohibits virtually all variation in health insurance 
premiums across consumers, forcing insurers to charge one price to all consumers, no matter their 
expected costs. 
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the ACA are likely to experience much more serious supply-side and demand-side 
selection problems than in other settings such as the employer and Medicare markets 
more typically studied in the literature. In fact, some recent research suggests the 
potential for complete market unraveling in an Exchange-like setting (Handel et al. 
2013). 
These selection problems are widely recognized among economists. However, 
with respect to the demand-side selection problems, the health economics literature has 
largely focused on only three solutions: restricting the contract space, subsidizing 
adversely selected plans, and allowing premiums to vary by expected cost (Cutler and 
Reber 1998, Einav et al. 2010, Bundorf et al. 2012, Geruso 2013, Handel et al. 2013). In 
this paper, I study an additional solution to the demand-side adverse selection problem: 
Risk adjustment. Risk adjustment has been implemented in some form in almost every 
individual health insurance market in the world, including the new state Exchanges.
2
 Risk 
adjustment transfers costs from plans that attract a relatively unhealthy mix of enrollees 
to plans that attract a relatively healthy mix of enrollees. It works by first using 
sophisticated algorithms to predict consumers’ health care costs and then reallocating 
premium revenues to plans based on those predicted costs, effectively pooling all costs 
that are predicted by the algorithm among all plans in a market. While it has long been 
recognized that risk adjustment has the potential to ameliorate insurers’ incentives to 
engage in cream-skimming by inefficiently manipulating contracts to attract healthy 
                                                        
2 In the US, risk adjustment is used in some form in Medicare Advantage, Medicare Part D, the new 
state Health Insurance Exchanges, and many state Medicaid Managed Care programs. Risk 
adjustment is also used in some form in the health insurance markets of the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Germany, Israel, and Belgium. 
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enrollees (Glazer and McGuire 2000, Glazer and McGuire 2002, Brown et al. 2012, 
McGuire et al. 2013a, 2013b, Newhouse et al. 2013), the effect of risk adjustment on 
health plan pricing and consumer sorting across plans has been largely overlooked.
3
 
The importance of risk adjustment in the context of equilibrium pricing of health 
plans can be described with a simple observation: With no risk adjustment, in a 
competitive equilibrium each plan’s price is determined by the mix of consumers it 
enrolls; however, with perfect risk adjustment, where all costs are fully pooled across 
plans, each plan’s price no longer reflects the cost profile of its enrollees. In markets 
where some plans are adversely selected, this shift in prices could be quite large, and any 
large shift in prices is likely to result in consumers re-sorting across plans, affecting the 
overall level of efficiency in the market. In the first part of this paper, I develop a simple 
theoretical model to show how risk adjustment affects prices in a competitive 
equilibrium. The model shows that risk adjustment causes plan prices to reflect the 
portion of costs of each plan's enrollees that are not predicted by the risk adjustment 
model (“residual costs”), while the costs predicted by the model (“predicted costs”) are 
pooled across all plans. I then use a series of graphical representations, building on those 
presented in Einav et al. (2010) and Einav and Finkelstein (2011), to develop intuition for 
how risk adjustment affects and welfare. The intuition provided by these figures provides 
a major contribution of this paper. 
                                                        
3 A few notable recent papers beginning to explore this topic are Glazer, McGuire, and Shi (2013), Shi 
(2013), and Handel, Hendel, and Whinston (2013). Glazer, McGuire, and Shi (2013) derive a risk 
adjustment model that maximizes the fit of the payment system to costs while simultaneously 
inducing plans to set premiums in a welfare-maximizing way. Shi (2013) studies the interaction 
between risk adjustment and age-based premium variation in the context of an Exchange. Handel, 
Hendel, and Whinston (2013) study the tradeoff between adverse selection and reclassification risk 
in an Exchange and briefly introduce a form of perfect risk adjustment. 
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In practice, risk adjustment is imperfect and results in some portion of costs being 
pooled across plans. Risk adjustment policies differ not only in the proportion of costs 
that are pooled, but also in which costs are pooled. For example, demographic-based risk 
adjustment results in the pooling of individual costs that are predictable by consumer 
demographics. Diagnosis-based risk adjustment, on the other hand, results in the pooling 
of individual costs that are predictable by consumer diagnoses. Diagnosis-based risk 
adjustment can actually be broken down further into “prospective” and “concurrent” risk 
adjustment. Prospective risk adjustment results in the pooling of costs that are explained 
by diagnoses from the prior year, while concurrent risk adjustment results in the pooling 
of costs explained by diagnoses from the current year. The model and the graphical 
representation below show that the effect of a particular form of risk adjustment on 
equilibrium prices depends on the correlation between demand and the costs predicted by 
the risk adjustment model. Consider a case where individuals are required to choose one 
of two health plans, and one of the plans is adversely selected. In this case, if there is no 
correlation between demand and predicted costs, then there will be no difference between 
equilibrium prices and sorting with or without risk adjustment. However, if predicted 
costs are positively (negatively) correlated with demand for that plan, risk adjustment 
will cause the prices of the two plans to converge (diverge), resulting in more (fewer) 
consumers choosing the adversely selected plan. In many cases, if risk adjustment causes 
the prices to diverge and fewer consumers to choose the adversely selected plan, it will 
decrease welfare. This finding mimics for demand-side selection problems the finding of 
Brown et al. (2012) that imperfect risk adjustment can worsen supply-side selection 
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problems. The finding also implies that in order to accurately simulate competitive 
equilibria in health insurance markets with and without imperfect risk adjustment, the 
correlation between preferences and “predicted costs” must be taken into account along 
with the correlation between preferences and total costs used in previous studies (Glazer 
et al. 2013, Handel et al. 2013, Shi 2013). Preference heterogeneity presents the potential 
that these two correlations need not be identical.
4
 
In the second part of this paper, I investigate the efficiency consequences of plan 
risk adjustment empirically by estimating the joint distribution of demand, total costs, and 
predicted costs using administrative health insurance claims data from a large employer. 
Following the implications of the model, I allow for correlation between preferences and 
predicted costs along with correlation between preferences and total costs. For employees 
at this firm, I recover the joint distribution using a structural model of health insurance 
choice similar to other models in the literature (Cohen and Einav 2007, Handel 2013, 
Geruso 2013). I then use this distribution to simulate plan prices and consumer sorting 
under various forms of risk adjustment in the context of a Health Insurance Exchange 
where prices are set competitively and all consumers choose between a Bronze plan and a 
                                                        
4 In settings where plans are vertically differentiated and differ only in cost sharing, the correlation 
between demand and predicted costs is likely to be captured in the correlation between demand and 
total costs, making the joint distribution of demand and total costs somewhat adequate for 
simulation of equilibrium under risk adjustment. However, in horizontally differentiated settings 
similar to that studied by Bundorf et al. (2012), the relationship between preferences, total costs, and 
predicted costs is less clear, making estimation of this distribution more important. Additionally, as 
discussed below, when comparing risk adjustment models, the correlations between preferences, 
total costs, and the additional costs predicted by one model over another is what is important, and 
these correlations are not easy to predict ex-ante, again making estimation necessary. 
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Platinum plan.
5
 I use these simulations to compare efficiency with no risk adjustment and 
efficiency under a number of risk adjustment models that could potentially be used in the 
Exchanges.
6
 
I replicate the result of Handel et al. (2013) that with no risk adjustment, the 
market fully unravels, and all consumers enroll in the less comprehensive Bronze plan. 
Interestingly, I find that while demographic-based risk adjustment does weaken the 
relationship between demand and costs (i.e. flattens the incremental average cost curve), 
its effects are not large enough to undo market unraveling. However, diagnosis-based risk 
adjustment, similar to that being implemented in the Exchanges, eliminates much of the 
correlation between total costs and demand and almost fully undoes market unraveling, 
resulting in over 80% of market participants enrolling in the more comprehensive 
Platinum plan. Moreover, when risk adjustment is combined with reinsurance, as it is in 
the Exchanges, virtually all variation in plan costs across consumers is eliminated and 
close to 100% of the market enrolls in the Platinum plan. Welfare calculations indicate 
that the welfare consequences of risk adjustment in this setting are far from trivial, with 
risk adjustment improving welfare by over $800 per person, per year, or around 20% of 
                                                        
5 In the Exchanges, plans are divided into tiers based on their actuarial value. The tiers are called 
(from least to most comprehensive) Bronze, Silver, Gold, and Platinum. 
6 Risk adjustment models can largely be grouped into three categories: demographic, prospective, 
and concurrent. Demographic models use only age and gender to predict costs. Prospective and 
concurrent models use diagnosis groups from health insurance claims and, sometimes, utilization. 
Prospective models use variables from time t-1, while concurrent models use variables from time t, 
to predict costs in time t. The HHS-HCC model chosen by HHS for use in the Exchanges is a 
concurrent model. There is some controversy about this decision given that the concurrent variables 
are potentially more endogenous to spending than the prospective variables. 
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total health care costs among employees of the firm I study.
7
 Interestingly, I find that in 
both environments concurrent risk adjustment models, which explain a substantially 
larger portion of the variance in consumers' costs, result in only a slightly better 
equilibrium than prospective models, with incremental welfare gains of only $1-$10. I 
argue that this is due to the fact that the extra costs explained by concurrent models are 
not likely to be predictable, and therefore are not likely to be correlated with demand. 
These findings represent an important contribution to the literature on adverse 
selection in markets for health insurance. Risk adjustment, a policy meant to limit 
incentives for plans to cream-skim healthy enrollees, also has a large and important effect 
on equilibrium prices and sorting in competitive health insurance markets. In fact, in the 
setting studied here, it proves critical for the market to function efficiently. Additionally, 
when combined with reinsurance, market unraveling is completely undone. This suggests 
that risk adjustment may play a much more important role in these markets than was 
previously assumed and should be taken much more seriously among economists as a 
solution to not just supply-side selection problems, but also selection problems coming 
from the demand-side. These findings also suggest that because risk adjustment can 
almost completely undo market unraveling, it is unwise to ignore it in any empirical 
                                                        
7 This is a huge welfare improvement. It is worth noting that it is especially large compared to the 
calculations of welfare loss from adverse selection found elsewhere in the literature (Cutler and 
Reber 1998, Einav et al. 2010, Geruso 2013). It is important to note, however, that in all of these 
other settings, the plans consumers were choosing from were quite similar in terms of cost sharing. 
Here, the plans have huge differences in cost sharing, reflecting the huge differences in cost sharing 
found across tiers in the Exchanges. Simulations with plan options that are more similar to the 
options available in the settings studied in other papers found welfare results similar to the results 
from those papers, suggesting that if the estimated structural demand and cost parameters from 
those papers were used to study the Bronze-Platinum setting studied here, they would find similar 
results. 
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study of the markets where it is being used, such as Medicare Part D and the Exchanges, 
as it is likely to have large and important effects on plan pricing. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model of a 
competitive health insurance market with risk adjustment and presents the graphical 
framework to provide intuition for the relationship risk adjustment, prices, and sorting, 
focusing on the importance of the correlation between demand and predicted and residual 
costs. Sections 3 discusses the data used for estimation. Section 4 outlines the structural 
empirical model used to the joint distribution of demand, total costs, and predicted costs. 
Section 5 presents the results of the simulations of equilibrium under risk adjustment, and 
Section 6 concludes. 
Section 2: Theoretical Framework 
 The model I develop in this paper builds on those developed in Einav et al. 
(2010a) and Bundorf et al. (2012). The key innovation is that total costs are divided into 
two components: predicted costs and residual costs. In the model individuals are required 
to choose one of two insurance contracts. Everyone faces the same price for each 
contract. One of the contracts provides enhanced coverage (contract E) and the other 
provides basic coverage (contract B). As in Bundorf et al. (2012), consumers are 
distinguished by their health risk,  , and preferences,  . Let           represent consumer 
 ’s valuation of plan   in dollars, so that            
          
         represent 
consumer  ’s willingness-to-pay for Plan E over Plan B. Let   represent the difference in 
the price for Plan E and the price for Plan B. Therefore, individual   chooses to purchase 
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Plan E if and only if            . This leads to the following demand for Plan E and 
Plan B where N equals the total number of individuals in the population: 
                          
              
where        is the joint distribution of health risk and preferences and      is equal to 
one if the argument between the parentheses is true and zero otherwise. 
 Next, I describe how plans set  . First, let        represent the expected monetary 
cost to plan   of enrolling an individual with health risk   . Second, assume that insurers 
set prices in perfect competition. While this is not likely the case in my empirical setting 
where the employer is able to arbitrarily set employee contributions, it is a convenient 
benchmark and potentially a good description of the Exchanges. In competition, insurers 
will set prices equal to average cost. Therefore, I describe the average costs of plans E 
and B as follows: 
        [                 ] 
        [                 ] 
In equilibrium, the premium differential   will then be equal to the difference between E 
and B’s average costs:8 
                        
The expressions show that two factors cause the premium differential,   , to vary. To see 
the first factor, let us assume that the individuals enrolling in Plan E and Plan B are 
                                                        
8 It is possible that such a premium will not exist. In this case, as shown in Handel et al. (2013) in 
equilibrium all individuals will enroll in Plan B if        is always greater than   for all values of   
and in Plan E if        is always less than   for all values of   in the population. In these cases    
will be equal to        and       , respectively. 
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identical. Now, if the cost to Plan E from enrolling individual   is different from the cost 
to Plan B from enrolling the same individual, i.e.         
     ,  
  will reflect that 
cost difference. Plan costs for enrolling the same individual could differ for a variety of 
reasons including differences in plan generosity, moral hazard, administrative costs, etc. 
To see the second factor, let us now assume the cost to Plan E from enrolling individual   
is identical to the cost to Plan B from enrolling the same individual, i.e.         
     . 
Now, if the individuals enrolling in Plan E and Plan B are identical, the average cost for 
each plan will also be identical, and     . However, if the individuals enrolling in Plan 
E are sicker (and thus higher cost) than the individuals enrolling in Plan B, Plan E's 
average cost will be larger than Plan B's and the premium differential will be positive, 
    . Thus, in addition to reflecting differences in plan costs,    also reflects the 
relationship between demand for E and total individual health care costs. It is precisely 
this relationship between price and the correlation between demand and total costs that 
results in adverse selection. 
Section 2.0.1: Risk Adjustment 
I now augment the model by adding risk adjustment. To incorporate these policies into 
my model, I first introduce the concept of a “risk score.” Risk adjustment starts with by a 
regulator choosing a set of variables to predict market enrollees' total costs. These 
variables often include indicators for age-by-gender cells and groups of diagnoses. Each 
of these variables is assigned a weight. The weights are assigned via a linear regression of 
current costs on the chosen set of variables in a large sample of individuals. The weights 
are combined with information on the market enrollees’ actual experience to produce 
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individual-level risk scores,   , for each enrollee.
9
 Risk adjustment is then implemented 
through a series of plan-specific transfers dictated by some variant of the following 
formula: 
      (
 ̅ 
 ̅
  )  ̅ 
In formula  ̅  represents the average risk score of plan  ’s enrollees,  ̅ is the average risk 
score of all enrollees in the market, and  ̅ is the average premium in the market.10 The 
formula ensures that the transfers will be budget neutral and that plans with higher 
average risk scores receive positive transfers, lowering their average cost, and plans with 
lower average risk scores receive negative transfers, raising their average cost. 
 The formula can also be translated into individual transfers. Effectively, for 
individual   plan   receives a transfer from the regulator equal to 
  
 ̅
 ̅ and pays the 
regulator  ̅. With these risk adjustment transfers, the residual plan cost, or plan cost net 
of risk adjustment, from enrolling individual   is a function of both total cost risk,  , and 
the risk score,  , and is defined as 
                                                        
9 For simplicity, I assume that an individual's risk score is invariant to his choice of plan. In the 
Exchanges, this is actually not the case. Risk scores are explicitly different for different plan tiers, 
with risk scores being systematically higher in plans with higher actuarial values. This is due to the 
fact that HHS estimated different models for each tier, assuming that in different tiers, plans cover 
different portions of total costs. I do not account for this possibility in the model, but I do use the HHS 
risk scores that vary across plans in the simulations of the HHS risk adjustment model. Risk scores 
could also vary across plans due to coding differences across plans (Geruso and Layton 2014). For 
simplicity, I abstract from this type of risk score variation here. 
10 Note that all of these values other than the market average risk score are functions of   because 
they will change as   changes and consumers re-sort across plans. Additionally, note that here (and 
in the Exchanges) transfers depend on average plan risk scores rather than average plan costs as 
they do in Handel et al. (2013). 
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 ̅
 ̅   ̅
          
        
 
where   
         are the costs not predicted by the risk adjustment model (“residual 
costs”) and   
         
  
 ̅
 ̅   ̅ are the costs explained by the risk adjustment model 
(“predicted costs”).11 This implies that average costs for Plan E can now be rewritten as 
    
      [  
                ] 
And for contract B 
    
      [  
                ] 
This implies the following new premium differential 
    [  
                ]   [  
                ] 
 As before,    reflects differences in the cost to Plan E from enrolling individual   
and the cost to Plan B from enrolling the same individual. However, whereas before    
also reflected the relationship between demand for Plan E and total individual health care 
costs, it now reflects only the relationship between demand and residual individual health 
care costs. Thus, if only the 10-15% of costs explained by risk adjustment model are 
correlated with demand while the residual costs are totally independent of demand, risk 
adjustment will cause    to no longer be affected by the relationship between demand 
and individual health care costs. In this case, even though under risk adjustment only 10-
15% of costs are pooled, the price differential will reflect only differences in plan costs. 
More formally, if residual costs do not vary with         there will be no relationship 
                                                        
11 Note that it is entirely possible that predicted costs exceed total costs,   
          
     . This 
could happen if the risk adjustment model over-predicts an individual’s costs. 
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between the premium differential and costs, and the equilibrium premium differential    
simplifies to 
        [  
      ]   [  
      ] 
the difference between the average cost of the entire population in Plan E and the average 
cost of the entire population in Plan B, or the average incremental cost for the entire 
population. More generally, if residual costs are less (more) strongly correlated with 
demand than are total costs,    will be smaller (larger) with risk adjustment than without. 
While it may seem impossible for residual costs to be more strongly correlated with 
demand than are total costs, heterogeneity in   makes this entirely possible. This would 
occur in a setting where the average total cost of Plan E is relatively higher than the 
average total cost of Plan B, but Plan B has a higher relative risk score than Plan E. The 
intuition for this concept will hopefully be made clearer in the figures in the next section. 
For now I suggest that the concept is similar to that described in Finkelstein and McGarry 
(2006) where preference heterogeneity can cause advantageous selection rather than 
adverse selection. Here, there are also multiple dimensions of cost, and preference 
heterogeneity can cause there to be adverse selection on total costs but advantageous 
selection on predicted costs, resulting in a stronger relationship between demand and 
residual costs than demand and total costs, and causing adverse selection to be worse 
with risk adjustment than without. Even if preference heterogeneity is not strong enough 
to cause risk adjustment to worsen adverse selection, it is clearly important to take 
correlations between preferences and predicted costs into account when simulating 
equilibria with risk adjustment. 
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Section 2.0.2: Efficiency 
Efficiency requires that an individual enroll in Plan E if and only if her willingness-to-
pay for Plan E over Plan B exceeds the incremental social cost of enrolling her: 
                  
       
     . Note that risk adjustment does not affect the 
efficiency criteria. This is because the social cost of enrolling individual   in plan    is 
invariant to any transfers of costs across plans: Individual   will always cost the market 
more in Plan E than in Plan B. Risk adjustment just changes how those costs are 
distributed across plans in the market. 
Recall that individuals sort across plans according to their willingness-to-pay, 
      . At the same time, efficiency requires them to sort according to their incremental 
marginal cost,      . It is important to note that in this environment whether there is risk 
adjustment or not, there is only one tool to induce sorting, and thus affect welfare: the 
uniform price differential,  . Risk adjustment affects efficiency by altering the 
equilibrium value of  , thus causing market participants to re-sort between plans. As 
noted above, the direction of this re-sorting depends on the correlation between demand 
and predicted costs. The welfare consequences of this re-sorting depends on the joint 
distribution of           and      ).
12
 
                                                        
12 In addition to making it unclear how risk adjustment will affect sorting, the potential for 
preference heterogeneity also makes it unclear ex-ante what optimal sorting looks like (Bundorf et al. 
2012). However, a treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of the paper. Instead, I just suggest that 
the effect of risk adjustment on welfare is unclear ex-ante. A thorough study of risk adjustment in 
such an environment is a promising and interesting direction for future research. 
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Section 2.1 Graphical Description 
In order to provide intuition for how risk adjustment affects equilibrium prices 
and sorting, I now describe the theoretical model developed above in a series of figures. 
Assume, again, that all individuals must choose one of two plans. Plan E is more 
comprehensive than Plan B but there is no moral hazard.
13
 The right panel of Figure 1.1A 
replicates Figure 1 of Einav et al. (2010). The x-axis describes enrollment in Plan E with 
enrollment increasing to the right. The y-axis describes  , the difference between the 
premium of Plan E and the premium of Plan B. This figure describes the “textbook” case 
of adverse selection. The demand curve lies everywhere above the incremental marginal 
cost curve, implying all individuals value Plan E more than their incremental marginal 
cost of enrolling in Plan E, or in other words it is optimal for everyone to enroll in Plan E. 
This could be due to risk aversion or some other preferences. Additionally, the 
incremental average and marginal cost curves are downward sloping, implying that Plan 
E is adversely selected. 
The competitive equilibrium will be at Point A, where the demand curve crosses 
the incremental average cost curve. However, because all individuals value Plan E more 
than their incremental cost, efficiency requires that all individuals enroll in Plan E. This 
will only occur if   is set below Point B. This is the textbook adverse selection problem. 
                                                        
13 For these figures to be entirely accurate, consumers must be required to choose between Plan E 
and Plan B, but Plan B must actually provide no coverage at all (uninsurance) yet have a price equal 
to the average plan cost of the enrollees in Plan B. While in the typical case, this “premium” for Plan B 
would always be equal to zero, with risk adjustment transfers, it will be non-zero. While this case is 
not realistic, it is very convenient, and the intuition is generalizable to the case where Plan B does 
provide some level of coverage. 
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As shown in the model above, risk adjustment results in each plan's prices 
reflecting the residual costs rather than the total costs of its enrollees. In the right panel of 
Figure 1.1A, the incremental average cost curve reflects total costs. The left panel of 
Figure 1.1A breaks the incremental average cost curve into two curves representing 
incremental predicted and residual costs. Because total costs are equal to the sum of 
predicted and residual costs, the slope of the incremental total average cost curve,  , is 
the sum of the slope of the incremental predicted cost curve,   , and the incremental 
residual cost curve,           . The figure shows the slopes of the incremental 
average cost curve and the incremental predicted cost curve. In the case described in the 
figure, demand for Plan E is positively correlated with both predicted and residual costs, 
implying that Plan E will be adversely selected on both predicted and residual costs. Risk 
adjustment effectively sets     , by pooling these costs across plans. As in the model 
above, this implies that the slope of the incremental average risk adjusted cost curve is 
equal to the slope of the residual cost curve,       . This is shown in Figure 1.1B. The 
price differential no longer reflects the relationship between demand and predicted costs. 
Instead, the price only reflects the relationship between demand and residual costs. In this 
case, this results in a flatter incremental average risk adjusted cost curve, and a new 
competitive equilibrium emerges at Point C where the demand curve crosses the 
incremental average risk adjusted cost curve. In this new competitive equilibrium, with 
risk adjustment a larger portion of the individuals in the market enroll in Plan E, in this 
case implying improved efficiency.
14
 It is also clear that if    and    re both negative 
                                                        
14 It is not always optimal for more individuals to enroll in the more comprehensive plan. Preference 
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(i.e. predicted and residual costs are positively correlated with demand), risk adjustment 
will always result in a larger portion of the market enrolling in the more comprehensive 
plan. Figure 1.1C shows how the competitive equilibrium is affected by “perfect” risk 
adjustment, where total costs are perfectly predicted and pooled. It is interesting to note 
that in this case if      (the case where demand and residual costs are independent) 
imperfect risk adjustment will result in the same result as perfect risk adjustment. This 
suggests that the relevant metric for determining the effectiveness of a risk adjustment 
policy is not how well it explains total costs. Instead, it is most important for risk scores 
to explain the correlation between demand and total costs as fully as possible because as 
the relationship between predicted costs and total costs increases,    goes to zero. This 
suggests that risk adjustment models that explain additional costs that are unlikely to be 
correlated with demand (i.e. unpredictable acute costs) may be no better than models that 
do not explain such costs. 
 Figure 1.2A again describes the textbook case of adverse selection. However, in 
this case, while Plan E is still adversely selected on total costs, it is advantageously 
selected on predicted costs and adversely selected on residual costs. In this case    
      , and    . Figure 1.2B shows the effects of risk adjustment on equilibrium 
prices and sorting. Because      the incremental average risk adjusted cost curve is 
actually steeper than the incremental average cost curve. This results in fewer individuals 
                                                                                                                                                                     
heterogeneity and moral hazard or administrative costs can cause some individuals' incremental 
marginal cost to exceed their incremental willingness-to-pay (Einav and Finkelstein 2011, Bundorf et 
al. 2012). In this textbook case, however, the incremental willingness-to-pay of all individuals is 
assumed to exceed their incremental marginal cost, making it optimal for the entire market to enroll 
in the more comprehensive plan. 
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enrolling in Plan E, in this case causing the equilibrium to be less efficient. It is clear that 
if    is positive and large (i.e. predicted costs are strongly, negatively correlated with 
demand), risk adjustment can even lead to a complete unraveling of the market where 
everyone enrolls in Plan B. 
 While it may seem unlikely that there could be advantageous selection on pooled 
costs, there are plausible scenarios where this could occur. This is due to there being both 
multiple dimensions of “costs” and preferences. Consider the following example. 
Reinsurance, a policy that reimburses plans for the costs of high cost individuals, is a 
form of risk adjustment where predicted costs are the costs of individuals above the 
reinsurance threshold and residual costs are all other costs. Assume that reinsurance is 
implemented in a health insurance market, implying costs above the reinsurance cutoff 
are pooled. Let there be two types of individuals: Risky and safe. Risky individuals value 
more comprehensive insurance less than safe individuals. They are also more likely to 
engage in risky activities such as snowboarding or rock climbing that result in large acute 
health care costs. Safe individuals value more comprehensive insurance more than risky 
individuals. Let’s also assume that safe individuals tend to go to the doctor a lot due to a 
mild case of hypochondria. In this example, the costs of the safe individuals will be 
moderately high but not high enough to trigger reinsurance payments. The costs of risky 
individuals will be very low for most but extremely high for a few individuals who incur 
large acute costs due to their risky behaviors. These large payments will trigger 
reinsurance payments. In this example, the average cost of safe individuals will likely be 
much higher than the average cost of risky individuals. Safe individuals will also be more 
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likely to enroll in the comprehensive plan, implying that the comprehensive plan is 
adversely selected on total costs. However, because safe individuals are much less likely 
than risky individuals to incur costs high enough to trigger reinsurance payments, the 
comprehensive plan will be advantageously selected on predicted costs. This case will be 
similar to the one described in Figure 1.2, and risk adjustment will fewer rather than more 
individuals to choose the adversely selected and more comprehensive plan. Risk 
adjustment models that predict only acute costs would produce a similar outcome in this 
setting. 
 This case also illustrates why when risk adjustment is imperfect some payment 
models may be better than others, and why better “fit” does not always imply higher 
welfare. Consider the case of two risk adjustment models, Model A and Model B. Under 
Model A (Model B), predicted and residual costs are described as            and 
            (            and           ), respectively. Now, assume that Model A 
explains all of the costs explained by Model B, plus an additional portion of costs, i.e. 
                                and                               . This 
implies that Model A “fits” total costs better than Model B in the r-squared sense so that 
∑           
  ∑           
 
  . Now, the slope of the incremental average cost curve 
can be described as the sum of either the slopes of Model A's incremental predicted and 
residual cost curves or Model B's incremental predicted and residual cost curves: 
                 . Additionally, the slope of Model A's incremental 
residual cost curve can be described as the difference of the slope of Model B's residual 
cost curve and the slope of the curve describing the additional costs explained by Model 
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A:           . This implies that the incremental average risk adjusted cost curve 
will be equal to                 under Model A and          under 
Model B, and the difference in the slope of the incremental average risk adjusted cost 
curves under Model A and under Model B will be equal to    . This implies that if 
     (    ), the incremental average cost curve will be flatter under Model A 
(Model B). Thus, in order to compare two models, again the portion of total costs 
explained by the model, or the “fit” of the model, is not the relevant metric. Instead, it is 
the correlation between demand and the additional costs that are explained by Model A 
that determines whether Model A results a flatter incremental average risk adjusted cost 
curve and additional enrollment in the adversely selected plan. In the textbook case, if 
those additional costs are positively correlated with demand (i.e.     ), then Model A 
will result in a more efficient equilibrium than Model B, and if they are negatively 
correlated with demand, Model B will result in a more efficient equilibrium than Model 
A. 
 An environment in which Model A has a better fit and yet      is not at all 
implausible. Consider the comparison of prospective and concurrent risk adjustment 
models. In general, prospective models explain chronic costs (Model B) and concurrent 
models explain chronic costs and acute costs (Model A).
15
 Here,          represents acute 
costs, and      implies adverse selection on acute costs and      implies 
                                                        
15 Recall that prospective models are estimated by regressing costs in year t on diagnoses from year 
t-1 and concurrent models are estimated by regressing costs in year t on diagnoses from year t. This 
implies that prospective models are likely to explain costs that are predictable from year to year 
(chronic costs) and concurrent models are likely to explain costs that are explainable by diagnoses 
(chronic and acute costs) 
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advantageous selection on acute costs. If the same assumptions hold as in the reinsurance 
example above to make more comprehensive plans advantageously selected on acute 
costs, then in this case      and concurrent risk adjustment will lead to a steeper 
incremental average risk adjusted cost curve and a fewer individuals enrolling in the 
adversely selected plan, despite concurrent models achieving substantially better fit. 
Perhaps more likely, if      (i.e. demand is unrelated to acute costs) prospective and 
concurrent risk adjustment will result in identical equilibrium sorting, prices, and welfare, 
despite the concurrent model explaining much more of the variance in total costs than the 
prospective model. In the empirical part of this paper, I show that it is in fact the case that 
the extra costs explained by concurrent models are relatively uncorrelated with demand. 
 Even if more comprehensive plans are adversely selected on both pooled and non-
pooled costs as in Figure 1.1, in practice, the assumptions of the textbook case may not 
hold. For example, it is likely that there will be moral hazard, implying that it may not be 
efficient for all individuals to enroll in the more comprehensive plan. Costs may also 
differ across plans for other reasons such as differences in administrative costs. There 
may also be preference heterogeneity (Glazer and McGuire 2011; Bundorf et al. 2012; 
Geruso 2013). In all of these cases the explanation of how risk adjustment affects prices 
and sorting given here will remain true: If predicted costs are positively (negatively) 
correlated with demand, risk adjustment will result in more (fewer) individuals choosing 
the adversely selected plan. However, the efficiency consequences of this re-sorting of 
individuals across plans may be different because in some of these cases it may not be 
optimal for all individuals to enroll in the more comprehensive plan. This will be 
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especially important in cases where plans are horizontally differentiated as in Bundorf et 
al. (2012). I also point out that while the Figures 1.1 and 1.2 may not be fully realistic, 
they make clear the concept that in order to simulate competitive equilibria with risk 
adjustment, one needs to take into account not just the correlation between demand and 
total cost, but also the correlation between and predicted costs. As discussed above, due 
to potential preference heterogeneity, these two correlations need not be identical This is 
a new concept that has not previously be recognized.
16
 In the next section I use data from 
a large employer to recover this joint distribution and then simulate equilibria under 
different forms of risk adjustment. 
Section 3: Data and Setting 
 I estimate the joint distribution of preferences, total costs, and predicted costs 
using data from a large employer in the Truven Marketscan Database during 2006-07.
17
 
During this period, the firm offered its employees a choice of two PPO plans: a basic plan 
(Plan B) and a more comprehensive, enhanced plan (Plan E). Around 50,000 employees 
                                                        
16 It seems apparent that similar to the figures in Einav et al. (2010), the figures here show that the 
demand and cost curves, along with the predicted and residual cost curves, present sufficient 
statistics for the welfare analysis of plan risk pooling policies. The only assumptions that have to be 
made are that individuals’ choices reflect their preferences and that plan behavior is not a function of 
plan risk adjustment (i.e. there is no upcoding or alterations of the set of contracts offered). In 
environments where risk adjustment is already being used, given exogenous variation in prices, 
along with data on plan average costs, enrollment, and average risk scores, these curves can all be 
estimated relatively easily. In environments where risk adjustment is not being used, given 
additional data on individual level insurance claims, predicted and residual cost curves for different 
counterfactual plan risk pooling policies can be estimated, and the welfare consequences of the 
counterfactual policies can be calculated. However, the potential for large changes in equilibrium 
prices and sorting suggests that the assumptions of linear demand and cost curves, while likely valid 
locally, may be invalid in this context. This will become apparent in the empirical exercise below. An 
additional issue with this estimation strategy is that the incremental average cost curve shown in the 
figure is not the relevant curve for finding the equilibrium price when Plan B offers greater than zero 
coverage. 
17 This is the same employer used by Geruso (2013). 
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enrolled in these plans during the time period, along with 76,000 dependents. For all 
individuals in the data, I observe their plan choice and administrative health insurance 
claims for each year during which they enroll in a plan. As is common in this type of 
data, I do not observe employees who choose not to enroll in a plan. Fortunately, due to 
the high subsidies offered by employers and the market failures present in the individual 
market, less than 20% of individuals forgo coverage offered to them by their employer 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2013). 
 In order to simplify estimation, I limit the sample in the following ways. First, I 
only include employees who enroll no dependents. This permits me to avoid issues 
stemming from combining each family member’s distribution of costs, without really 
taking away from the simulations of the effects of risk adjustment. Perhaps more 
importantly, it also allows me to avoid making assumptions about the family structure of 
the employee premium contribution which is not available in the data. Second, I only 
include each employee’s choice from 2007. In order to estimate switching costs, I require 
information on each employee’s prior plan. This requirement implies that I cannot use 
choices from 2006.
18
 Third, I limit the sample to employees who are enrolled for the full 
365 days of 2006 and 2007. As described below, in order to estimate each employee’s 
distribution of expected out-of-pocket costs, I require information on utilization and 
diagnoses from the year prior to plan choice. If this information is incomplete, the 
                                                        
18 Data from this firm are present in the Marketscan database for 2005 and 2008. However, in 2005, 
employees are offered more than just these two plans and it is not entirely clear that the plans are 
consistent from year-to-year. This raises concerns about my ability to estimate switching costs 
accurately using 2006 choices, so I leave the 2006 choices out. For 2008, estimation results seem to 
indicate that my estimates of the employee contribution to the premium were fairly inaccurate, 
skewing some of the results. Implausibly large estimates of switching costs in 2008 (higher than 
$5,000) also caused concern. For these reasons, I also leave out choices from 2008. 
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estimates of future costs will be biased.
19
 Finally, I drop any employee not enrolled in the 
first month of 2007 and any employee who changed plans in the middle of 2007. 
 The left columns of Table 1.1 shows observed characteristics of the employees in 
the sample. I note that the Marketscan database includes minimal demographic 
information about the employees in order to protect the privacy of Truven's clients. The 
average age among the employees in my sample is around 42, and 60% of the employees 
are male. About 10% of the individuals in the sample are defined as “new” employees, 
meaning they were not enrolled in a plan during 2006. As discussed below, this will be 
important for estimating switching costs. The average total annual health care costs 
among the employees in the sample is around $4,000. 
 The two PPO plans offered by this employer differ only in cost sharing, and the 
contracts remained constant throughout the sample period. The cost-sharing parameters 
of each plan are found in left columns of Table 1.2. For medical costs, Plan E has a lower 
deductible, coinsurance rate, and out-of-pocket maximum. With respect to other costs 
from ER visits and prescription drugs, cost sharing is identical in the two plans.
20
 The 
main differences between the plans are the cost sharing parameters for medical claims 
and the plan premiums. Unfortunately, neither the premiums nor the employee 
                                                        
19 As discussed below, in order to estimate switching costs, I require the presence of new enrollees 
who were not previously enrolled in a plan. Therefore, I do include enrollees not enrolled at all 
during the prior year. For these new enrollees, the distribution of expected out-of-pocket costs is 
estimated using information on utilization and diagnoses from the current year, so I require that they 
remain enrolled for all 365 days of the current year. This implies that the condition for remaining in 
the sample is that the enrollee be enrolled for either 365 days of the prior year and one month of the 
current year (to allow me to observe plan choice) or 365 days of the current year. 
20 All of these parameters apply only to providers in the plan’s network. Claims from out-of-network 
providers are covered much less generously. However, there are very few of these claims, and they 
are not consistently and clearly identified, so I largely ignore them here. 
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contribution to the premiums are available in the data. Because the employee contribution 
is a critical piece of the empirical model described below, I follow Kowalski (2013) and 
Geruso (2013) and estimate the contribution from the data. I discuss the estimation 
process in the following section. Here I just note that while it may seem quite difficult to 
estimate the employee contribution, most employers follow a rule that bases premiums 
for year   on average costs in each plan in year    . I observe the universe of claims 
from year    , so I can calculate premiums according to this rule. Additionally, I note 
that for the sake of the empirical model, all that matters is the difference in employee 
contributions for Plan E and Plan B, not their actual values. This makes the estimation of 
contributions easier because certain unobserved costs such as the administrative load will 
likely be the same for the two plans. 
Section 3.1 Cost Model Sample 
 In order to estimate the choice model discussed below, I need to construct an 
estimate of each individual’s distribution of expected costs. As discussed in Section 4.2.3 
below, estimation of this distribution is likely to be more accurate with a larger dataset. 
Because the firm sample is relatively small, in order to estimate the cost model I augment 
the sample using data on 845,000 additional individuals from the Marketscan Database to 
form the cost model sample. The cost model sample consists of a random sample from 
the sample of all individuals in Marketscan from 2006-07 enrolled in a PPO plan for at 
least 300 days of year   and year    . The characteristics of the cost model sample are 
found in column 4 of Table 1.1. While the means of the variables in the table differ for 
these two samples, as discussed below, the ranges of risk scores and ages are more 
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relevant for comparing the samples. Additionally, the cost model sample will be validated 
by comparing costs predicted by the cost model to actual costs among the employees in 
the sample. 
Section 4: Empirical Model 
 As discussed above, in order to simulate equilibrium prices and sorting under risk 
adjustment, I require the joint distribution of demand, total costs, and predicted costs. In 
this section, I will discuss how I recover each component of this distribution. 
Section 4.1: Total Costs and Predicted Costs 
 Because my data include the universe of health insurance claims for each 
individual in the sample, I observe total costs. I also observe predicted costs in the data. 
As discussed above, predicted costs are the costs explained by individuals' risk scores. 
Risk scores are assigned using the following formula: 
       
   represents a vector of “risk adjusters,” or variables that describe an individual’s health 
status.   represents a vector of risk adjustment weights. Different risk adjustment models 
use different groups of variables. The models I use in the simulations include dummy 
variables for age-by-sex cells and a set of 394 “Hierarchical Condition Categories,” or 
HCCs developed by Verisk Health. HCCs indicate whether an individual has one of 394 
health conditions that have an effect on medical costs. They are groups of diagnoses and 
are based on health insurance claims. When the diagnoses are from the prior (current) 
year, the model is referred to as a “prospective” (“concurrent”) model. HCCs are also 
used in the models developed by HHS and CMS for the Federal Exchange, Medicare 
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Advantage, and Medicare Part D. In addition to the Verisk models, I also simulate 
equilibria under the HHS-HCC model being implemented in the Exchanges. The HHS-
HCC model is a concurrent model. 
 The risk adjustment weights,  , are estimated using a large sample of insurance 
claims from the Marketscan database. First, total annual costs,   , are regressed on the 
risk adjusters: 
          
The coefficients from the regression,  ̂, are then normalized by dividing by the average 
cost in the estimation sample:   
 ̂
 ̅
. This implies that an individual who would be 
predicted to have average costs in the estimation sample will be assigned a risk score of 
1.0. 
 In practice, individuals are assigned HCCs using diagnoses from their health 
insurance claims. Because I observe the health insurance claims for each employee in my 
sample, I also observe their HCCs. I calculate each individual's risk score by combining 
these HCCs with the pre-estimated weights for the Verisk and HHS-HCC risk adjustment 
models. The critical assumption here is that individuals would receive the same diagnoses 
in a setting with or without risk adjustment.
21
 
                                                        
21 This assumption would be violated if plans respond to risk adjustment by “upcoding” or by 
increasing utilization in order to increase the number of diagnoses and thus extract a larger risk 
adjustment transfer (see Geruso and Layton (2014) for an example of this in Medicare). While this 
type of behavior is likely, it is unlikely that it would dramatically alter individuals' risk scores and the 
joint distribution estimated here. Additionally, if plans are identical and all individuals are equally 
“upcode-able,” upcoding will result in the market average risk score increasing in tandom with the 
plan average risks scores. Because risk adjustment transfers are based on normalized risk scores, 
this would result in precisely the same normalized risk scores as the setting with no upcoding. 
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Section 4.2 Demand 
 While employees' costs can be observed in the data, demand is unobservable and 
must be estimated. Conceivably, demand could be non-parametrically estimated by 
observing how employees respond to an exogenous shift in plan prices (Einav et al. 
2010). However, because there is no variation in prices in my data, in order to estimate 
preferences, I must specify a structural model of health plan choice and use the model to 
estimate demand using a method similar to that used in Cohen and Einav (2007). 
Fortunately, the two plans at the firm I study are vertically differentiated in that they 
differ only in cost sharing, making the assumption that the structural model fully 
characterizes the employees' choices more easily justified. I start by assuming that 
employees make choices based on the following Von-Neuman Morgenstern expected 
utility function: 
               (                 )     
Four variables enter into the employee’s utility function:         , employee  ’s 
distribution of expected out-of-pocket costs if enrolled in plan  ;  , employee  ’s 
wealth;   , plan  ’s premium; and          an indicator for whether employee   was 
enrolled in plan   during the previous period. The additional factor affecting individual 
choice is the shape of   . I assume that employees' preferences follow the constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) formulation. Let    represent the ex-post consumption 
level of individual  . The CARA assumption implies that 
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The shape of each individual's CARA utility function is defined by her coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion,   , with larger values of    implying higher levels of risk aversion. 
I define   as follows: 
                                
The employee's consumption is a function of initial wealth, the plan premium, expected 
out-of-pocket costs, a switching cost incurred if the employee chooses a different plan in 
year   than in year    , and an i.i.d. preference shock,     , with mean    and variance 
  
 .
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 Because the two plans employees of the firm can choose between vary only in their 
financial characteristics, I argue that this specification comes quite close to fully 
characterizing employee choice. With all of the components of this model, I can 
determine each individual's choice of plan under different levels of the price differential 
from the model above  . This will allow me to determine each individual's demand for 
Plan E, the third component of the joint distribution required for simulation of 
competitive equilibria with risk adjustment. As most of the components of the model are 
unobserved, they require some form of estimation. I now discuss how I estimate each 
component. 
Section 4.2.1: Plan Premiums:    
As discussed above, the data do not include any information about the employee 
contribution to the premium so I must estimate it. Most employers follow a simple 
pricing rule based on the average cost of individuals enrolled in a plan during the prior 
year (see Handel (2013) and Geruso (2013)). I assume that for the firm I study, the 
                                                        
22 The assumption of CARA utility makes   irrelevant, implying no income effects. 
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premiums for employees without dependents are equal to the average cost of the 
employees enrolled in each plan during the prior year plus some loading factor,   
  
     
   . I calculate      
 
 using the claims data from the prior year. I then assume that 
the employer sets the employee contributions equal to 20% of the full premium of each 
plan (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013). Note that for estimation of the choice model it is 
not important for the premiums of each plan to be accurately estimated. Instead, it is just 
important that the premium differential   be correct. Given the assumptions, this 
premium differential is: 
            
       
   
To address the possibility that    is incorrectly estimated, I also include a plan specific 
intercept for Plan E in    . Because all individuals pay the same prices, This intercept will 
capture both any idiosyncratic preference for Plan E and any bias in the estimate of  . 
Section 4.2.2: Switching Costs:    
 There is extensive empirical evidence that individuals face substantial switching 
costs when choosing to move between health plans (Sinaiko and Hirth 2011, Handel 
2013, Polyakova 2013). There are many reasons for this phenomenon such as the time 
and hassle costs of researching a new plan and switching, attachment to a network of 
providers, or just pure inattention or laziness.
23
 Here, the source of the switching cost is 
unimportant. It is included in the model to allow simulation of equilibrium sorting where 
all individuals face an active choice, as in the first year of operation of the Exchanges. In 
order to separate switching costs from persistent heterogeneity in preferences, I follow 
                                                        
23 See Handel (2013) for a thorough discussion of potential sources of inertia. 
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Handel and Kolstad (2013) by exploiting the fact that some employees in the data were 
not previously enrolled in a plan. While I do not observe why these enrollees are 
enrolling for the first time, I know that they should not face a switching cost when 
making their choice. To account for observable differences between new and old 
enrollees, I allow   to vary with observable demographic characteristics. Specifically, I 
assume that 
                       
Effectively, I compare the choices of new and old enrollees with similar demographics 
and cost risk to estimate the switching costs. 
 As discussed above, this    is identified by comparing the choices of new and old 
enrollees. If these enrollees are identical with respect to any relevant unobserved 
characteristics, then the differences in the patterns of their choices identify the size of the 
switching cost. If there is no switching cost, then the choices should be similar. However, 
if there are switching costs, individuals previously enrolled in Plan E should be more 
likely to choose Plan E than otherwise identical individuals not previously enrolled in 
either plan. The important assumptions here are that new and old enrollees are similar 
with respect to unobserved variables that affect risk preferences and that there is 
sufficient variation in the observed characteristics (age and gender) among the new 
enrollees such that there is a new enrollee similar to every old enrollee. Columns 2 and 3 
of Table 1.1 show that while the mean age is lower among the new enrollees, the range of 
the ages of new enrollees is almost identical to that of old enrollees. 
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Out-of-Pocket Cost Distributions:          
As discussed, the model requires an estimate of each employee’s distribution of 
expected out-of-pocket costs in each plan,          . I construct this distribution directly 
from data in the cost model sample described above. To obtain a distribution of expected 
total costs for each employee, I first divide the full Marketscan sample into cells of 
employees with similar health status in year    . The cells are based on predictive 
measures of each individual’s medical cost risk generated by sophisticated predictive 
modeling software developed by Verisk Health and used by health insurers and large 
employer to predict the costs of their enrollees.
24
 The software uses information such as 
diagnoses and utilization found in insurance claims data from year     to generate 
individual-level medical risk scores,   , describing each individual’s medical cost risk in 
year  . These risk scores are different from the risk scores used for risk adjustment 
described above. The risk adjustment risk scores are based only on information about 
diagnoses and demographics. The medical risk scores used here are based on the entire 
set of information available in the health insurance claims. This includes past utilization 
and spending in addition to the diagnoses and demographics used to generate the risk 
adjustment risk scores. In order to ensure that the estimates of each employee's cost 
distributions are as precise as possible, I split the sample into 1,000 cells based on 
medical cost risk. To ease computation, I take a random sample of 1,000 individuals from 
each medical cost risk cell. For all of the individuals in a given cell, I fit a lognormal 
                                                        
24 I note that I sort individuals into cells based only on predictions of medical cost risk and not 
predictions of prescription drug cost risk because the plans do not vary with respect to cost-sharing 
for prescription drugs, making those costs irrelevant to the employee's choice. I do, however, 
incorporate predictions of prescription drug costs in the counterfactual simulations below. 
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distribution with a point mass at zero to the actual medical costs of the individuals in the 
cell in year   and allow the lognormal parameters to vary with age and gender. The 
lognormal parameters plus the point mass at zero fully describe the estimates of each 
employee's distribution of expected medical costs. I then use the simple cost-sharing rules 
for each plan to map each employee's expected total medical costs to expected out-of-
pocket costs to form         .
25
 
 I use the cost model sample rather than the smaller choice model sample to 
construct          because there is a tradeoff between cell size and the number of cells. 
With a larger number of cells I capture more of the private information about individuals’ 
future costs. However, larger cells necessarily imply fewer individuals in each cell, 
resulting in less accurate estimation of the parameters describing         . Using the 
larger cost model sample avoids this tradeoff by increasing the total number of 
individuals in the sample. The cost of using the cost model sample rather than the choice 
model sample to estimate          is the requirement of an additional assumption: 
Individuals in the cost model sample and the choice model sample are similar with 
respect to any relevant variables not used to form the cells. Given the large amount of 
sophisticated information used to form the cells and the large number of cells, I argue that 
this assumption is reasonable. Additionally, in Table 1.1 I show that the range of risk 
scores is similar for the cost model and estimation samples, implying that there are 
                                                        
25 As mentioned above, there is no cost-sharing for ER and preventive visits. Because the prediction 
software predicts total medical risk, rather than medical risk other than ER and preventive visits, I 
cannot separately predict an employee's use of these services. Instead, I ignore the fact that they are 
priced differently and combine them with other medical spending. In practice, these services make 
up a relatively small portion of spending and have a small impact on inferences about the 
distribution of         . 
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similar individuals in the samples. Table 1.1 also shows that for the estimation and 
simulation samples the average expected cost produced by the cost model is quite similar 
to the average realized cost among employees in the sample, implying that the estimates 
are not systematically biased. 
Risk Preferences:    
Each individual's coefficient of absolute risk aversion,   , is the final component 
of the choice model. I estimate this parameter as follows. Because the two plans available 
to the employees in my sample differ only in cost sharing, if the employees are all risk 
neutral and          and    are known, their optimal choices can easily be recovered by 
calculating the mean of each employee’s distribution of expected costs in each plan, 
adding that mean to each plan’s premium, and then comparing the two sums. Whichever 
plan has the lower total cost (premium plus out-of-pocket costs) would be the optimal 
choice. Call this choice the risk-neutral optimal choice. The intuition behind the 
identification of    is that under the assumption that          is observed, an employee’s 
deviation from the risk-neutral optimal choice describes her level of risk aversion (Cohen 
and Einav 2007). For example, if an employee faces higher total cost in Plan B than in 
Plan E, but she chooses Plan E anyway, she must be risk averse, and the size of the cost 
difference identifies the extent of her risk aversion. This method is also used by Handel 
(2013) and Geruso (2013). 
 I estimate a random coefficient distribution for    with mean           and 
normally-distributed variance   
 , where    represents the random component of  . To 
ensure the joint distribution of demand, total costs, and predicted costs is fully 
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characterized, I allow    to vary with a set of demographic variables,   , along with 
employees’ total medical risk scores (total costs),   , and risk adjustment risk scores 
(predicted costs),   , to allow for heterogeneity in risk preferences. Specifically, I assume 
that           can be described as follows: 
                                                   
Allowing    to vary with    is motivated by previous research that has shown that the 
correlation between risk preferences and cost risk can influence the degree and direction 
of selection in equilibrium (see Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), Cohen and Einav 
(2007), Einav et al. (2013), and Handel et al. (2013)). The inclusion of    in the risk 
preference equation is motivated by the graphical analysis above. Recall that the 
equilibrium consequences of risk adjustment depend on the relationship between demand 
and predicted and residual costs. Thus, in order to accurately simulate equilibrium prices 
and sorting under risk adjustment, it is critical that the model fully capture these 
relationships. Because demand is a function of   , it is necessary to allow    to vary by 
the risk scores that determine predicted and residual costs. In fact, if this correlation is not 
allowed for in the estimation of   , the situation described in Figure 1.2 would be missed 
in the simulations. 
Section 4.2.5: Limitations 
While this demand specification characterizes the choices of consumers quite 
nicely, it does rely on a few important assumptions. First, I assume that when making 
their choices between the two plans, employees are using the same distribution of 
expected out-of-pocket costs that I assign to them. While it is possible that individuals 
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know more than what I am able to predict, it is unlikely that they know much more. On 
the other hand, it is also possible that individuals know much less than the model 
suggests. To deal with this problem, in the appendix I test the sensitivity of the parameter 
estimates to the specificity of the information available to consumer. I also suggest that 
some portion of any misspecification of expected out-of-pocket costs may be absorbed by 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion. While this may seem undesirable, recall that for 
accurate simulation of competitive equilibria under risk adjustment, it is the joint 
distribution of demand, total costs, and predicted costs that is required, not the joint 
distribution of risk preferences, out-of-pocket costs, total costs, and predicted costs. As 
long as the willingness-to-pay is characterized in some way in the demand model, 
whether through the estimate of the individual's out-of-pocket cost distribution or her 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion, the simulations will provide accurate results. This 
still leaves open the possibility that rather than just using limited information in a rational 
manner, individuals actually use sophisticated information but they do so irrationally. 
There is evidence for this type of behavior (Handel and Kolstad 2013, Abaluck and 
Gruber 2011). It is important to note, however, that “mistakes” may also be captured as 
risk preferences in this model. Again, this is not a problem for using the joint distribution 
of demand, total costs, and predicted costs to simulate competitive equilibria with and 
without risk adjustment. However, it does present a problem for inference about welfare 
consequences of risk adjustment because the area below the demand curve and above the 
price may not actually represent consumer surplus (Spinnewijn 2013). 
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Section 4.2.6: Estimation 
Because the random components of the model,  
  and   
 , re assumed to be 
normally distributed, I estimate the parameters of the model using a random coefficients 
probit simulated maximum likelihood approach similar to the method used by Handel 
(2013) and Geruso (2013) and outlined in Train (2009). Estimation begins by fixing the 
parameter vector,  , and taking a draw from each of the distributions of the random 
components of the model,    and   . Next,   draws are then taken from each employee's 
total cost distribution and run through each plan's cost-sharing parameters to simulate 
         for each employee   and plan  . Each employee's expected utility from plan   is 
then estimated by averaging the CARA utility function over the   draws from         : 
 [   ]  ∑ 
   
                 
 
                 
 
 
   
 
where 
  
                                                    
  
                          
Given the draws of the random components of the model,    and   , and the expected 
utility estimates for each plan they imply, I could simulate each employee's choice by 
comparing the expected utility for Plan E and Plan B and assigning employee   to the 
plan with higher expected utility, an accept-reject simulator. However, the accept-reject 
simulator can cause problems in the estimation process due to flat portions of the 
likelihood function where no employees choose to move from one plan to the other and 
undefined portions of the log-likelihood function due to some individuals having a zero 
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probability of enrolling in one of the plans. Both of these problems could potentially be 
solved by including a larger number of draws of the random components; however, for 
both issues to be fully resolved, the number of necessary draws would approach infinity, 
which would be computationally impossible. Instead, I use a smoothed accept-reject 
simulator . The simulator I use was developed by Handel (2013) and simulates 
probability that the employee will choose each plan according to the following function: 
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The form of the simulator ensures that the estimated probability increases (decreases) 
when the accept-reject simulator would increase (decrease) and that the probability lies 
between zero and one. As the smoothing parameter,  , becomes large, the simulator 
becomes identical to the accept-reject simulator. 
 The probability of choosing each plan is calculated for each draw,  , of the 
random components. To find the simulated probability that the employee chooses plan,  , 
given the draw from the parameter distribution, I average over the smoothed values, 
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The simulated log-likelihood function is then defined as 
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    is equal to one if the employee actually chose plan   and zero otherwise. The 
likelihood function is quite intuitive in that it will achieve its maximum where the 
simulated probability that each employee chose plan   is as close to one as possible when 
the employee actually chose plan   and as close to zero as possible otherwise. I use 
standard numerical techniques to find the parameter vector, , that maximizes the 
likelihood function. In the actual estimation I set            and    . 
Section 4.2.7: Model Results 
 Table 1.3 presents the results from the choice model discussed above. The 
estimates of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion are similar to estimates in the health 
insurance literature (Geruso 2013, Handel 2013). The average estimate of the coefficient 
of absolute risk aversion is          and the median estimate is         . To aid 
interpretation, this level of risk aversion implies that the average employee in the sample 
would be indifferent between a gamble where she will win $100 or lose $94 with equal 
probability and the status quo. Perhaps more importantly, the estimates imply that risk 
aversion is negatively correlated with total medical cost risk, positively correlated with 
prospective risk adjustment risk scores, and negatively correlated with concurrent risk 
adjustment risk scores. If taken literally, this implies that controlling for prospective and 
concurrent risk scores, employees with high levels of total medical cost risk have lower 
levels of risk aversion. This result is similar to the finding of Handel et al. (2013). 
However, as discussed above, it is possible that the expected out-of-pocket cost 
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distributions are miss-specified, resulting in biased estimates of the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion. If this is the case the correlations could represent real relationships 
between risk aversion and total costs and risk scores or they could represent the 
misspecification of the expected out-of-pocket cost distribution. 
 The estimated switching costs are quite large, with the mean and median 
switching costs being around $4,800. To put this in context, this is around 126% of the 
total average health care costs among the employees in the sample. These estimates are 
substantially larger than other estimates found in the literature (Handel 2013, Handel and 
Kolstad 2013). This could be due to large switching costs in this population or to some 
form of model misspecification. Estimating the model using data from other years 
produces similarly large estimates. However, as discussed above, accurate estimates of 
switching costs are not critical for the simulations below. Instead, the joint distribution of 
active choice demand, total costs, and predicted costs is what is required. The switching 
costs are just estimated to ensure that the estimates of risk preferences are not 
contaminated by employee inertia. Given that the estimates are so similar to other 
estimates in the literature, the potentially biased estimates of switching costs here are 
somewhat unimportant. 
 Given the assumption of CARA utility and the estimates of employee risk 
aversion (  ) and the expected out-of-pocket cost distribution (        ), I can now 
recover each employee's relative willingness-to-pay for one plan,  , over another plan,   , 
where the plans are vertically differentiated in that they differ only in cost sharing. This 
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provides the final component of the joint distribution of total costs, predicted scores, and 
demand. 
Section 5: Counterfactual Simulations 
In order to simulate competitive equilibria with and without risk adjustment, I 
first expand the sample to form a new simulation sample. The simulation sample includes 
all single-coverage employees from 2005-07. The sample is restricted in the same ways 
as the choice model sample described above (i.e. must be enrolled for all 365 days of the 
year, etc.). For this sample, total costs and risk scores for each plan are calculated or 
estimated as described in Section 4. Summary statistics for this simulation sample can be 
found in the final column of Table 1.1. 
I simulate competitive equilibria with and without risk adjustment in an 
environment similar to the Exchanges currently being established throughout the United 
States. Specifically, each individual is required to choose either a Bronze plan or a 
Platinum plan where the two plans are vertically differentiated in that they only differ in 
cost sharing. The Platinum plan is much more comprehensive than the Bronze plan. Plan 
cost sharing is described by standard non-linear price schedules where individuals pay the 
full cost of all care received up to a deductible, then some portion of each additional 
dollar of care up to an out-of-pocket maximum. The exact price schedules can be found 
in the last two columns of Table 1.2. The simulated Platinum (Bronze) plan has a 
deductible of $0 ($4500) a coinsurance rate of 20% (20%) and an out-of-pocket 
maximum of $1500 ($6500). The cost-sharing parameters were chosen using the 2014 
version of the actuarial value calculator provided by the Department of Health and 
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Human Services.
26
 The choice to use the most and least comprehensive plans available on 
the Exchange in the simulation was deliberate. In order to capture the most accurate 
picture of adverse selection on the Exchange, the simulation must include these two 
options.
27
 
 One additional component is required to complete the joint distribution of 
demand, total costs, and predicted costs. Demand is a function of two factors: risk 
preferences and the distribution of expected out-of-pocket costs. Risk preferences are 
assigned to each individual according to the estimated parameters from the model above, 
found in Table 1.3. The distributions of expected out-of-pocket costs for the new 
Platinum and Bronze plans are estimated using techniques similar to those described in 
Section 4. The key difference is that under the Platinum and Bronze plans, cost sharing 
for prescription drug utilization is not assumed to be identical in the two plans. Instead, 
the cost-sharing parameters described above are applied to total health care costs, the 
combination of prescription drug costs and medical costs. Therefore, in order to construct 
the distributions of expected out-of-pocket costs for the Platinum and Bronze plans, I first 
need to estimate each individual's distribution of expected total health care costs, rather 
than the distributions of total medical costs used to estimate the choice model. I do this 
by dividing the cost model sample discussed above into 1000 cells based on total cost 
risk instead of medical cost risk, where total cost risk is generated using a sophisticated 
                                                        
26 This is the calculator that all insurers are required to use to ensure that their plans meet the 
actuarial value requirements of the ACA. The calculator can be found at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/av-calculator-
final.xlsm 
27 In practice, most consumers will choose between 4 tiers of plans with varying levels of 
comprehensiveness. However, the competitive equilibrium in this environment would be quite 
complex and extremely difficult to model while not providing much additional intuition. 
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predictive model analogous to the one used to generate medical cost risk. I then follow 
the procedure outlined above to complete the construction of the expected out-of-pocket 
cost distributions, here using the Platinum and Bronze cost-sharing parameters rather than 
the Enhanced and Basic plan parameters used above. The combination of risk preferences 
and the expected out-of-pocket cost distribution allow me to calculate each individual's 
expected utility under plan   by taking   draws from the estimated          and using 
the following expression 
 [   ]  ∑ 
            
 
 
 
   
 
I can then determine which plan   will choose given a price differential  , providing the 
final component of the joint distribution: Demand. Note that in the simulations 
consumers are assumed to pay the full incremental cost of enrolling in the Platinum plan 
rather than the subsidized cost assumed in the choice model. The subsidized cost was 
used to estimate the choice model because it is likely to correspond closely with the price 
the employees of the firm actually faced. The full incremental cost is used in the 
simulations because this is the price that will be faced by individuals purchasing coverage 
through the Exchanges. 
Section 5.1: Welfare 
In order to assess the welfare consequences of risk adjustment, I follow Einav et al. 
(2010) and use a certainty equivalent concept. The certainty equivalent,    , is defined as 
the value,  , that makes individual   indifferent between paying   and facing the 
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uncertain loss under insurance plan  . I calculate the certainty equivalent for individual   
under plan   by finding the value of     that makes the following expression true 
 
 
  
           (        )           
The certainty equivalent is convenient because it provides a way to determine  's 
valuation of the insurance plan in dollars. Given an individual's certainty equivalent 
under each plan, I can calculate individual  's willingness-to-pay for the Platinum plan by 
subtracting     from    :             . The willingness-to-pay for the Platinum 
plan incorporates the difference in out-of-pocket costs paid by   and the difference in 
uncertainty under the two plans. It also represents consumer surplus from   moving from 
the Bronze plan to the Platinum plan. 
Total welfare, however, must also account for changes to producer surplus. 
Because the difference in out-of-pocket costs under the two plans just represents a 
transfer from the insurer to the consumer, it does not affect total welfare. Only the 
decreased uncertainty will impact total welfare. Thus, the change in total welfare from   
moving from the Bronze plan to the Platinum plan is 
             
    
   
Where   
 
 is the plan cost from enrolling   in plan  , making    
    
    ’s incremental 
marginal cost.     essentially represents the incremental welfare improvement from 
moving   from the Bronze to the Platinum plan. This implies that the change in total 
welfare resulting from a move from a setting with no risk adjustment to a setting with risk 
adjustment is equal to 
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Where  [   
  ] is  ’s expected utility under plan   given the equilibrium prices with risk 
adjustment and  [   
   ] is  ’s expected utility under plan   given the equilibrium prices 
without risk adjustment. The intuition for this measure is that welfare only changes when 
individuals move from one plan to another, and when an individual moves, welfare either 
increases or decreases by    , depending whether   is moving from Bronze to Platinum 
or Platinum to Bronze. 
Section 5.2 Correlations 
 As discussed in Section 2, the effect of risk adjustment on equilibrium prices and 
sorting depends critically on the correlations between demand, total cost, and predicted 
cost. In this section, I present evidence of these correlations in the simulation sample. To 
do so, I first group members of the sample into 50 quantiles of “willingness-to-pay” for 
the Platinum plan over the Bronze plan. To construct these groups, I use the expected 
utility model described in Section 4 to calculate for each individual   the difference 
between her expected utility in the Platinum plan and her expected utility in the Bronze 
plan where both premiums are set to zero. 
 Figure 1.3 shows the correlation between demand and total costs, with the 
quantile of willingness-to-pay on the x-axis and the average total cost for the group on 
the y-axis. It is clear that total costs are increasing with demand. This Figure shows that 
the slope of the incremental average total cost curve,   from section 2.1, is downward 
sloping, implying that the Platinum plan will be adversely selected. 
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 Next we move to the correlations between predicted and residual costs. I show 
these correlations for four risk adjustment models: an age/sex risk adjustment model 
including only demographic variables, and prospective and concurrent diagnostic risk 
adjustment models. In each model predicted costs are determined by first regressing total 
costs on the risk score. The predicted values from this regression are the predicted costs 
and the residuals from the regression are the residual costs. The left panels of Figures 
1.4A-1.4C show the correlation between demand and predicted costs, and the right panels 
show correlations between demand and residual costs. 
 It is clear that the predicted costs from all of the models are positively correlated 
with demand, implying that in all three settings the slope of the incremental predicted 
cost curve,   , is downward sloping, or in other words the Platinum plan is adversely 
selected on predicted costs. As expected, the correlation between demand and prospective 
and concurrent predicted costs is stronger than the correlation between demand and 
demographic predicted costs. Additionally, for all forms of risk adjustment, there is a 
positive correlation between demand and residual costs, implying that the incremental 
residual cost curve,   , is also downward sloping. This suggests that even after risk 
adjustment, the Platinum plan will be adversely selected. 
 Interestingly, with prospective and concurrent risk adjustment, there appears to be 
no correlation between demand and residual costs for everyone except for a few 
extremely high cost cases with highest willingness-to-pay. In other words, the 
incremental average risk adjusted cost curve is flat for everyone except for the highest 
spenders. This suggests that when prospective or concurrent risk adjustment is combined 
  
47 
with reinsurance, which compensates plans for the highest spenders, the correlation 
between demand and costs may be completely eliminated. Additionally, it is interesting 
to note that the correlation between demand and residual costs is quite similar for 
prospective and concurrent risk adjustment, implying that despite explaining a much 
larger portion of total costs (40% vs. 15%), concurrent risk adjustment may not do much 
better than prospective in terms of flattening the cost curve and inducing more enrollees 
to choose the Platinum plan. 
Section 5.3: Equilibrium 
 In order to simulate equilibrium prices and sorting in this environment, I first need 
to establish an equilibrium concept. Handel et al. (2013) show that in this setting, the 
competitive equilibrium can be found using the following algorithm where willingness-
to-pay is bounded between    and   ,    and    represent the premium of the Platinum 
and Bronze plans,                and        represent the average plan costs of 
enrollees in the Platinum and Bronze plans given price differential  ,     and     
represent the average plan costs of the entire population in the Platinum and Bronze 
plans, and                     : 
1. If              then the entire market enrolls in the Platinum plan and 
       
2. If    such that          then the equilibrium value of   is equal to    
                and consumers sort according to willingness-to-pay 
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3. If              then the entire market enrolls in the Bronze plan and    
    
Figure 1.5 illustrates the equilibrium search with no risk adjustment.   is on the x-axis. 
The light blue line represents the 45-degree line, and the orange line represents       . 
If there is an interior equilibrium, it will be where         . It is clear that there is no 
interior equilibrium in this setting and that          for all values of  . This implies 
that in equilibrium, the entire market enrolls in the Bronze plan and       . This is 
also known as market unraveling and is the same result found by Handel et al. (2013). In 
this setting, the correlation between demand and total costs, i.e. adverse selection, is so 
strong that there is no price differential at which any part of the market enrolling in the 
Platinum plan would result in a competitive equilibrium where both plans earns zero 
profits. 
Section 5.3.1: Risk Adjustment 
 With risk adjustment, the equilibrium concept remains the same, but the relevant 
plan average costs change. Risk adjustment is implemented by assuming the regulator 
gives each plan the following transfer 
      (
 ̅ 
 ̅
  )  ̅ 
where as in section 2,  ̅  represents the average risk score of the enrollees in plan  ,  ̅ 
represents the average risk score in the entire market, and  ̅ represents the average 
premium in the market. With risk adjustment, equilibrium is where the premium 
differential is equal to the incremental average risk adjusted cost. In other words, 
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equilibrium is now where the premium differential is equal to the incremental average 
cost net of risk adjustment transfers, 
    
                  
The algorithm for finding the competitive equilibrium remains the same, except        
is replaced with         . Note that   
      
 
 for both plans because when the 
entire market is enrolled in the same plan     . 
 I simulate four types of risk adjustment: demographic based on age-by-sex cells, 
prospective and concurrent diagnostic based on HCCs, and the HHS-HCC model being 
implemented in the Exchanges.
28
 Figures 1.5 and 1.6 illustrate the equilibrium search 
under these four forms of risk adjustment. Again, the light blue line represents the 45-
degree line and the orange line represents       . The dark blue, grey, and gold lines 
represent          under demographic, prospective, and concurrent risk adjustment, 
respectively. Under demographic risk adjustment,            for all values of   and 
the entire market still enrolls in the Bronze plan. In other words, demographic risk 
adjustment has no effect on equilibrium prices or sorting in this setting. However, under 
both prospective, concurrent, and HHS-HCC risk adjustment          crosses the 45-
degree line, implying that there exists an interior equilibrium. This can be seen more 
                                                        
28 The transfer for HHS-HCC risk adjustment is slightly different from the formula used for the other 
forms of risk adjustment. It is 
      (
 ̅ 
 ̅
 
   
  
)  ̅ 
where     is the actuarial value of plan      is the enrollment-weighted average actuarial value in 
the market. Additionally, under the HHS-HCC model an individual's risk score is different in the 
Platinum plan than in the Bronze plan, with the Platinum risk score being higher than the Bronze risk 
score. The reasons for these two adjustments are unclear, but I use them in order to simulate the true 
policy. 
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clearly in Figure 1.6. With both forms of diagnostic risk adjustment there are in fact 
multiple points where           . Recall that according to the algorithm, the 
competitive equilibrium value of  ,   , is the smaller value of   for which   
        . According to the algorithm then, under prospective risk adjustment  
  
      , under concurrent risk adjustment        , and under HHS-HCC risk 
adjustment          . 
 Figure 1.7 illustrates the equilibrium allocations of individuals across plans in a 
more familiar way, similar to the graphical representation above. In this figure, 
enrollment in the Platinum plan is on the x-axis. Again, the orange, dark blue, gray, gold, 
and green lines represent the incremental average cost curve under no risk adjustment, 
demographic risk adjustment, prospective risk adjustment, concurrent risk adjustment, 
and HHS-HCC risk adjustment, respectively. The light blue line reflects demand or 
willingness-to-pay for the Platinum plan relative to the Bronze plan. For prospective, 
concurrent, and HHS-HCC risk adjustment, the equilibrium price    is where the grey, 
gold, and green incremental average risk adjusted cost curves cross the light blue demand 
curve. The equilibrium price and Platinum enrollment under HHS-HCC risk adjustment 
are highlighted with the dashed lines. Recall that with no risk adjustment or demographic 
risk adjustment, the entire market enrolls in the Bronze plan. The figure shows that under 
prospective, concurrent, and HHS-HCC risk adjustment, a substantial portion of the 
market, over 60% for HHS-HCC risk adjustment and over 80% for the others, will enroll 
in the Platinum plan. 
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 The results of these simulations can also be found in Table 1.4. The table clearly 
shows that diagnostic risk adjustment compresses the premiums of the Platinum and 
Bronze plans and undoes a substantial portion of market unraveling. Changes in welfare 
due to risk adjustment are also found in Table 1.4. The welfare calculations suggest that 
individuals in this market would place a high value on diagnostic risk adjustment, almost 
$700 per person per year for HHS-HCC risk adjustment and more than $800 per person 
per year for the others. This suggests huge welfare gains from risk adjustment, around 
20% of average total health care costs in this population. 
 It is also interesting to note that the effects of prospective and concurrent risk 
adjustment are quite similar, despite the concurrent model explaining a substantially 
larger portion of individuals' total costs. This is largely due to the fact that there is little 
correlation between demand and the extra costs explained by the concurrent model.
29
 
This is an important and fairly intuitive finding. If the extra costs explained by the 
concurrent model are unpredictable acute costs, they are unlikely to affect an individual's 
plan choice. 
Section 5.3.2: Reinsurance 
The ACA implements a reinsurance program during the first three years of the 
Exchanges existence. The program reimburses health plans for 80% of an enrollee's plan 
costs above a threshold of $60,000 and below a cap of $250,000. Insurers are expected to 
                                                        
29 This could be partially due to the fact that the specification of          is based on predictions of 
future costs using past information. If consumers have private information about future costs beyond 
what can be explained by the sophisticated predictive models used here (childbirth could fit in this 
category), the extra costs explained by concurrent models may be more highly correlated with 
demand, and concurrent risk adjustment may have a larger incremental effect over prospective risk 
adjustment. However, the allowed correlation between risk aversion and concurrent risk scores 
should pick at least some of this misspecification of         . 
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purchase private coverage for costs exceeding $250,000, with a coinsurance rate of 85%. 
Reinsurance is also used in the Medicare Part D program. Because reinsurance essentially 
transfers costs from plans with more extremely high cost enrollees to plans with fewer 
high cost enrollees, it can be thought of as a form of risk adjustment where the predicted 
costs are costs above the reinsurance threshold and residual costs are all other costs. 
Recall that Figures 1.5 and 1.6 showed that diagnostic risk adjustment almost entirely 
eliminates the correlation between demand and costs for everyone except for the most 
expensive enrollees. This suggests that when risk adjustment is combined with 
reinsurance, adverse selection problems could be reduced even further. 
 To explore this possibility I simulate equilibrium prices and sorting with each 
form of risk adjustment combined with reinsurance. I simulate reinsurance by assuming 
that for each enrollee, plans receive a payment equal to 85% of any plan costs exceeding 
$60,000 within a year. The simulated reinsurance program is funded with a uniform per 
capita actuarially fair premium equal to the expected per capita reinsurance payment in 
the market. The equilibrium results with reinsurance are found in Table 1.4 and in Figure 
A1.1 in the appendix. The Figure and Table show that even with reinsurance, when there 
is no risk adjustment or demographic risk adjustment, the market still fully unravels and 
everyone enrolls in the Bronze plan. With diagnostic risk adjustment, however, the 
incremental average risk adjusted cost curves are even flatter than they were without 
reinsurance. The flattening of the curves is especially apparent for the highest 
cost/highest willingness-to-pay enrollees at the far right of the figure. The results in the 
table indicate that when concurrent risk adjustment is combined with reinsurance, market 
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unraveling is entirely undone, with the premium differential shrinking enough to induce 
100% of market participants to enroll in the Platinum plan. Similarly, with prospective 
and HHS-HCC risk adjustment, result in 94% and 83% of enrollees choosing the 
Platinum plan, respectively. However, the additional welfare gains from reinsurance 
when combined with prospective and concurrent risk adjustment, around $20-$30, while 
non-trivial are small relative to the gains from diagnostic risk adjustment. The additional 
gains from reinsurance when combined with HHS-HCC risk adjustment are more 
substantial, around $150. This finding complements the finding of Zhu et al. (2014) that 
when combined with risk adjustment, reinsurance can substantially weaken plans' 
incentives to cream skim healthy enrollees. 
Section 5.3.3: Age-based Pricing 
 The ACA allows for premiums in the Exchanges to vary by age as long as they 
remain within a 3:1 ratio. Because age-based pricing causes the prices paid by enrollees 
to be closer to their expected costs, this policy has the potential to undo some of the 
adverse selection problems resulting from uniform pricing that I study in this paper. This 
suggests that the effects of risk adjustment may not be as large in practice due to this 
regulation. In fact, Shi (2013) finds that welfare in a simulated Exchange is highest when 
risk adjustment is combined with age-based prices. To study this question, I implement 
age-based pricing as it is implemented in the Federal Health Insurance Exchange. In the 
Federal Exchange, plans submit one price that applies to a 21 year old. An individual's 
price is this price multiplied by an age-specific weight assigned by HHS. For example, 
the weight for a 25 year-old is 1.004, the weight for a 40 year-old is 1.278, and the weight 
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for a 64 year-old is 3.0.
30
 In practice, risk adjustment combined with mandated age-curve 
may “over-compensate” for costs correlated with age and cause plan revenues for an 
individual to be less correlated with costs than without the mandated age-curve. 
 The results from simulations including the HHS-mandated age-curve can be 
found in Table 1.5 and Figures A1.2 and A1.3 in the appendix. Interestingly, the results 
are largely unchanged from the uniform price case. The bolded case in Table 1.5 with the 
age-curve, reinsurance, and HHS-HCC risk adjustment is the full policy being 
implemented in the Exchanges. It is clear that this policy goes a long way toward undoing 
the problems cause by adverse selection with 83% of the market enrolling in the Platinum 
plan, resulting in a welfare gain of over $800. 
Section 6: Discussion 
 Adverse selection presents a large problem for competitive health insurance 
markets like the Exchanges created by the ACA. The negative effects of adverse selection 
occur both on the demand-side and the supply-side, and they have the potential to be 
quite important in the setting provided by the Exchanges due to the relatively unrestricted 
nature of the contract space. The potential ability of risk adjustment to fix supply-side 
selection problems has been known for quite some time (Glazer and McGuire 2000). The 
effects of risk adjustment on demand-side selection problems, however, are relatively 
unexplored. This is true, despite the fact that if risk adjustment is perfect, it will 
                                                        
30 This is different from the age-based pricing studied by Shi (2013) in that HHS forces insurers to 
use their age curve rather than allowing insurers to set their own age-based prices according to age-
specific expected costs. I choose to use the fixed age-curve approach because this is the approach 
used in the Exchanges in every state. While the alternative approach is interesting, and was used in 
Massachusetts prior to the ACA, the concept of equilibrium is much more complex due to multiple 
age-based risk pools and is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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completely eliminate these demand-side selection problems. In this paper, I study the 
effects of risk adjustment on demand-side selection problems in a setting where contracts 
are fixed and insurers compete on price to enroll consumers. I show that in this 
environment, imperfect risk adjustment causes plan prices to be based only on costs that 
are not predicted by the risk adjustment model rather than total costs. This could 
ameliorate or exacerbate adverse selection problems, depending on the correlation 
between demand and predicted costs. I then use data from a large employer to estimate 
the joint distribution of demand, total costs and predicted costs. I use this distribution to 
simulate equilibrium prices, sorting, and welfare in an Exchange-like environment where 
consumers choose between a Bronze plan and a more comprehensive Platinum plan. I 
find that without risk adjustment, the market completely unravels due to adverse selection 
and the entire market enrolls in the Bronze plan. With risk adjustment based on prior 
diagnoses, however, market unraveling is almost entirely undone, and over 80% of 
market participants choose the Platinum plan. This results in a welfare gain of over $800 
per person, per year. I also find very small incremental gains from concurrent risk 
adjustment over prospective risk adjustment, despite the concurrent model explaining a 
substantially higher portion of the variance in total costs. 
 The tradeoff between choice and adverse selection is a recurring theme among 
health economists. In the absence of choice, there is no potential for adverse selection 
because the costs of all consumers are combined in one risk pool. However, there is also 
no potential for efficiency gains from competition or from accommodating preference 
heterogeneity. Risk adjustment presents an opportunity to limit adverse selection 
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problems by pooling a portion of consumers' costs across plans while still allowing 
choice and competition. Even the imperfect forms of risk adjustment studied in this 
paper, appear to be able to eliminate a substantial portion of the welfare loss caused by 
adverse selection in a competitive environment similar to the Exchanges. 
 While the results in this paper are compelling, they are limited by some important 
caveats. First, the estimates of consumer preferences used in the simulations are based on 
a highly parametric structural model. Because the data do not include any premium 
variation (or even the premiums themselves!), I am unable to non-parametrically estimate 
an individual's willingness-to-pay for insurance. While the setting in which the 
individuals choose plans is quite simple and potentially easily characterized, the process 
by which consumers make choices in the real world is complex. There is evidence of 
important behavioral frictions in health plan choice (Abaluck and Gruber 2011, Handel 
2013, Handel and Kolstad 2013), and although I attempt to control for perhaps the most 
important of these, inertia, in my estimation, it is controlled for imperfectly and makes up 
only one of many potential frictions. Additionally, the preference estimates and simulated 
choices here depend on the assumption that I correctly characterize individuals' 
distributions of expected out-of-pocket costs. This assumption seems extreme in that 
individuals may know more or less about their future health care utilization than is 
predictable by the sophisticated algorithms I use to estimate their expectations. However, 
the sophisticated nature of the algorithm does lend some credibility to the estimated 
expectations, especially given that little is known about the true form of these 
expectations. These limitations in estimating consumer preferences, combined with the 
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importance of these preferences described by the model and figures in Section 2, suggest 
that the effects of risk adjustment on equilibrium prices, sorting, and welfare may differ 
from those found here. 
 Additionally, throughout this study, the assumptions of a strong mandate and no 
moral hazard were maintained. If there were moral hazard, equilibrium pricing and 
sorting results would likely be similar, but the welfare consequences of risk adjustment 
would likely not be so extreme. This is due to the fact that with moral hazard it would not 
be optimal for the entire market to enroll in the Platinum plan. This possibility is related 
to the discussion of moral hazard in Einav and Finkelstein (2011). Additionally, if the 
mandate is weak and consumers can opt out of the market, the equilibrium consequences 
of risk adjustment could be quite different. As shown in the simulations, risk adjustment 
raises the premium of the Bronze plan. If the mandate is weak, this could easily result in 
healthy consumers dropping out of the market entirely, potentially resulting in the entire 
market unraveling. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but presents a promising 
area for future research. Here, I just point out that a large portion of the individuals 
participating in the Exchanges will be receiving subsidies that are based on the price of 
the second-cheapest Silver Plan. This implies that for a large segment of the market, the 
absolute prices of the Bronze and Silver Plans don't actually matter; all that matters is the 
difference between the Bronze or Silver Plan price and the Platinum plan price, and this 
is what is simulated in this paper. 
 Despite the potential limitations, however, consumer choice is likely to follow 
similar patterns to those shown in the counterfactual simulations. Therefore, the effect of 
  
58 
risk adjustment on equilibrium prices, sorting, and welfare while perhaps not perfectly 
estimated, is likely to be substantial. This is true not only in the Exchanges but also in 
Medicare Part D where premiums are set competitively, some portions of the contracts 
are fixed, and demand is correlated with predicted costs (Polyakova 2014). When 
combined with its potential beneficial effects on supply-side selection problems (Glazer 
and McGuire 2000), this makes risk adjustment a powerful tool for ameliorating adverse 
selection problems and improving welfare within competitive insurance markets. As 
these markets mature and data becomes available, it will be interesting to observe the 
correlations between demand, costs, and predicted costs and the effects of risk adjustment 
in practice. 
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Figure 1.1A: Equilibrium sorting with adverse selection 
  
Notes: Right panel describes setting where consumers required to choose between 2 
insurance contracts. Enrollment in plan E is on x-axis and price differential is on y-axis. Blue 
line represents incremental average cost curve, green represents incremental marginal cost 
curve, red represents demand curve. Competitive equilibrium is at point A. Efficiency 
requires that everyone enroll in plan E. Left panel splits incremental average cost curve into 
two components: Residual costs and predicted costs. 
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Figure 1.1B: Equilibrium sorting with adverse selection and imperfect risk adjustment 
  
Notes: Right panel describes setting where consumers required to choose between 2 
insurance contracts. Enrollment in plan E is on x-axis and price differential is on y-axis. Top 
blue line represents incremental average cost curve and red represents demand curve. 
Bottom blue line represents incremental average cost curve with risk adjustment. 
Competitive equilibrium with no risk adjustment is at point A. Equilibrium with risk 
adjustment is at point C. Efficiency requires that everyone enroll in plan E. Risk adjustment 
improves efficiency. Left panel splits incremental average cost curve into two components: 
Residual costs and predicted costs. With risk adjustment predicted costs are pooled across 
plans, so the predicted cost curve is flat, and the incremental average cost curve with risk 
adjustment reflects only the correlation between residual costs and demand for E. 
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Figure 1.1C: Equilibrium sorting with adverse selection and perfect risk adjustment 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Right panel describes setting where consumers required to choose between 2 
insurance contracts. Enrollment in plan E is on x-axis and price differential is on y-axis. Top 
blue line represents incremental average cost curve and red represents demand curve. 
Middle blue line represents incremental average cost curve with imperfect risk adjustment. 
Bottom blue line represents incremental average cost curve with perfect risk adjustment. 
Competitive equilibrium with no risk adjustment is at point A. Equilibrium with imperfect 
risk adjustment is at point C and equilibrium with perfect risk adjustment is at point D. 
Efficiency requires that everyone enroll in plan E. Imperfect risk adjustment improves 
efficiency, and perfect risk adjustment results in additional efficiency improvements. Left 
panel shows that in this case all costs are predicted costs. With risk adjustment predicted 
costs are pooled across plans, so the incremental average cost curve with risk adjustment is 
flat.  
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Figure 1.2A: Equilibrium sorting with adverse selection 
  
Notes: Right panel describes setting where consumers required to choose between 2 
insurance contracts. Enrollment in plan E is on x-axis and price differential is on y-axis. 
Blue line represents incremental average cost curve and red represents demand curve. 
Competitive equilibrium is at point A. Efficiency requires that everyone enroll in plan E. 
Left panel splits incremental average cost curve into two components: Residual costs and 
predicted costs. In this case demand and residual costs are positively correlation (adverse 
selection) and demand and predicted costs are negatively correlated (advantageous 
selection). Such a result could occur due to preference heterogeneity. 
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Figure 1.2B: Equilibrium sorting with adverse selection and adverse risk adjustment 
  
Notes: Right panel describes setting where consumers required to choose between 2 
insurance contracts. Enrollment in plan E is on x-axis and price differential is on y-axis. 
Bottom blue line represents incremental average cost curve and red represents demand 
curve. Top blue line represents incremental average cost curve with risk adjustment. 
Competitive equilibrium with no risk adjustment is at point A. Equilibrium with risk 
adjustment is at point E. Efficiency requires that everyone enroll in plan E. In this case, risk 
adjustment decreases efficiency. Left panel splits incremental average cost curve into two 
components: Residual costs and predicted costs. In this case demand and residual costs 
are positively correlation (adverse selection) and demand and predicted costs are 
negatively correlated (advantageous selection). Such a result could occur due to 
preference heterogeneity. Because of negative correlation between predicted costs and 
demand, risk adjustment results in a steeper incremental average cost curve. 
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Figure 1.3: Correlation between Willingness-to-Pay for Platinum and Total Cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Figure shows correlation between total cost and willingness-to-pay for Platinum 
over Bronze Plan for employees at large firm for choice years 2006-08. Expected utility 
for Platinum and Bronze plans calculated using choice model described in paper. 
Individuals in sample grouped into 50 groups based on difference in expected utility. 
Group number is on the x-axis with 0 being the group with the lowest willingness-to-pay 
and 50 the highest. Average realized costs for the group are on y-axis. Cost increasing in 
willingness-to-pay suggests that Platinum Plan will be adversely selected. 
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Figure 1.4A: Correlation between Demand and Predicted and Residual Costs (Demographic) 
 
Figure 1.4B: Correlation between Demand and Predicted and Residual Costs (Prospective) 
 
Figure 1.4C: Correlation between Demand and Predicted and Residual Costs (Concurrent) 
 
  Notes: Figures show correlation between willingness-to-pay for the Platinum plan and predicted and residual costs in 
sample under 3 types of risk adjustment: Demographic (age and gender), Prospective Diagnostic, and Concurrent 
Diagnostic. Expected utility for Platinum and Bronze plans calculated using choice model described in paper. 
Individuals in sample grouped into 50 groups based on difference in expected utility. Group number is on the x-axis in 
all figures with 0 being the group with the lowest willingness-to-pay and 50 the highest. In the figures on the left, costs 
predicted by the risk adjustment model are on the y-axis. In the figures on the right, residual costs are on the y-axis. 
There is a positive correlation between demand and predicted costs in all cases, implying that risk adjustment will 
weaken the correlation between demand and costs. Prospective and concurrent risk adjustment almost completely 
eliminate correlation between demand and costs for all but the most expensive groups. 
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Figure 1.5: Equilibrium Search – Price Differential and Incremental Average Cost under Different Types of 
Risk Adjustment 
 
  Notes: Figure shows search for equilibrium in setting where sample individuals required to 
choose between Bronze and Platinum Plans. Light blue line is the 45-degree line. Orange line 
represents incremental average cost (IAC) curve with no risk adjustment, blue line represents 
IAC with demographic risk adjustment, gray line represents IAC with prospective risk 
adjustment, gold line represents IAC with concurrent risk adjustment, and green line 
represents IAC with HHS-HCC risk adjustment. IAC with no and demographic risk adjustment is 
everywhere above 45-degree line implying complete market unraveling where everyone 
enrolls in Bronze plan. Prospective, concurrent, and HHS risk adjustment IACs cross 45-degree 
line, implying an interior equilibrium exists. Equilibrium is at lowest P where IAC crosses 45-
degree line. Concurrent results in the lowest price differential. Prices, enrollment, and welfare 
can be found in Table 1.4. 
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Figure 1.6: Equilibrium Search (Zoomed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Figure shows search for equilibrium in setting where sample individuals required to 
choose between Bronze and Platinum Plans. Light blue line is the 45-degree line. Orange 
line represents incremental average cost (IAC) curve with no risk adjustment, blue line 
represents IAC with demographic risk adjustment, gray line represents IAC with 
prospective risk adjustment, gold line represents IAC with concurrent risk adjustment, and 
green line represents IAC with HHS-HCC risk adjustment. IAC with no and demographic 
risk adjustment is everywhere above 45-degree line implying complete market unraveling 
where everyone enrolls in Bronze plan. Prospective, concurrent, and HHS risk adjustment 
IACs cross 45-degree line, implying an interior equilibrium exists. Equilibrium is at lowest 
P where IAC crosses 45-degree line. Concurrent results in the lowest price differential. 
Prices, enrollment, and welfare can be found in Table 1.4. 
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Figure 1.7: Equilibrium Price Differentials and Sorting under Different Types of Risk Adjustment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Figure shows equilibrium in setting where sample individuals required to choose 
between Bronze and Platinum Plans. Light blue line is the demand curve. Orange line 
represents incremental average cost (IAC) curve with no risk adjustment, blue line 
represents IAC with demographic risk adjustment, gray line represents IAC with 
prospective risk adjustment, gold line represents IAC with concurrent risk adjustment, 
and green line represents IAC with HHS-HCC risk adjustment. Enrollment in Platinum 
Plan is on x-axis. IAC with no and demographic risk adjustment is everywhere above 45-
degree line implying complete market unraveling where everyone enrolls in Bronze plan. 
Prospective, concurrent, and HHS risk adjustment IACs cross 45-degree line, implying an 
interior equilibrium exists. Equilibrium is at lowest P where IAC crosses 45-degree line. 
Concurrent results in the lowest price differential. Equilibrium price and enrollment in 
Platinum are highlighted by dotted lines. Prices, enrollment, and welfare can be found in 
Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Estimation Sample 
Cost Model 
Sample 
Simulation 
Sample 
 
Full 
sample 
Old 
Employees 
New 
Employees 
  
Male 0.6 0.6 0.67 0.49 0.6 
New 0.07 
  
n.a. n.a. 
Age: 
     
mean 41.16 41.61 35.95 34.98 41.5 
1st Pcntl 21 22 20 1 22 
25th Pcntl 32 32 26 17 32 
50th Pcntl 42 42 34 38 42 
75th Pcntl 50 50 46 51 50 
99th Pcntl 62 62 61 63 62 
Total costs: 
     
mean 3875.44 3998.5 2422.19 3086.05 3792.1 
1st Pcntl 0 0 0 0 0 
5th Pcntl 0 0 0 0 0 
25th Pcntl 73 90 0 129 85 
50th Pcntl 857 910 368 566.43 900 
75th Pcntl 3016 3136 1811 2074.46 3109 
95th Pcntl 15789 16167 9019 11970.83 15097 
99th Pcntl 52385 53019 28672 40495 47342 
Expected costs: 
     
mean 4142 4215.44 3274.79 
 
3754.78 
1st Pcntl 281.39 287.7 253.26 
 
30.65 
5th Pcntl 486.33 416.06 327.93 
 
55.91 
25th Pcntl 531.63 1058.03 672.09 
 
736.35 
50th Pcntl 2102.46 2173.89 1468.5 
 
1762.27 
75th Pcntl 4357.62 4435.8 3366.14 
 
3903.24 
95th Pcntl 12904.04 13153 10502.4 
 
12634.13 
99th Pcntl 32102 31910.01 34241.64 
 
33785.27 
Total cost risk 
scores: 
     
mean 0.91 0.93 0.71 0.89 0.92 
1st Pcntl 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.1 0.15 
5th Pcntl 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.18 
25th Pcntl 0.31 0.33 0.23 0.27 0.32 
50th Pcntl 0.53 0.55 0.38 0.51 0.54 
75th Pcntl 0.98 1 0.77 0.99 1.01 
95th Pcntl 2.65 2.73 2.13 2.59 2.74 
99th Pcntl 6.19 6.28 4.5 5.87 6.18 
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Prospective RA 
risk scores 0.89 0.9 0.75 
 
0.89 
Concurrent RA 
risk scores 0.83 0.85 0.58 
 
0.81 
N 9133 8420 713 845000 25398 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: Summary statistics for Estimation Sample, Cost Model Sample, and 
Simulation Sample. All samples come from Truven Marketscan dataset from 
choice years 2006-08. Estimation and Simulation Samples are from one large firm 
in Marketscan dataset where employees choose between 2 PPO plans. Samples 
are restricted to single-coverage employees enrolled for all 365 days of the year 
prior to and year of plan choice to ensure that costs can be predicted using full set 
of information. Estimation sample is restricted to employees from choice year 
2007. Cost model sample is formed by first taking all individuals in Marketscan 
during at least 300 days of both 2006-2007. Then, total cost risk scores are 
generated from prior health claims using Verisk Health DxCG predictive modeling 
software. Marketscan sample is divided into 1000 cells based on total cost risk 
scores from year 1. Cost Model Sample is constructed by taking a random sample 
of 1000 individuals from each cell. Lognormal distribution with point mass at 
zero fit to costs in year 2 for each cell. Expected costs calculated by finding mean 
of the estimated distribution. Prospective and concurrent risk scores generated 
using Verisk Health DxCG risk adjustment software using diagnoses and 
demographics from year 1. 
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Table 1.2: Cost-sharing Parameters for Firm and Simulation Plans 
 
Firm Simulations 
 
Basic Enhanced Bronze Platinum 
Deductible 500 300 4500 $0  
Coinsurance 20% 10% 20% 20% 
OOP Max 4750 2600 6500 1500 
     
Drug copay Generic = $10 
Brand=$5 
Generic = $10 
Brand=$5 
Included in medical 
deductible, 
coinsurance, OOP max 
  Notes: Table shows cost-sharing parameters for plan options at the firm and for plan 
options in the Exchange simulations. Firm parameters are used to create          for 
estimation of the choice model, simulation parameters are used to create          for 
Bronze and Platinum plans in the simulations. Under all plans, consumers pay the full cost 
of care up to the deductible, then they pay the coinsurance rate up to the out-of-pocket 
max. Beyond the out-of-pocket max, the consumer pays nothing. For the firm plans, drug 
coverage is not part of the price schedule, but coverage is identical in the two plans. For 
the simulations, drug spending is included with other medical spending in the non-linear 
price schedule. In the firm plans, ER visits and preventive visits are free of charge, but 
these visits make up only a small portion of total medical expenditures, so they considered 
to be priced with other medical spending. 
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Table 1.3: Choice Model Results 
  
Parameter 
Estimate Parameter Std Error 
Enhanced Shifter -824.74 317.22 
   Switching Cost - Intercept 527.31 773.66 
Switching Cost - Age Coeff 104.91 30.36 
Switching Cost - Fem Coeff -708.95 370.41 
   
CARA - Intercept 8.4*10
-4
 1.5*10
-4
 
CARA - Predicted Cost Coeff -1.6*10
-4
 7.4*10
-5
 
CARA - Age Coeff -4.7*10
-6
 1.5*10
-6
 
CARA - Age*Pred Cost Coeff 1.9*10
-6
 1.3*10
-6
 
CARA - Fem Coeff -2.5*10
-5
 -3.3*10
-5
 
CARA - Pros Risk Coeff 4.6*10
-5
 3.4*10
-5
 
CARA - Conc Risk Coeff -2.0*10
-5
 9.8*10
-6
 
   
CARA - Std Dev -3.4*10
-4
 -1.0*10
-4
 
Preference Shock - Std Dev 876.11 653.04 
   
Mean CARA 6.9*10
-4
 
 
Median CARA 6.8*10
-4
 
 
   Mean Switching Cost 4745.36 
 Median Switching Cost 4828.82   
  Notes: Results from simulated maximum likelihood estimation of choice model 
described in the paper. Enhanced shifter is a plan-specific intercept for the 
Enhanced Plan. Switching costs are estimated by comparing the choices of 
switchers and those of new enrollees of similar age and gender. CARA intercept 
represents the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for a zero year-old with total 
predicted cost and risk adjustment risk scores of zero. Predicted cost coefficient 
describes how CARA parameter varies with total predicted cost,   . Pros and conc 
risk coefficients describe how CARA parameter varies with risk adjustment risk 
scores. Mean CARA parameter implies that average individual in the sample would 
be indifferent between the status quo and a lottery that offered $100 with 50% 
probability and $95 with 50% probability. 
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Table 1.4: Equilibrium Prices, Sorting, and Welfare with Uniform Pricing 
 
No Reinsurance 
  Price Differential Bronze Price Platinum Price % in Platinum Change in Welfare 
No Risk Adjustment n.a. $1,969 n.a. 0% n.a. 
Age/sex Risk 
Adjustment 
n.a. $1,969 n.a. 0% $0 
Prospective Risk 
Adjustment 
$1,082 $2,403 $3,483 80% $829 
Concurrent Risk 
Adjustment 
$952 $2,501 $3,453 82% $838 
HHS Risk 
Adjustment 
$1,819 $1,978 $3,797 65% $695 
  Reinsurance 
  Price Differential Bronze Price Platinum Price % in Platinum Change in Welfare 
No Risk Adjustment n.a. $1,969 n.a. 
 
n.a. 
Age/sex Risk 
Adjustment 
n.a. $1,969 n.a. 0% $0 
Prospective Risk 
Adjustment 
$149 $3,222 $3,365 94% $861 
Concurrent Risk 
Adjustment 
n.a. n.a. $3,380 100% $862 
HHS Risk 
Adjustment 
$872 $2,566 $3,438 83% $843 
  Notes: Table shows equilibrium price differential (price of Platinum – price of Bronze), prices, proportion 
enrolled in Platinum plan, and change in welfare from no risk adjustment case to case with indicated type of 
risk adjustment. Bottom panel adds reinsurance where reinsurance reimburses 65% of an individual’s plan 
costs above $60,000 and is funded with an actuarially fair per capita premium. Equilibrium found using 
algorithm described in the text. If there is no interior equilibrium, there is no price differential, and only the 
price of the plan in which the entire market enrolls is shown. Types of risk adjustment include age/sex 
which uses only demographic variables to predict costs, prospective and concurrent which use prior and 
current diagnosis groups, respectively, to predict costs, and HHS which is a concurrent model that uses a 
different set of diagnosis groups and allows for higher risk scores for Platinum enrollees and a penalty factor 
for the Platinum plan. Welfare calculated by the certainty equivalent concept discussed in the paper. 
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Table 1.5: Equilibrium Prices, Sorting, and Welfare with Age-based Pricing 
  No Reinsurance 
  
Avg Price 
Diff 
Avg Bronze 
Price 
Avg Platinum 
Price 
% in 
Platinum 
Change in 
Welfare 
No Risk Adjustment n.a. $1,969 n.a. 0% n.a. 
Age/sex Risk 
Adjustment 
n.a. $1,969 n.a. 0% $0 
Prospective Risk 
Adjustment 
$1,095 $2,381 $3,471 81% $831 
Concurrent Risk 
Adjustment 
$1,048 $2,423 $3,460 82% $835 
HHS Risk 
Adjustment 
$1,954 $1,867 $3,822 61% $649 
  Reinsurance 
  
Avg Price 
Diff 
Avg Bronze 
Price 
Avg Platinum 
Price 
% in 
Platinum 
Change in 
Welfare 
No Risk Adjustment n.a. $1,969 n.a. 0% n.a. 
Age/sex Risk 
Adjustment 
n.a. $1,969 n.a. 0% $0 
Prospective Risk 
Adjustment 
$171 $3,191 $3,367 94% $860 
Concurrent Risk 
Adjustment 
n.a. n.a. $3,380 100% $862 
HHS Risk 
Adjustment 
$969 $2,481 $3,446 83% $840 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Table shows equilibrium price differential (price of Platinum – price of Bronze), prices, 
proportion enrolled in Platinum plan, and change in welfare from no risk adjustment case to case 
with indicated type of risk adjustment. Bottom panel adds reinsurance where reinsurance 
reimburses 65% of an individual’s plan costs above $60,000 and is funded with an actuarially fair 
per capita premium. In all cases, prices vary by age according to the HHS age curve. Equilibrium 
found using algorithm described in the text. If there is no interior equilibrium, there is no price 
differential, and only the price of the plan in which the entire market enrolls is shown. Types of risk 
adjustment include age/sex which uses only demographic variables to predict costs, prospective 
and concurrent which use prior and current diagnosis groups, respectively, to predict costs, and 
HHS which is a concurrent model that uses a different set of diagnosis groups and allows for higher 
risk scores for Platinum enrollees and a penalty factor for the Platinum plan. Welfare calculated by 
the certainty equivalent concept discussed in the paper. Case in bold represents the full pricing 
policy currently being implemented in the Exchanges. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RISK SELECTION, RISK ADJUSTMENT, AND MANIPULABLE MEDICAL CODING: 
EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE 
 
with Michael Geruso 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 Risk adjustment is the primary mechanism used to counteract distortions caused 
by adverse selection in competitive insurance markets. It is used in nearly all US markets 
for public and private health insurance, including Medicare Advantage, Medicare Part D, 
many privatized state Medicaid programs, and the ACA exchanges. Risk adjustment 
modifies payments to insurers on the basis of a consumer’s expected costs, estimated 
using information that includes prior diagnoses from insurance claims.
31
 For instance, a 
consumer coded with a history of diabetes generates a larger than average payment for 
the insurer. This capitation payment is independent of actual treatment the enrollee 
receives, compensating the insurer for attracting a patient with high expected costs, while 
still forcing the insurer to internalize the marginal costs of providing care. In this way, 
risk-adjustment escapes the incentive problems created by fee for service payments, but 
discourages “cream skimming,” in which insurers avoid high cost consumers by 
distorting their menu of services, inefficiently rationing services demanded by high-risk 
individuals (Frank et al. 2000, Glazer and McGuire 2000). Risk adjustment also has the 
effect of weakening the connection between premiums and the risk pool of a plan’s draw 
of enrollees, decreasing the likelihood of market unraveling due to adverse selection, 
                                                        
31 In regulated private insurance markets, such as the Health Insurance Exchanges created by the ACA, risk 
adjustment often works via a system of mandated ex-post transfers between private insurers related to the 
average risk score of their pools of enrollees. 
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which has been documented in numerous settings in which risk adjustment was absent 
(e.g. Bundorf et al. 2013, Geruso 2013, Handel 2013, Handel et al. 2013, Einav et al. 
2010, Fang et al. 2008, Buchmueller and DiNardo 2002, Cao and McGuire 2002, Cutler 
and Reber 1998). 
Implicit in the theory of risk adjustment is the assumption that consumers have 
risk scores that are invariant to the insurer with whom they are enrolled.
32
 But in all real 
world payment systems, it is the insurers themselves who report the diagnoses that 
determine enrollee risk scores, suggesting the potential for manipulation, or at least 
heterogeneity in coding practices. Therefore, even when successful in counteracting 
cream-skimming and adverse selection, risk adjustment creates its own distortion: It 
rewards insurers who would code the same patient more intensively. These coding 
incentives constitute an important but underexplored problem in the regulation of public 
and private health insurance markets. For publicly funded programs like Medicare and 
Medicaid, differences in coding between the public and private options create an implicit 
subsidy that distorts the choice that beneficiaries face between public and private 
insurance, and impacts the total size of public spending. Discussion of risk adjustment 
and coding is largely absent from discussions of adverse selection (see, for example, 
Einav and Finkelstein 2011), despite the fact that risk adjustment is the most widely 
utilized policy tool for combating the price distortions caused by selection. 
                                                        
32 See for example Pope et al (2004) describes among the principles guiding the creation the CMS HCC risk 
adjustment used in Medicare Advantage. These principles include requirements that, “The diagnostic 
classification should not reward coding proliferation, ” and “Discretionary diagnostic categories should be 
excluded from payment models.”  
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We define “upcoding” broadly as the practice by which different insurers would 
produce different risk scores, and therefore extract different payments, for the same 
individual.
33
  This could happen in many ways. For example, insurers can (and 
sometimes do) pay their providers using a risk adjustment payment model similar to the 
one the insurer itself faces, aligning provider and insurer incentives to code patients 
intensively. Insurers are in a good position to manipulate coding in this way: They have 
full knowledge of the publicly-posted risk-scoring algorithms that convert diagnosis 
codes to risk scores and, ultimately, payments. Plans may also differ in coding practices 
for an entirely different set of reasons, such as differences in practice patterns or 
electronic medical record adoption that may be unrelated to coding incentives.  
The extent of coding differences across insurers is largely unknown because in 
most data, upcoding is observationally equivalent to adverse selection. An insurer might 
report an enrollee population with higher than average risk scores either because the 
consumers choosing its plan are in worse health (selection) or because for the same 
individual, the insurer uses coding practices that result in higher risk scores (upcoding). 
Because of this central identification difficulty, there has been limited empirical work on 
the extent of upcoding in any US health insurance market. Two exceptions are Silverman 
and Skinner (2004) and Dafny (2005), which exploit changes over the 1990s in how 
                                                        
33 We note that this definition of upcoding is deliberately broad. Another term for our definition of upcoding 
that would have a more neutral connotation is “coding heterogeneity,” as our definition of upcoding 
encapsulates all sources of variation in risk scoring across plans, whether the variation is intentional or 
unintentional. We use this broad definition due to the fact that in our model the effect of coding differences on 
costs (the focus of this paper) does not depend on the source of these differences. 
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Traditional Medicare compensated hospitals on the basis of diagnosis, showing that 
hospital coding patterns changed to track the reimbursement changes.
34
  
In this paper, we develop a general method for separating upcoding from 
selection, applicable to any market for public or private health insurance. The core insight 
of our approach is novel, but straightforward: We note that if the same individual would 
generate a different risk score under insurer A than insurer B and if we observe a change 
in market share of the two insurers, then we should also observe changes to the observed 
market-level average of the risk score. Such a pattern could not be rationalized by 
selection, because selection can affect only the sorting of risk types across health plans 
within the market, not the overall market-level distribution of reported risk types.  
Our model primitives correspond closely to empirical moments that are readily 
observable in most insurance markets: the market-level average-risk score and market 
shares. Our approach thus contrasts with attempts to identifying upcoding by following 
individual switchers across plans (see for example, Government Accountability Office 
2013). Data on risk scores for the same individual enrolled in different plans are rarely 
available, and identification via plan switching requires that consumers change plans for 
reasons unrelated to changes in their health.
35
 Our method does not require this 
identifying assumption. 
                                                        
34 Song et al. (2010), find that traditional Medicare enrollees who move from a “low intensity” region to a “high 
intensity” region exhibit substantial increases in their Traditional Medicare risk scores. While not direct 
evidence of upcoding, this strongly suggests that risk scores are not fixed for an individual. 
35 When data on individual risk scores are available, rarely can researchers follow the same individual from one 
plan to another. Even in large state all-payer datasets, individual identifiers usually change when individuals 
move from one plan to another because they are originally assigned by the insurers rather than the database 
managers. 
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We apply our framework to analyze upcoding in Medicare Advantage (MA) from 
2006 to present. Medicare Advantage (also known as Medicare Part C) is comprised of 
private plans from which Medicare beneficiaries can choose in lieu of traditional fee-for-
service Medicare (TM). Premiums are heavily subsidized with funds that would 
otherwise pay for the beneficiary’s Traditional Medicare services. MA is an ideal setting 
for applying our framework, both because MA is the largest risk-adjusted health 
insurance market in the US, with annual tax expenditure exceeding $100 billion, and 
because it is widely believed among researchers and regulators that upcoding is a 
persistent and important phenomenon among plans competing in the MA market.
36
 
Whether coding should be systematically more intensive in private Medicare plans than 
under Traditional Medicare, is a priori ambiguous. On one hand the risk adjustment 
payment system incentivizes intensive coding, but on the other, the managed care plans 
that make up much of Medicare Advantage typically control costs by limiting utilization, 
which would tend to reduce the encounters necessary for generating diagnoses.  
We exploit the large and geographically heterogeneous changes to MA 
penetration that occurred beginning in the mid 2000s in response to the Medicare 
                                                        
36 CMS and the GAO have released reports that investigate this question, but their methods do not adequately 
separate “upcoding” from selection (CMS 2010; GAO 2012). Nonetheless, the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) subtracts a 3.41% upcoding deflation factor when determining payments to private 
plans in the Medicare Advantage program, under the assumption that private plans code the same patients 
more intensively than do doctors performing services under the Traditional Medicare program (CMS 2010). 
The GAO study chose a cohort of individuals enrolled in MA during 2007. It compared the growth in risk 
scores in the MA cohort to a cohort of FFS enrollees, controlling for observables. They then concluded that 
there was evidence of upcoding in MA and calculated the overpayment to be from 4.8% to 7.1%. Unbiased 
identification of the estimates, however, would require that any differences between the control group (FFS 
enrollees) and the treatment group (MA enrollees) would have to be orthogonal to the risk score, conditional 
on the control variables. In other words, the study assumes no quantitatively important selection, which we 
show empirically is incorrect. We also point out that the GAO study measures difference in risk score growth 
over time. We note that this is not the policy relevant parameter. Instead the relevant parameter is the 
difference between the risk score an individual received in MA and the score she would have received in FFS 
that we highlight here. 
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Modernization Act in order to examine whether market-level observed risk co-varies with 
MA penetration over time. Using the rapid within-county changes in penetration that 
occurred over our short panel, we find that a 10 percentage point increase in MA 
penetration leads to a 0.4 percentage point increase in the average risk score in a county. 
This implies that MA plans generate risk scores for their enrollees that are on average 4% 
larger that what those same enrollees would have generated under TM.  We show that it 
is difficult to rationalize this result by the alternative explanation that true county-level 
population health was changing contemporaneously with these penetration changes. We 
also exploit an institutional feature of Medicare Advantage that causes risk scores to be 
based on prior year diagnoses. This yields sharp predictions on the timing of effects that 
offer several falsification tests of our identification in the spirit of an event study. 
In this paper we make four important contributions to the literature on adverse 
selection and the public finance of healthcare. First, ours is the first paper to model the 
implications of differential coding patterns across insurers. While there has been 
substantial research on the statistical aspects of diagnosis-based risk adjustment models, 
little is known about whether the clinical indicators used are robust to manipulation or 
about the distortionary implications of coding heterogeneity.
37
 This is an important 
omission in the literature, since risk adjustment features prominently in the recent US 
healthcare reform. We create a framework to show how differences in coding may cause 
excess public spending and always cause implicit subsidies across health plans that 
                                                        
37 See van de Ven and Ellis (2000) and Ellis and Layton (2013) for reviews of the literature on risk adjustment. 
A couple of recent papers, McGuire et al. (2013) and Glazer, McGuire, and Shi (2013), develop a model of risk 
adjustment in the new state Health Insurance Exchanges, showing how to use risk adjusted payments to 
maximize the “fit” of the payment system while simultaneously minimizing the welfare losses from inefficient 
sorting due to adverse selection. 
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distort consumers’ choices—in our case between Traditional Medicare and MA. This 
coding distortion along the public-private insurance choice margin has not been 
previously recognized. A non-obvious result that emerges from our modeling is that for 
many policy questions regarding the public finance of health insurance and regulatory 
incidence, it is not necessary to take a stand as to which insurer’s coding regime is the 
“correct” reference coding or to identify the pathways by which coding regimes diverge. 
In our empirical setting, this means that it doesn’t matter whether physicians under 
Traditional Medicare pay too little attention to coding or whether MA insurers pay too 
much attention to coding. It also doesn’t matter whether the coding differences are a 
response to the incentive to upcode or due to other factors. 
Second, we provide a simple and intuitive method for estimating the presence, 
direction, and extent of coding differences across plans in selection markets. Our method 
is widely applicable and has minimal data requirements, and may be particularly useful in 
analyzing risk adjustment in the ACA Exchanges in the future.
38
 It may also be useful for 
separating selection and other outcomes in other contexts where, within a geographic 
market, a fixed population chooses between public and private providers of a service. For 
example, our method could be used to estimate causal effects of charter schools on 
graduation rates and test scores in a way that is robust to endogenous sorting of students 
across schools. 
                                                        
38 Private insurers in individual markets have historically kept claims records proprietary. State all-payer 
databases make this data available, but individual identifiers often change when an individual moves from one 
insurer to another, making it impossible to track individuals’ risk scores across plans. Therefore, upcoding in 
the Exchanges, may need to be analyzed using only market-level data, or, at best, without the ability to follow 
individuals between plans. 
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Third, we provide the first econometric evidence of upcoding in MA. We find that 
risk scores in MA are about 4 percent of the mean higher than they would have been in 
FFS Medicare for the same beneficiary. While Medicare Advantage enrollees look 
healthier than FFS enrollees because of selection, in reality they are even healthier than 
they look. While, similar to Brown et al. (2012), we cannot perform a full welfare 
analysis of this coding difference, we note that the public spending implications are 
significant. Medicare is the costliest public health insurance program in the world, and a 
significant fraction of US government spending. Absent a coding correction, our 
estimates imply excess payments of around $4 billion to Medicare Advantage plans 
annually.
39
 This subsidy distorts Medicare beneficiaries’ choice of health insurance away 
from Traditional Medicare, effectively providing a larger voucher for purchasing an MA 
plan than for purchasing Traditional Medicare. We also note that increasing the 
competitiveness of the MA market would have no effect on this margin of distortion. 
More broadly, our empirical results yield important insights into the potential for coding 
heterogeneity in other markets. Risk adjustment is the core of modern healthcare payment 
reform. In the ACA Exchanges, for example, a nearly identical risk adjustment algorithm 
will be used to enforce ex post transfers among insurers.
40
  
Finally, our findings contribute to the growing policy literature on the broader 
welfare impacts of the Medicare Advantage program. Besides the benefits of expanding 
choice, one popular argument in favor of Medicare Advantage is that it might create 
                                                        
39 We estimate that in 2010, the government paid private Medicare plans about $97 billion 
40 The presence of upcoding in Exchanges would imply that the mandated RA transfers partly reward coding 
intensity, rather than merely compensate adversely selected plans for higher cost patients. This incentivizes 
insurers to divert resources toward coding at the cost of services valued by consumers. 
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important spillover effects on Traditional Medicare.  Studies of physician and hospital 
behavior in response to the growth of managed care (see for example, Baker (1996), 
Glied (2002), Glazer and McGuire (2002), and Frank and Zeckhauser (2007)) suggest the 
possibility of positive externalities in which the existence of managed care plans lowers 
costs for all local insurers. Indeed, Baicker et al (2012) find that the expansion of MA 
resulted in lower hospital costs in Traditional Medicare. Our findings indicate that these 
benefits of MA do not come without costs. Any positive spillovers should be balanced 
alongside the additional cost (and deadweight loss of taxation) of enrolling a beneficiary 
in MA due to both positive selection and upcoding. 
The outline for the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide 
reduced form, suggestive evidence of coding differences between MA and TM, by 
comparing coding patterns in the two market segments using micro claims data. In 
Section 3, we derive a general expression for the implicit subsidy caused by coding 
differences and provide a graphical explanation of our method for estimating upcoding in 
the presence of selection. In Section 4, we discuss our data and empirical setting. Section 
5 presents results, and section 6 discusses several implications of our findings for policy 
and economic efficiency. Section 7 concludes. 
Section 2: Upcoding in Practice 
What does upcoding look like in practice?  Risk adjustment models include large 
numbers of explanatory variables, consisting mostly of dummy variables indicating 
whether an individual received a diagnosis code that maps to a particular diagnosis 
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grouping.
41
 These diagnoses are generated during encounters between providers and 
patients, and recorded in claims that are sent to insurers. 
At the extreme, insurers can commit outright fraud by adding diagnosis codes to a 
patient’s records with no medical basis.42 But a more subtle (and legal) approach is 
simply to dedicate more resources to carefully and meticulously coding every eligible 
diagnosis. As mentioned above, insurers can construct contracts with providers to 
incentivize coding. In addition, insurers purchase commercial software that has the sole 
function of scanning medical records and determining for each individual the most 
lucrative combination of codes consistent with their health state.
43
 In some cases these 
software products, which are aimed at gaming the risk adjustment algorithms, are 
designed and marketed by the very same organizations that developed the risk scoring 
algorithms used by regulators. Other strategies may include requiring patients to come in 
each year for an “evaluation and management visit,” which is inexpensive to the insurer, 
but during which codes can be added which otherwise would have gone undiscovered. 
Insurers may also choose to selectively contract with providers that code more 
aggressively. 
                                                        
41 The most popular of these groupings of diagnoses are Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCCs), Diagnosis-
related Groups (DRGs), and Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACGs). 
42 For example, in United States v. Janke 2009, a Florida-based Medicare Advantage insurer was found to be 
fraudulently adding diagnosis codes to claims, resulting in average overpayments of $3,015 per enrollee for 
around 10,000 enrollees. 
43 See http://www.apixio.com/apixio-hcc-optimizer 
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Section 3: Identifying Upcoding 
Section 3.1: Risk Adjustment 
We begin by briefly describing a model of risk-adjusted payments to health 
plans/providers. A regulator pays plans risk adjusted payments from a fund, or enforces 
transfers between plans. The fund can be financed via tax revenues or via fees assessed to 
health plans by the regulator.
44
 We consider the case of two health plans, though the 
extension to several plans is straightforward. The plans receive a payment from the 
regulator for each individual they enroll. The payment to plan   for enrolling individual 
  is equal to the individual’s risk score,   , multiplied by some benchmark payment,  , set 
by the regulator:   
      . The benchmark payment can be equal to average actual 
costs in the full population of enrollees, as in the ACA exchanges, or some statutory 
amount, as in Medicare Advantage.
45
 The risk score       ̂ is calculated by multiplying 
a vector of risk adjusters,   , by a vector of risk adjustment coefficients,  ̂. The risk 
adjusters typically consist of a set of dummy variables for demographic groups (usually 
age-by-sex cells) and a set of dummy variables for diagnosis groups. Diagnosis groups 
are mapped from the diagnosis codes contained in health insurance claims. The data used 
to generate    can originate from the prior year’s insurance claims (a prospective model) 
or the current year’s claims (a concurrent model). The implicit assumption in the theory 
                                                        
44 These are the two most common ways risk adjustment is funded in practice with the former being used in 
Medicaid, Medicare Advantage, Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands and the latter being used in Switzerland 
and the Exchanges in the United States. Medicare Part D uses a combination of the two. For details on the 
various mechanisms for implementing the risk adjusted payments, see van de Ven and Ellis 2000. 
45 In MA,   is set by a complex formula that is partially tied the average cost of enrolling a beneficiary in 
Traditional Medicare in the local area. 
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of risk-adjustment is that    does not vary according to the plan in which a consumer is 
enrolled. The risk adjustment coefficients,  ̂, are usually estimated from a regression of 
actual treatment costs on the risk adjusters in some reference population.
46
  
Section 3.2: Upcoding 
We define upcoding as differences in coding practices across plans that would 
lead to two plans generating distinct risk scores for the same individual. If the risk score 
is a characteristic of a consumer-plan pair, then risk adjustment compensates plan 
characteristics, and not solely consumer characteristics. Because   and   are set by the 
regulator and fixed across insurers, upcoding can arise only from differences in the 
recording of diagnoses on claims that map to the risk score. Formally, we relax the fixed 
risk scoring assumption by allowing the risk adjusters,   
 
, for individual   to vary by 
plan. It is straightforward to show that the difference between the risk adjusted payment 
for individual   if she enrolls in plan   and the payment if she enrolls in plan    is: 
  
    
    
     ̂   
 
   
  
  
 
Thus, plan   would receive a subsidy,   
 
, for enrolling individual  , the size and direction 
of which is determined by the intensity of its coding. In the case of Medicare Advantage, 
if MA insurers would assign more (or more generously reimbursed) diagnoses to patients, 
this is equivalent to providing a voucher for the purchase of MA that is in excess of the 
                                                        
46 For example, if    were actual costs for individual  , and the estimating equation were          , then 
 ̂   ̂
 ̅
⁄  . The choice of reference population is not important for analyzing the effects of coding differences 
across plans. 
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Traditional Medicare voucher by the amount:   ̂   
     
   . In the empirical exercise, 
we operationalize the risk score for individual   in plan   as equal to the “true risk” plus a 
plan-specific coding factor:   
       . 
47
 We think about the plan-specific coding 
factor,   , as coming from plan profit maximization where plan  ’s profits are defined as 
follows: 
   ∑{       [  (     (     ))     (  )        ]}
 
   
 
In this expression,         represents the probability that individual   will enroll in plan   
and        represents individual  ’s utilization of medical care, both as decreasing 
functions of the shadow price of medical care,   , chosen by the plan.
48
 Additionally,    
represents the coding intensity chosen by the plan and         is the cost to the plan of 
increased coding intensity. We model the plan-specific coding factor,          , as a 
decreasing function of the shadow price of medical care (      and as an increasing 
function of coding intensity (     . This is because an individual’s risk score can 
change due to shifts in the “extensive margin” (increased encounters with physicians that 
can result in additional diagnoses) or the “intensive margin” (increased number of 
diagnoses from each visit). Let   
  and   
  be the values of    and    that maximize plan 
 ’s profits. In our operationalization of the risk score for individual   in plan   we think of 
                                                        
47 In the ACA Exchanges risk-adjusted payments will be based on a relative risk score, rather than an absolute 
risk score. In the appendix, we show that if we assume the additive coding factor the implicit subsidy in this 
case is decreasing in the proportion of individuals enrolled in plan  . 
48 One could also allow    to vary across services as in Glazer and McGuire (2002). While this would have 
important implications for the structure of optimal risk adjustment when the fixed risk scoring assumption 
does not hold, it is not important for the effects of risk adjustment on costs (the focus of this paper), so we 
abstract from it here. 
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   as being equal to      
    
  . This shows that coding differences can come first from 
heterogeneous costs of coding intensity across plans, but differences can also come from 
differences across plans in the relationship between the shadow price of medical care and 
utilization and differences in the relationship between the shadow price and enrollment. 
Additionally, it is important to note for our empirical exercise that in one segment (MA) 
plans are both profit maximizing and subject to risk adjusted payments, while in the other 
segment (FFS), neither of these are true. 
 The vulnerability of a risk adjustment regime to manipulation can vary depending 
on the risk adjusters chosen by the regulator. In the extreme, risk adjusters based solely 
on easily observable demographic variables such as age and gender could not be 
heterogeneously coded across plans.
49
    
3.3 Identifying Upcoding in Selection Markets 
  The central difficulty of identifying upcoding arises from selection on risk scores. 
At the health plan level, average risk scores can differ across plans competing in the same 
market either because of coding practice differences for identical patients, or because 
patients with systematically different health conditions are attracted to different plans. At 
the individual level, the counterfactual risk score that a person would generate in another 
plan is unobservable.
50
  
                                                        
49 This is the intuition for risk adjusters based on diagnoses rather than utilization, since the former are arguably 
less likely to vary across plans than the latter. 
50 Even examining switchers, who enroll in plan A one year and plan B the next, is problematic for identifying 
coding differences between plans because the switching behavior could be motivated by an unobserved (to the 
econometrician) health trajectory, which would have a direct effect on coded conditions and therefore risk 
scores. 
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Our solution to the identification problem is based on the recognition that within a 
large geographic market, the total population distribution of health conditions (among all 
enrollees in all health plans) should not change much year-to-year. Thus if the average 
risk score in the entire market changes in response to a net shifting of individuals 
between health plans within the market, it is indicative of differences in coding practices 
between the plans.  
Figure 2.1 provides the graphical intuition for this idea. We depict two plans, 
labeled A and B, which are intended to correspond roughly to TM and MA. All 
consumers are enrolled in one plan or the other. Consistent with our application below, 
we assume that plan B (like Medicare Advantage) is advantageously selected, meaning 
that lower risk individuals prefer it.
51
  
We begin in the top panel of Figure 2.1 by assuming no upcoding. The panel 
shows 3 curves: average risk in A (A Risk), average risk in B (B Risk), and the average 
risk of all enrollees in the market (Total Risk). The proportion of individuals enrolled in 
B (B penetration) increases along the horizontal axis. The downward slope of the A Risk 
curve and the B Risk Curve indicate that A is adversely selected, and that B is 
advantageously selected. For example, the plan B average risk at low levels of plan B 
market share is low because the few beneficiaries choosing B are especially low risk. 
Because the panel depicts only selection and not upcoding, the total risk averaged over 
both plans (i.e. the market) is constant, regardless of plan B market share. 
                                                        
51 For the purposes of our model, we offer no explanation for why lower risk individuals choose MA first and 
why the marginal MA enrollee is higher risk than the other MA enrollees. Nonetheless, this is a common 
assumption and the existing evidence supports it. See for example, Newhouse et al (2012) and Brown et al. 
(2012). 
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The bottom panel of Figure 2.1 incorporates upcoding. We add a new curve, B 
Risk
A
, which is the counterfactual average risk of plan B enrollees under plan A coding 
practices. We shift the B Risk
B 
curve up to indicate that coding practices in B are such 
that individuals receive higher risk scores than they would have under A coding practices. 
This is a graphical depiction of our notion of upcoding, and makes no assumptions about 
the source of coding differences. Note that the distance between the B Risk
A 
curve and 
the A Risk
A 
curves is the selection effect and the distance between the B Risk
B 
curve and 
the B Risk
A 
curve is the coding difference effect. 
While the vertical difference between the B Risk
B 
curve and the B Risk
A 
is the 
appropriate theoretical construct, it is unlikely that the counterfactual B Risk
A 
curve 
would ever be observable. Fortunately, the bottom panel of Figure 2.1 suggests an 
alternative way to identify coding differences. Comparing the top and bottom panels of 
Figure 2.1 shows that if and only if there are coding differences between A and B, the 
slope of the total risk curve will no longer be equal to zero. Instead, if the same individual 
would receive a higher risk score in B than in FFS, the Total Risk curve will be upward 
sloping. This is true whether or not one of the plans is adversely selected. The implication 
is that with variation in market share that is exogenous to the underlying population 
health, we can identify the presence of coding differences between A and B as a non-zero 
slope of the total risk curve. Further, the slope of the curve identifies the extent of coding 
differences and allows calculation of the implicit subsidy caused by the risk-adjusted 
payment system. 
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The figure assumes that the B and A average risk curves are linear for tractability. 
However, identifying the existence of coding differences depends only on the assumption 
that variation in market share is exogenous to the risk scores. Under any assumptions 
about selection and any assumptions about the distribution of health states in the 
population, upcoding will manifest as a non-zero slope of the total risk curve. Estimating 
the magnitude of coding differences via the slope of the total risk curve requires only the 
additional assumption that the upcoding factor is uniform across enrollees, again 
regardless of the shapes or even signs of the plan-specific risk curves. We assume that 
upcoding is uniform across enrollees in the empirical section, but acknowledge that this is 
a local approximation, since we have no method for identifying heterogeneity in how 
individual enrollees are coded when using aggregate, market-level data. We also note that 
this assumption is similar to other linearity assumptions made in the public finance 
literature when calculating policy-relevant parameters (for example, see Einav and 
Finkelstein 2011). 
Section 4: Data and Setting 
Section 4.1: MA Plans 
We now apply our insight for separately identifying selection and upcoding to the 
case of Medicare. Individuals who are eligible for Medicare can choose between the 
traditional fee-for-service (FFS) plan offered by the government or coverage through a 
private plan chosen in the Medicare Advantage (MA) market. Many of the plans 
available in the MA market charge no additional premium for enrollment. They are 
attractive to Medicare enrollees because they offer more comprehensive financial 
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coverage, such as lower deductibles and coinsurance rates, and additional benefits, such 
as dental care. The tradeoff faced by beneficiaries selecting an MA plan is that most of 
these plans are managed care plans. They restrict enrollees to a particular network of 
doctors, and may impose gatekeeping to specialists via referral requirements.  
 The government pays MA plans a fixed amount (capitation payment) for each 
individual they enroll, which is a function of a base or benchmark rate determined by the 
individual’s county of residence and a person-specific adjustment determined by her risk 
score, as in Section 3. (See the appendix for details on the exact payment formula.) Plans 
receive higher payments for enrolling individuals with higher risk scores.
52
 The county-
specific benchmarks are tied to the average cost of individuals enrolled in FFS Medicare 
in that county, though Congress and CMS have made many ad-hoc adjustments over 
time.
53
 Risk scores are determined using the CMS-HCC risk adjustment model, which 
includes indicators for age and sex cells and indicators for a series of diagnosis groups 
known as Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCCs) (Pope et al. 2004). 
Section 4.2: Data  
Tracing the curves in Figure 2.1 requires observing market-level risk scores 
across a range of MA penetration levels. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) provides publicly available data on the enrollment by county by contract in 
                                                        
52 Plan payments are actually a function of MA risk relative to FFS risk. This means that any payment 
differences are due to differential coding in MA vs. FFS, i.e.         . See the appendix for a discussion of 
why equilibrium coding would differ between FFS and MA. 
53 Over the time period we study, county base rates were set as the maximum of the relevant (urban/rural) 
payment floor, the TM costs of TM enrollees in the county according to a five year moving average lagged 
three years, a 2% update over the prior year, and a variable update determined by national TM cost growth. 
Payments to plans were further adjusted from the county rate according to a bidding scheme. For more details 
on the determination of county-level payments over this period, see Baicker et al (2013). 
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Medicare Advantage plans.
54,55
 For traditional Medicare enrollees, CMS reports 
enrollment by county. We combine this information to construct county-level MA 
penetration. For each county-year, we also observe the average FFS risk score and the 
MA average risk score. We construct the total market risk score as an enrollment-
weighted average of the FFS and MA risk scores. 
We exploit the fact that MA actually consists of around 3000 separate geographic 
markets defined by county boundaries, each with distinct menus of MA plan offerings, 
prices, and penetration rates. For most of our analysis, we collapse all MA plans together, 
and consider the markets as divided between the MA and FFS segments. The top of Table 
2.1 lists penetration rates for all of Medicare Advantage, over the time period of our 
data.
56
 The units of observations are counties, and our sample reflects data for 3,133 
counties.
57
 We note these statistics are representative of counties, not individuals, since 
our unit of analysis is the county-year. Table 2.1 shows that average within-county MA 
penetration increases substantially during our short, 5-year time period. In the top panel 
of Figure 2.3, we put this growth in historical context, charting the rapid growth in MA 
that began in the mid 2000s. In the bottom panel, we plot the histogram of differences 
between county-level MA penetration in 2006 and penetration in 2010. There is 
substantial variation in penetration changes and it is largely positive.  
                                                        
54 A contract covers a single insurer and may include one or several health plans. 
55 See the appendix for the web sources for the data 
56 2006 and 2010 are the first and last years for which data is on risk scores is available. 
57 We eliminate Los Angeles County because in one dataset the county has two SSA county codes while others 
it only has one. Because it is unclear to us how to merge these data for Los Angeles, we drop it from the 
sample. We also eliminate any SSA counties that do not have a corresponding FIPS county code (mostly 
counties in Puerto Rico) to facilitate merging of control variables. 
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This growth in penetration over the mid to late 2000s is widely attributed to the 
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, which, among other changes, increased base 
payment rates in many counties and added a prescription drug benefit that was highly 
complimentary to Medicare Advantage plans (see for example, Gold 2009). In Figure 2.4, 
we show that this MA penetration growth, while geographically heterogeneous was not 
obviously limited to only certain regions or to urban areas. The figure shades each county 
according to its quartile of penetration changes. 
Table 2.1 also shows that, consistent with previous evidence, risk scores are lower 
in MA than in FFS—though we show evidence below that they are nonetheless inflated 
via upcoding. The lower risk scores among MA plans are suggestive of advantageous to 
selection into MA on risk score. 
Section 4.3: Empirical Framework 
We approach identification in two ways. First, to control for any unobserved local 
factors--such as physician practice styles, medical infrastructure, or health behaviors--that 
could simultaneously affect population health and MA, we estimate fixed effects models 
of the form 
                                                  (1)  
 
where         is the total market-level risk,     and    are county and year fixed effects, 
    represents a set of state-specific time trends, and     is a vector of time-varying 
county characteristics capturing shifts in demographics (age), economic conditions 
(unemployment, median income, and uninsurance rates), and health care infrastructure 
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(number of hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and hospital beds).
58
     captures all 
unobserved properties of the local market that are fixed over our short panel and     
captures all unobserved state factors that vary linearly over time.          represents 
the MA penetration rate in county   at time    . The coefficient of interest is   , on this 
lagged MA penetration, rather than contemporaneous penetration. This is because of an 
institutional feature in which risk scores are calculated based on the prior year’s medical 
history. 
Our second approach to identification exploits this institutional feature of how 
risk scores are calculated in Medicare Advantage. We illustrate the timing in Figure 2.2. 
The individual’s risk score that is used for payment throughout year     is based on 
diagnoses from the enrollment period between   and    . This implies, for example, 
that if an individual moves to MA in year  , the risk score for her entire first year in MA 
will be based on diagnoses she received while in TM in the prior plan year. Therefore, 
while the risk pools of the MA and TM market segments will change contemporaneously 
in response to a change in MA penetration (as consumers are reshuffled from one 
segment to another while retaining their old risk scores), the overall market level risk 
should remain constant. After the first year of MA enrollment, the risk score of the 
switcher will be updated to include diagnoses she received while enrolled in her first year 
                                                        
58 Data for the control variables comes from the SEER dataset at the National Cancer Institute (age) and the 
Area Resource File (all other controls). 
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of MA coverage. Therefore, coding differences between plans are revealed as changes to 
market-level risk, but only with a one year lag.
59
  
Because of this timing, a positive coefficient on lagged penetration (    indicates 
more intensive coding in MA relative to FFS. In contrast, the coefficient on 
contemporaneous penetration should be equal to zero. We add a contemporaneous MA 
penetration term to equation (1), 
                                                          (2) 
and test whether    is equal to zero. 
This is a powerful placebo test, revealing any source of contemporaneous 
correlation between penetration and county risk that could contaminate our results. If    
is different from zero, this would suggest that there is some factor correlated with MA 
penetration and true underlying population health reflected in risk scores.
60 
If    is not 
different from zero, it supports our identifying assumption that there are no time-varying 
county characteristics that are correlated with           and          other than the 
ones that we control for in    .  
In addition to allowing the data the opportunity to falsify our identifying 
assumption, we argue that this assumption is plausible. On the supply side, it implies that 
insurers don’t base their decision to enter a county, or base changes to their product 
                                                        
59 The switcher case is the easiest to illustrate, but exactly the same pattern holds for shifts in the choice 
patterns of new beneficiaries. 
60 Appropriate instruments could also be used to find plausibly exogenous variation in MA penetration. We 
attempted to use the instruments developed by Afendulis et al. (2013) and Baicker et al. (2013) but neither were 
well-suited to our data and time period. Because the Afendulis et al. instrument is non-time-varying, many of 
our observations are effectively eliminated, reducing our power by enough that our estimates, though 
consistently positive, are too noisy to make any conclusions. The Baicker et al. instrument is time-varying but 
does not vary enough during our time period to function well. 
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characteristics and prices on year-to-year changes in the average health of the county. 
This seems sensible, given that the dramatic penetration growth over our period appears 
to be driven by regulatory changes to Medicare embodied in the Medicare Modernization 
Act of 2003. We would spuriously estimate upcoding effects in MA only if insurers 
expanded market share by lowering prices or increasing benefits in places where the 
population was simultaneously becoming sicker or older. (Later, we show in a series of 
“randomization tests” that penetration changes do not predict demographic changes in the 
county).  
In terms of consumer choice, our assumption implies that individuals’ demand for 
MA does not increase as the average health in the county declines. This seems plausible, 
given that it has been widely documented that MA plans predominately attract lower risk 
enrollees.  
Perhaps the strongest argument in support of our identification strategy is that true 
underlying population health, reflected especially in prevalence of chronic conditions that 
form the basis for risk scoring, is unlikely to change sharply within a county (i.e. year-to-
year), while changes in reported risk due to coding will change instantaneously in the 
second year of MA enrollment for the mechanical reason described above.  
 Although estimating selection is not our primary goal, it is important to note that 
the timing in the selection regressions is different. In contrast to the market level risk, 
MA and FFS specific risk should change contemporaneously with changes in penetration 
due to selection, as shown in Figure 2.2. This is because if, say, a high risk-score enrollee 
switches from MA to FFS, his higher risk score immediately contributes to the new FFS 
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average. MA and FFS risk may additionally change with a lag if enrollees switch in 
anticipation of future health shocks, making     effects on TM and MA average risk 
ambiguous. To examine this and simultaneously evaluate whether MA is advantageously 
selected on the margin of penetration expansion, we run the following regressions of 
segment-specific risk scores on penetration: 
                                                        (3) 
                                                         (4) 
Section 5: Results  
We begin in Table 2.2 by reporting results on selection. We estimate the slopes of 
the MA and FFS risk curves, following equations (2) and (3). In the first three columns, 
the dependent variable is county-level average FFS risk. In the second three it is MA risk. 
The three specifications for each outcome differ by the inclusion of controls. All columns 
include state time trends and county and year fixed effects. Columns (2) and (5) add 
controls for economic conditions and narrow age bins, and columns (3) and (6) add 
controls for health care infrastructure. (See table notes for details.) In most specifications, 
the estimates of the slopes of the MA and FFS risk curves are positive and significant. 
Thus we find, consistent with previous evidence in Brown et al (2011) and 
Newhouse et al (2012), that Medicare Advantage is advantageously selected on the risk 
score.  An effect size of 0.05 on FFS average risk, indicates that a 10% increase in MA 
penetration leads to an increase in the FFS average risk score of around 0.004-0.005.
61
 In 
                                                        
61 While the FFS results are quite similar to the findings of Newhouse et al. (2012), our MA result may seem to 
contradict their finding that individuals switching into MA get healthier as MA penetration increases (see 
Newhouse et al. appendix). We point out that in reality our analysis is quite different. Instead of measuring 
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MA, the magnitudes are larger than FFS, perhaps reflecting that marginal enrollees 
represent a greater share of the smaller MA risk population. These slopes provide 
evidence of advantageous selection into MA on the risk score, consistent with the figure 
in Section 3.  Importantly, any selection on the risk score is compensated for.
62
 However, 
in order for risk adjustment to have any effect at all, there must be selection on the risk 
score, so it is important to know whether this type of selection exists (Layton 2014).
63
  
Table 2.3 reports our main upcoding results.  The coefficient of interest is on 
lagged MA penetration. In column 1 we present estimates of the baseline model 
controlling for state time trends and county and year fixed effects. The coefficient on 
lagged MA penetration indicates that a county going from 0% to 100% MA penetration 
would cause an increase in the total average risk score by 0.04 points, or about half a 
standard deviation. This implies that an individual’s risk score in MA is about 4% higher 
than it would have been in FFS. In columns 2 and 3, we control for time-varying 
observable county characteristics. The coefficient on lagged MA penetration is largely 
unaffected.  Table 2.3 also shows that coefficient estimates for contemporaneous 
penetration (MA Pent) support our placebo test. Unlike the case in the selection 
regressions in Table 2.2, here the contemporaneous coefficients are not statistically 
different from zero in almost all specifications. These coefficients imply that the health of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
changes in county-level MA average risk correlated with changes in MA penetration, they measure changes in 
the risk scores of individuals switching into MA correlated with changes in MA penetration. 
62 We note that the “selection” we estimate here is different from most discussions of selection in the 
economics literature. We estimate selection on a risk score rather than selection on costs net of premiums, 
implying nothing about selection on uncompensated costs and welfare losses from that selection. See Einav 
and Finkelstein (2010) for a useful summary of this topic 
63 See Layton (2014) for a useful discussion of this important point. Basically, the effects of risk adjustment on 
equilibrium sorting across plans depend on the slopes of the “predicted” cost curve and the “residual” cost 
curve. In these regressions we measure the slope of the “predicted” cost curve. We cannot measure the slope 
of the “residual” cost curve due to data constraints. 
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the population was not drifting in a way that is predicted by contemporaneous or even 
lagged changes in penetration.  
Columns 4-6 repeat the specifications in columns 1-3, controlling for PFFS 
penetration. PFFS plans are quite different from other MA plans. During our sample 
period they did not have networks or negotiate rates with providers.
64
 Instead PFFS plans 
acted exactly like FFS Medicare, reimbursing Medicare providers for any services 
provided to their enrollees at Medicare rates. At the same time, much of the variation in 
MA penetration during our sample period comes from increases in PFS enrollment. Due 
to these important differences and concerns that potentially endogenous PFFS penetration 
may be driving our results, we separate out the effect of PFFS plans and all other MA 
plans. The coefficients in columns 4-6 represent the effect of changes in the penetration 
rate of all MA plans except for PFFS plans on market risk. Interestingly, when 
controlling for PFFS penetration separately, the contemporaneous coefficients move 
closer to zero and the lagged coefficients increase slightly. This implies that rather than 
driving our results, if anything, PFFS penetration attenuates them. 
We can extend the placebo test further by examining additional leads and lags, but 
are somewhat limited by our short panel. In Table 2.4, we included a variety of lead and 
lag combinations, under the intuition that upcoding effects should only be reflected in the 
coefficient on one-year-lagged penetration, while significant coefficients on 
contemporaneous effects or any other leads or lags would provide evidence of 
                                                        
64 In 2011, PFFS plans were required to establish rates and Medicare providers were no longer required to 
accept Medicare rates from PFFS plans. 
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confounding trends.
65
 Standard errors increase slightly and the sample size varies from 
specification to specification because of the short panel, but the patterns are consistent 
with a true causal effect. We argue that because population variables tend to change 
gradually rather than discretely, the precisely timed response with a lag of one-year is 
more consistent with a mechanical coding effect than an impulse change in true 
population health. 
In Table 2.5 we restrict the sample by eliminating counties with small shifts in 
MA penetration (column 1) and eliminating counties with relatively large shifts in MA 
penetration (column 2). These results indicate that much of the effect is coming from 
counties with large shifts in MA penetration. Because large shifts in MA penetration are 
much more likely to be due to supply-side factors (since large, rapid shifts in local 
population demographics and health are rare), we take this as further evidence that the 
positive coefficient on MA penetration is not due to spurious changes in demand due to 
health. In columns 3 and 4 we separate the sample into urban and rural counties. We do 
this because MA plan payments vary according to this definition. The effect seems to be 
larger in rural counties, but it is still positive for urban counties and statistically 
indistinguishable from the rural estimate. The estimate for urban counties is less precise 
because much of the time-variation in MA penetration occurs in rural counties during our 
sample period. 
                                                        
65 It is possible that “upcoding” effects get larger the longer an individual is in MA. This would result in 
positive coefficients for all lags of MA penetration. We do not find evidence of this, suggesting that the 
upcoding effect is instantaneous and constant. 
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Finally, we test the “randomization” of our changes to MA penetration by 
evaluating whether they predict changes in demographic makeups of counties. These 
results are presented in Table 2.6. Column 1 shows that there is a weak relationship 
between lagged penetration and the proportion of individuals eligible for Medicare due to 
their age. Columns 2-5 represent a more important falsification test. Because risk scores 
include a demographic component that increases with age, our results could be explained 
by a correlation between lagged MA penetration and aging of the Medicare population. 
The coefficients on lagged MA penetration in columns 2-5 show the relationship between 
the proportion of individuals in each Medicare-eligible age group and MA penetration. 
All of the coefficients are close to zero, implying no relationship between MA 
penetration and the age distribution of individuals eligible for Medicare within a county. 
Section 6: Discussion 
We have so far ignored the possibility that coding differences from one plan may 
“spill over” onto the risk scores of a population enrolled in another plan. This could 
occur, for example, because providers often see patients from a mix of different health 
plans. Therefore, if an MA health plan managed to influence a provider’s coding or 
practice patterns, it could impact the risk scores of all individuals served by the provider, 
including those insured under TM.
66
 We discuss spillovers at length in the appendix, but 
here we briefly note that while spillovers may affect our estimate of the implicit subsidy 
due to upcoding, they do not affect our estimate of the presence, direction, or extent of 
coding differences between MA and TM. 
                                                        
66 This would be unlikely if the coding of diagnoses were done at the health plan level, rather than the provider 
level or if “upcoding” consists of plans selectively contracting with providers that code aggressively. 
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 To put the size of our parameter estimates in context, recall that the subsidy to 
Medicare Advantage is equal to the upcoding factor multiplied by the county benchmark 
rate         . In 2010, the average annual value of   was about $10,500.
67
 Given our 
estimate of         , this implies a subsidy of about $419 per MA enrollee in 2010, or 
a total potential subsidy of about $4 billion. Since Medicare Advantage has different 
penetration rates across regions of the country and in urban versus rural areas, this 
implies impacts that are unequal geographically. For illustration, Figure 2.5 plots MA 
penetration by county in 2011. The Great Lakes region and the West appear to reap the 
largest per capita gains from the subsidy. From the consumer choice perspective, this 
subsidy effectively generates a voucher for the purchase of an MA plan that is higher 
than the implicit Traditional Medicare voucher, distorting consumer choice toward the 
private option.  
 While we document the impact on public spending and the choice distortion, it is 
difficult to take a stance on the welfare consequences of these subsidies. We can, 
however, say something about the costs of risk adjustment. Brown et al. (2013) estimate 
that shifts in selection caused by the implementation of risk adjustment led to a $30 
billion “differential payment,” or subsidy in our terminology, to MA plans. We argue that 
their estimate of the cost of risk adjustment is incomplete because it does not account for 
the subsidy generated by coding differences between TM and MA plans. Instead, the cost 
of risk adjustment is the combination of our estimate of increased costs due to coding 
differences and their estimate of increased costs due to selection. While our estimate of a 
                                                        
67 We estimate   as the total amount paid to MA plans (about $124 billion) divided by the total MA enrollment 
(about 12 million). Payment and enrollment estimates are from MEDPAC (2012). 
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$4 billion subsidy from coding differences is significantly smaller than their estimate of 
the $30 billion subsidy from selection, it is far from a trivial cost of risk adjustment.  
Speaking more generally about the welfare impact of a subsidy to MA plans, it may be 
the case that it is welfare improving to pay MA plans more than the cost of enrolling 
beneficiaries in TM, if the MA plans use the extra payments to provide additional 
benefits.
68
 Further, benefits of MA may not accrue privately to enrollees. For example, 
Baicker, Chernew, and Robbins (2012) find that the existence of MA creates local 
spillovers that lower hospital spending for Traditional Medicare patients. Nonetheless, 
from both a public costs and welfare perspective, evaluating such positive externalities 
requires understanding the magnitude of the hidden subsidy to MA, which creates both 
additional public costs and creates deadweight loss due to taxation. That is the main goal 
of this paper. 
Section 7: Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework for thinking about the effects of 
upcoding on plan payments and an empirical framework for estimating upcoding in the 
presence of selection. In the context of recent changes to payments structures in US 
health insurance markets, this paper provides a framework for analyzing the implicit 
transfers between health plans in the Exchanges due to risk adjustment. Researchers can 
easily adopt our method of estimating upcoding using the slope of the total market risk 
curve, given exogenous variation in enrollment across plans.  
                                                        
68 See Hall (2011) which estimates the return on government spending in MA to be 96-186% 
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Our estimates show quantitatively important subsidies to Medicare Advantage 
due to coding differences. One apparent solution to this unintended subsidy and price 
distortion is simple: As long as the upcoding factor can be determined, the regulator can 
deflate payments to market segments or specific plans by the relevant upcoding factor. 
Indeed, CMS currently deflates payments to all MA plans uniformly. However, this 
solution requires CMS to constantly estimate upcoding and may be impractical at the 
insurer or plan level, rather than at the market segment level we examine here (all of 
MA). Currently, CMS is considering abandoning the deflation of MA risk scores, and 
instead attempting to address upcoding by including MA claims in the estimation of the 
risk adjustment coefficients. Our model clearly shows that including MA enrollees in the 
estimation sample will not change the upcoding problem. A change in the estimation 
sample simply changes the coefficients  ̂, but the upcoding problem stems from 
differences in the diagnoses those coefficients multiply,   
 
.  
Ultimately, risk adjustment addresses a very important problem: adverse selection 
and the many margins of distortion it can create. In a second-best world in which adverse 
selection is an inherent feature of competitive insurance markets, the solution to the 
upcoding problem is not to abandon risk adjustment. However, the focus in the risk 
adjustment literature on maximizing “fit” of payments to expected costs is the wrong 
objective function. Glazer and McGuire (2000) argue that risk adjustment systems should 
be focused on the incentives faced by insurance plans, rather than fit. Applying that 
insight to our results suggests that an important dimension of incentives is the incentive 
to manipulate coding. Further, we argue that to ensure that risk adjustment does not 
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inappropriately subsidize one plan over another, attention should be paid not just to the 
potential manipulability of risk adjusters, but also to how much they may naturally vary 
across plans for any reason whatsoever.  
The optimal (second best) payment policy almost certainly includes risk 
adjustment, but with adjustments that reflect both predictiveness of costs and 
susceptibility to coding heterogeneity. For instance, “Diabetes” may optimally receive a 
larger weight than under the current system, while “Diabetes with acute complications” 
may optimally receive a lower weight than currently, since the former may be less 
susceptible to differential coding by different plans. Given the large role that risk 
adjustment is scheduled to play in the current health reform taking place in the United 
States, development of such optimal payment policies that take differential coding into 
account is potentially of great importance. 
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Figure 2.1: Separating Selection from Upcoding 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: The horizontal axis measures the market share of plan B. The vertical axis 
measures average risk for each level of market share, either associated with a 
particular plan or overall in the market. All consumers choose either plan A or plan B. 
``Total Average Risk'' is the average of observed risk scores taken over the entire 
market, regardless of plan choice. The dashed curve in the bottom panel is the 
counterfactual risk curve that would result from scoring Plan B enrollees according to 
Plan A diagnosis practices. 
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Figure 2.2: Timing Illustration: Coding Effects Occur with a Lag in Medicare 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: This diagram highlights the timing of changes to segment-specific (TM vs MA) 
average risk and market level average risk in response to a change in MA penetration. 
For the first year in either MA or TM, a switcher carries forward a risk score based on 
his last year in the other segment. Therefore, upcoding effects should not be apparent 
for the first plan year following the change in enrollment. The dashed curves after 
period $t+1$ for the MA and TM average risk curves indicate that changes in segment-
specific average risk in the years following the switch are ambiguous. 
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Figure 2.3: Growth in Medicare Advantage (MA) Penetration 
 
 
 
  
Notes: The top panel displays national trends in MA penetration, where the unit 
of observation is the Medicare beneficiary. Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2013. The bottom panel displays a histogram of within-county changes in 
penetration from 2006 to 2010, using the main estimation sample. The unit of 
observation here is the county. 
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Figure 2.4: Geographic Heterogeneity in MA Penetration Growth 
 
 
 
  
Notes: MA penetration growth by quartile, from 2006 to 2010. Darker regions 
experienced the largest positive change in MA penetration. 
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Figure 2.5: Implicit Transfer Across Geography Due to Upcoding 
 
 
  
Notes: MA penetration by quartile as of 2010. Darker regions have the highest 
MA penetration. 
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Table 2.1: County-level summary statistics 
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Table 2.2: Selection results: Effect of penetration changes on FFS and MA risk 
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Table 2.3: Upcoding results: Effect of penetration on county aggregate risk 
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Table 2.4: Falsification test: Leads and lags 
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneity in upcoding results 
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Table 2.6: Test of randomization 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RISK CORRIDORS AND REINSURANCE IN HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: 
INSURANCE FOR INSURERS 
 
with Thomas G. McGuire and Anna D. Sinaiko 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 As of October 1, 2013, new state-based or federally-facilitated health insurance 
exchanges have opened their virtual doors for U.S. citizens and legal residents who are 
not eligible for employer-sponsored or public coverage to purchase health insurance.  
These Exchanges represent the most significant policy initiative to increase access to 
health insurance since the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.  Their success will 
depend on, among other things, how insurance plans are paid, and in particular how plans 
are protected against the risk of enrolling some extraordinarily expensive enrollees, 
whether due to random variation, adverse selection, or other market problems.  
There are four primary tools to protect health plans against the financial risk 
associated with adverse selection: pricing of health plan premiums, risk adjustment, 
reinsurance, and risk corridors. Each of these tools ameliorates selection problems 
differently. Age-based pricing of health plan premiums matches revenues for an 
individual more closely to expected costs. Risk adjustment redistributes revenues from 
plans with healthier than average enrollees to plans with sicker than average enrollees. 
Reinsurance pools the costs of the sickest enrollees across plans. Risk corridors 
redistribute revenues from plans earning large profits to plans incurring large losses.
69
  
                                                        
69 One could add the individual mandate to this list, a requirement designed to ensure both low and 
high-risk individuals participate in the risk pool. 
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Much has been written about premium pricing and risk-adjustment (McGuire et 
al. 2013, Glazer et al. 2013, Shi 2013). Here our focus is on reinsurance and risk 
corridors. Fundamentally, these policies act as insurance for insurers. They protect 
insurers from the potential losses that could occur if they enroll an unexpectedly 
unhealthy group of enrollees. However, as with other forms of insurance, the risk 
protection from reinsurance and risk corridors likely comes at a cost: When insurers are 
protected from bad outcomes, they may not try as hard to avoid them, i.e. moral hazard.  
The best form of insurance for insurers, then, would be the one that reduces insurer risk 
as much as possible while limiting efficiency losses from moral hazard. In this paper, we 
simulate the distribution of costs faced by an insurer competing in a Health Insurance 
Exchange. We then use the simulated cost distribution to evaluate the potential of the 
reinsurance and risk corridor policies enacted through the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to 
reduce the risk faced by insurers in the Exchanges. We then develop a framework for 
thinking about efficiency losses from these policies and empirical measures of that 
efficiency loss. We use these measures and the simulated cost distribution to compare the 
power of reinsurance and risk corridors generally to reduce insurer risk with as little 
efficiency loss as possible. 
Insurers reduce risk faced by individuals by taking on individual risk and pooling 
that risk. It may seem odd then to seek to reduce the risk faced by insurers. However, if 
there is too much risk, risk-averse insurers will avoid entering a market, reducing 
competition. Risk-averse insurers will also charge higher premiums to compensate for the 
risk they are taking on, driving up prices in the market, potentially driving healthy 
  
120 
consumers out of the market, leading to adverse selection problems (Cutler and Reber 
1998, Einav et al. 2010, Hackmann et al. 2013).  Given that it may be desirable to reduce 
insurer risk, it is important to evaluate the ability of different policies to accomplish that 
goal. 
When considering optimal policies for reducing the risk faced by insurers, an 
analogy can be drawn to the principles of optimal health insurance set forth by Arrow 
(1963) and Zeckhauser (1970). Briefly, if insurer risk-aversion mimics individual risk 
aversion in that it is based on diminishing marginal utility of profits, a policy that 
reimburses insurers for all costs beyond a certain loss threshold (i.e. full coverage after a 
deductible) is the optimal policy. Similarly, if there is some moral hazard (i.e. insurer 
behavior changes in the presence of the risk reducing policy), partial coverage after a 
deductible will be optimal.  The implication of this result is that in the absence of moral 
hazard, risk corridors, which mimic the “full coverage after a deductible” policy will be 
preferred to reinsurance. The intuition for this claim is as follows: Risk corridor payments 
apply only when a plan’s total costs are in the tails of the total cost distribution whereas 
with reinsurance plans receive payments in every part of the cost distribution.  Because 
risk is reduced most quickly by eliminating the tails of the distribution, risk corridors are 
likely to reduce insurer risk more efficiently than reinsurance. 
The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we provide an explanation of the 
various risk reducing policies being implemented in the ACA Health Insurance 
Exchanges. In Section 3 we set forth a conceptual framework outlining an optimal insurer 
risk reducing policy and how to think about the efficiency consequences of reinsurance 
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and risk corridors. In Section 4 we provide details about a series of simulations we run to 
first assess the ability of the proposed reinsurance and risk corridor policies to reduce 
insurer risk and second compare the efficiency of reinsurance and risk corridors. We also 
describe the dataset of individuals likely to enroll in an Exchange plan that we construct 
from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). In Section 5 we present the results 
of our simulations. In Section 6 we discuss the results and their limitations. 
Section 2: Policy Background 
Reinsurance.  Private reinsurance has been available in the health insurance market for 
many years, and government-sponsored reinsurance has been implemented at the national 
level (e.g. the Medicare Part D program) and the state level (e.g. New York, 
Idaho).  Typically, private reinsurance policies cover only the highest cost cases, while 
government-sponsored reinsurance reimburses costs starting at much lower thresholds 
(Bovbjerg et al., 2008; Swartz, 2006). In Part D for example, Medicare subsidizes 80% of 
any spending on prescription drugs above an enrollee’s out-of-pocket maximum.  This 
has been a non-trivial amount; in 2012 Medicare’s reinsurance payments to plans 
amounted to $14.8 billion, 24% of total Medicare payments to prescription drug plans.   
Previous empirical research has largely used simulation (as opposed to 
evaluations of existing programs) to test the extent that reinsurance reduces a plan’s 
potential losses from enrolling high-risk individuals.  In an SCHIP-eligible population, 
Sappington et al. (2006) simulated plan profits under varying reinsurance parameters, and 
find that public reinsurance with an attachment point of $10,000, much lower than the 
attachment point being implemented in the Exchanges, reduced average plan losses by 40 
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percent.  However, Dow et al. (2010) used data from a Medicare population to 
demonstrate that even with reinsurance, incentives to avoid enrolling high cost patients 
remain as insurers could still expect to lose $5,400 per individual in the top one percent, 
and $1,700 per individual in the top three percent of spenders.   
Section 1341 of the ACA creates a reinsurance program for the first three years of 
the Exchanges, from 2014 to 2016.  For 2014, this program will reimburse 80 percent of 
individual market health plans’ annual costs of care for enrollees who incur spending 
above an “attachment point” of $60,000 and up to a $250,000 cap (HHS, 2012).  Plans 
are expected to have commercial reinsurance covering costs above $250,000.  All 
covered claims, not just claims for the federally determined essential health benefits, will 
be eligible for reinsurance (Winkleman et al., 2012).  This program will be financed by a 
small reinsurance premium, determined as a percentage of premiums and set annually 
that will be assessed for all covered lives in non-grandfathered health plans in the United 
States, including some self-funded plans.
70
  A state may collect additional contributions 
to provide funding for its administrative expenses or additional reinsurance payments.   
 
Risk Corridors Risk corridors, also known as aggregate stop-loss reinsurance, have also 
existed for quite some time in both the private and public sectors (Bovbjerg et al., 2008; 
Swartz, 2006). In the private sector, some reinsurance contracts include both individual 
and aggregate (i.e. risk corridor) protection (Bovbjerg et al., 2008). In the public sector, 
                                                        
70 The per-capita “reinsurance tax” was set to be 95% of total market premiums in 2014 
(equivalent to $63 per covered life), 60% in 2015 and 35% in 2016.  Recent policy changes have 
resulted in a delay in collection of these funds from insurers to the period 2015-17.  In 2014 the 
transitional reinsurance program will be funded with government revenues.  
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Arizona’s “Healthcare Group” program, which began in the mid-1980s, included a risk 
corridor-like policy that reimbursed health plans for costs exceeding an aggregate 
medical loss ratio of 86 percent annually (AcademyHealth 2007). Symmetric risk 
corridors that limit plans’ profits or losses are also included as part of Medicare payments 
to prescription drug plans in Part D, where after risk-adjustment and reinsurance 
payments for expenditures by high cost individuals, a plan’s losses or profits can trigger 
risk corridor payments or collections (MedPAC 2012).   There, payments to plans for 
greater than expected costs are financed by recouping funds from plans with greater than 
expected profits, and the expected net cost of the program to Medicare is zero.  The 
Medicare Shared Savings and Pioneer Accountable Care Organization (ACO) Programs 
also include payment models incorporating a risk corridor feature. Under the Shared 
Savings Program, ACOs can choose between a one-sided and two-sided arrangement. 
Under the one-sided arrangement, ACOs will be allowed to share up to 50% of savings in 
excess of a minimum loss ratio (Boyarsky and Parke 2012). Under the two-sided model, 
ACOs will be allowed to share in 60% of savings, but they will also be liable for up to 
60% of costs above expectation. Similar to the Exchange risk corridor program, if 
provider groups have exceedingly low revenues (high savings to Medicare), Medicare 
will reimburse some portion of the loss, and if the group has exceedingly high revenues, 
Medicare will extract some portion of the excess.  
Under Section 1342 of the ACA, a symmetric risk corridor program was 
established for the marketplaces to operate from 2014-16 and help plans manage high 
risks enrolled during the early years of the Exchanges.  Under this program a “target 
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amount” of expenditures will be calculated for each health insurer’s covered risk pool, 
which is equal to their total premiums collected minus an allowed amount for 
administrative costs and profits.   If a plan’s actual expenditures for medical care for its 
enrollees are greater than the target by at least 3 percent, the plan will receive a payment 
from the risk-corridor program.  In contrast, if a plan’s actual medical care expenditures 
are lower than the target by 3 percent or greater the plan must make a payment to the risk 
corridors program.  
Section 3: Insurance Principles 
In conventional theory, the firm is risk neutral, the rationale being that a large 
number of owners/investors are assumed to be able to protect themselves against any 
firm-specific risk by diversification in their investment portfolio.
71
  In practice, however, 
while firms are owned by shareholders who can diversify away risk, they are managed by 
individuals. When managers are risk-averse and their incomes are tied to the value of the 
firm, firms may act as if they are risk-averse. The optimal manager contract involves 
some portion of pay being tied to firm performance, with the exact portion being 
determined by the trade-off between motivating managers to maximize the value of the 
firm and changes to firm behavior stemming from manager risk aversion (Fama and 
Jensen 1983). Additionally, the correlation between manager pay and firm value has 
increased dramatically in recent years, largely due to the prevalence of stock options 
(Hall and Liebman 1998). Given that a high correlation between manager pay and firm 
                                                        
71 See Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 for justification of this assumption in the context of insurance. For an 
argument justifying this assumption in the context of the risk of pharmaceutical patent litigation, see Bulow 
(2004). 
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value implies that managers indeed face a great deal of risk, the assumption that firms 
behave as though they are risk neutral seems somewhat questionable.
72
  For firms in the 
insurance industry the role of risk and potential risk aversion take on special significance.  
Insurers can use the law of large numbers to reduce the risk of large losses: the variance 
of an insurer’s costs (i.e. insurer risk) decreases with the number of uncorrelated risks it 
enrolls. This property is what gives rise to insurance. An insurer can pool the risks of 
many risk-averse individuals, improving welfare while simultaneously decreasing its own 
uncertainty with each additional enrollee. With an infinite number of enrollees, insurance 
can eliminate all risk. However, insurers do not have infinitely large enrollment pools. 
Therefore, managers at insurance companies still face risk, especially when entering new 
markets such as the Exchanges where there is greater uncertainty about the distribution of 
risks from which they are drawing.  Moreover, managers at health insurance companies 
also face the risk of mispricing insurance policies or selecting an unexpectedly high cost 
group of enrollees.
 73
 These types of risk cannot be eliminated by increasing the size of 
the pool. 
In this paper, we assume that the firms potentially participating in health 
insurance Exchanges act as though they are risk averse. We give three justifications for 
this assumption. First, as discussed above, while owners can hedge away risk, firm 
managers are likely to be making the decisions regarding the pricing of contracts and 
                                                        
72 Conceivably, managers could hedge against the risk present in their pay packages on their own. 
However, given that changes in firm value are quite large (Hall and Liebman (1998) report a 
standard deviation of changes in firm value of around 32% or about $700 million), it seems likely 
that liquidity constraints will prevent them from fully hedging against this kind of risk. 
73 As has become obvious in recent months, insurers also face political risk where policies and 
regulations that affect the risk pool can change after insurers set prices. 
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whether or not to enter new markets. Because managers’ pay is largely tied to firm value 
(Hall and Liebman 1998), the firm’s choices are likely to reflect manager risk aversion. 
Second, the loading factor (the difference between medical claims paid by the insurer and 
premium revenue) has been estimated to be around 40% higher for very small groups 
than for very large groups (Gruber 1998). While this difference could be due to large 
fixed costs of insuring a group of individuals, at least some portion of it also likely 
reflects the fact that small risk pools are by definition riskier to insure than large pools. 
Second, there is a long line of research in the actuarial literature about how to calculate a 
“risk premium” in order to incorporate it into the loading factor on an insurance policy 
(see Kahane (1979), and Christofides and Smith (2001) for some examples of this 
literature). Most of these studies relate the “cost” of risk to be priced into the insurance 
premium to the standard deviation of the cost distribution, a measure we will use later.  
We measure insurer risk in two ways. The first we characterize as the 
conventional form of risk aversion, similar to individual risk aversion where individuals’ 
utility functions exhibit diminishing marginal utility in income. In this case risk is related 
to the variance of the distribution of potential outcomes. This possibility is motivated by 
the fact that traditionally risk-averse managers make pricing decisions under a reward 
structure that penalizes losses and rewards profits. The second form of insurer risk 
aversion we consider could be more accurately described as “large loss aversion.” This 
type of risk aversion is motivated by the managers or owners/investors facing a large 
penalty for being forced to declare bankruptcy or for depleting the insurer’s reserves. In 
this case risk is related to the probability of large losses.  
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We define potential outcomes for insurers using the distribution of expected costs 
of the insurer’s enrollees. When constructing costs, we include only medical and 
pharmaceutical expenditures and any transfers coming through the various policies we 
analyze. We ignore factors such as administrative costs, risk premia, etc. because these 
costs are largely predictable and will be priced into the premium set by an insurer. The 
predictability of these factors implies that they affect only the mean of the expected cost 
distribution, which is unrelated to our measures of insurer risk. We treat the mean of the 
cost distribution as the insurer’s expected cost per enrollee, and we assume that any 
outcome below this expected cost results in insurer “profits” and any outcome above this 
cost results in insurer “losses.”74 Figure 3.1 illustrates this cost distribution. Essentially, 
every year an insurer receives a draw from this distribution. If an insurer receives a draw 
from the left side of the distribution, it will earn unexpected profits in that year. On the 
other hand, if the insurer receives a draw from the right side of the distribution, it will 
experience unexpected losses. 
A risk neutral insurer will only care about the mean of the cost distribution. A risk 
averse insurer, on the other hand, makes choices based on other moments of the 
distribution. No matter the form that insurer risk aversion takes, whether conventional 
risk aversion or “large-loss aversion,” insurer risk aversion implies that insurers are 
willing to pay to have their risk reduced. If insurer risks can be pooled in a similar way as 
are individual risks, and at a cost lower than the insurers’ willingness-to-pay, total surplus 
                                                        
74 This definition of “profits” and “losses” comes from an assumption that insurers price their 
insurance policies at the average expected cost of potential enrollees. Such pricing is implied by the 
assumption of perfect competition. 
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can be increased. This provides motivation for policies that reduce the risk faced by 
insurers. Additional motivation comes from the possibility that when insurers are risk 
averse, they may be hesitant to enter markets with a great deal of uncertainty, such as the 
Exchanges, potentially limiting competition.
75
 Risk-averse insurers will also require 
larger risk premiums, increasing prices paid by consumers, and possibly driving lower 
risk consumers out of the Exchanges, reducing welfare (Einav et al. 2010). Given these 
motivations for reducing insurer risk, we now explore the optimal way to do so.
76
 
The seminal papers establishing the theory of insurance in health economics are 
Arrow (1963) and Zeckhauser (1970). Arrow established that with a limited budget, the 
optimal insurance policy is full coverage after a deductible. In Arrow’s model, 
individuals have diminishing marginal utility in non-medical consumption and there is 
uncertainty about their future health status and, thus, their medical expenses. Under these 
assumptions, individuals value an extra dollar of coverage against medical expenses more 
as the potential expense gets larger. Therefore, coverage for large expenses provides 
larger welfare gains than coverage for small expenses. Ellis and McGuire (1988) and 
Keeler et al. (1988) apply this principle to the design of outlier payments for hospitals 
paid via prospective payment. However, as Zeckhauser (1970) points out, full coverage 
after a deductible is not always the optimal insurance policy. In his paper, he formalizes 
                                                        
75 This is precisely the stated purpose of the risk-reducing policies such as reinsurance and risk corridors 
that are present during the first three years of the Exchanges’ existence. 
76 Risk adjustment is another policy related to insurer risk that is often discussed along with risk 
corridors and reinsurance. However, while risk adjustment has important effects on the mean of an 
insurer’s distribution of expected costs, its effects on the variance of the distribution are minimal. 
Because all of our measures of risk are based in some way on the variance of the cost distribution and 
are unrelated to the mean of the distribution, we abstract from risk adjustment through much of this 
paper. All of the important results that come out of our simulations are robust to the inclusion of risk 
adjustment. Those results are available on request from the authors.  
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the trade-off between risk protection and moral hazard in insurance. Insurance provides 
both welfare gains through risk protection and welfare losses through moral hazard. This 
implies that optimal coverage is a deductible followed by coverage equal to a coinsurance 
rate that is a function of the price elasticity of demand for medical care.   
In the context of protecting health insurers from risk, if we assume no moral 
hazard, Arrow’s principle of the optimality of full coverage after a deductible would 
imply that it is inefficient to use reinsurance to provide risk protection. Reinsurance 
provides the plan with protection from the risk that an individual incurs high costs. While 
this type of protection will decrease the variance of the insurer’s profit distribution and 
decrease the probability of a large loss, it is not the most efficient way to do so. Under 
reinsurance, some plans whose ex-post outcomes are in the left hand side of the cost 
distribution (positive profits) will receive reinsurance payments if they have one or two 
high cost cases and many low cost cases. At the same time, some plans whose ex-post 
outcomes are in the right hand side of the cost distribution (negative profits) will receive 
no reinsurance payments if they have many cases whose costs are only slightly above 
what was expected. A more efficient policy would mimic Arrow’s optimal insurance 
policy of full coverage after a deductible by only reimbursing plans incurring large losses 
(i.e. outcomes in the far left tail of the profit distribution). This type of policy would use 
fewer dollars to provide larger reductions in the variance of the profit distribution and the 
probability of a large loss. This is exactly what risk corridors do. 
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Section 3.1: Efficiency Loss 
Similar to other forms of insurance, risk protection from reinsurance and risk 
corridors is likely to come at the cost of moral hazard, i.e. changes in insurer behavior 
due to the protection provided by the policies. When considering the optimal form of risk 
protection, and when comparing the power of reinsurance and risk corridors to reduce 
insurer risk, the efficiency losses from moral hazard must also be considered. While some 
sort of efficiency loss seems inevitable, the source of the loss is unclear in the context of 
these policies. To give some concreteness to this issue, we use the following framework. 
A plan faces   states of the world, where a state of the world represents a single draw 
from the insurer’s cost distribution. In each state, a proportion   of a population of   
potential enrollees enrolls in the plan. Let     be the probability that individual   enrolls 
in the plan in state of the world  . At the beginning of each period, (before the state of the 
world is revealed) the health plan chooses a level of utilization management effort     for 
each potential enrollee. An individual’s utilization is a function of   . A plan chooses the 
effort levels to maximize the following expected profit function:  
 [ ]  ∑∑   [   (      )               ]
  
 
where        represents average enrollee utilization of medical care in dollars as a 
function of effort,              represents average plan revenues under policy   possibly 
as a function of utilization, and        represents the cost of effort. Risk corridors and 
reinsurance affect the plan’s behavior by altering the relationship between revenues and 
utilization, 
     
   
      . If     
   , then under policy   in state of the world  , each 
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additional dollar spent by individual   is fully reimbursed by the regulator. Let   
    be 
the relationship between revenues and utilization with no cost-sharing policy and fully 
prospective payment. Thus, if risk corridors reimburse the plan for all costs incurred by 
the plan beyond a threshold of plan costs, then       
    for all individuals in the states 
of the world where that threshold is crossed and zero otherwise. Likewise, if reinsurance 
reimburses a plan for all costs incurred by individual   beyond some threshold of 
individual costs, then       
    in every state of the world for each individual whose 
costs cross that threshold and zero otherwise. If we assume that     
           is 
optimal, efficiency loss can be described as a function of     
    
      
 . Because plans 
choose effort levels at the beginning of the period, prior to knowing the state of the 
world, in reality it is each individual’s expected level of   ,  ̅    
  ∑          
 
 , that 
actually matters for plan behavior, so we define efficiency loss as     ̅    
  .  
 We note that there is no analytical solution suggesting that one policy is “better” 
than the other in terms of efficiency. Reinsurance affects plans’ incentives for only a few 
people but in all states of the world. Additionally, reinsurance affects plans’ incentives 
for the individuals for whom “effort” is likely to be most beneficial. Risk corridors, on 
the other hand, affect plans’ incentives for all enrollees but only in a few states of the 
world. Fortunately, our framework provides a useful method for comparing the efficiency 
loss from each policy. In the appendix, we show that under our assumptions, the 
difference between the efficiency loss from reinsurance and the loss from risk corridors is 
approximately proportional to the following expression: 
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This implies that the efficiency loss from a given reinsurance policy is greater than the 
loss from a given risk corridor policy if and only if ∑
   
    
( ̅    
  )  ∑
   
    
( ̅    
  ) . Thus, 
if we can construct measures of ∑
   
    
( ̅    
  )  and ∑
   
    
( ̅    
  ) , we can determine 
which policy results in a larger loss of efficiency. We now turn to discuss the methods for 
constructing and testing these measures. 
Section 4: Data and Methods 
In this section, we will first present the dataset we use to analyze reinsurance and 
risk corridors and then discuss the construction of the insurer’s simulated cost distribution 
under each policy. We also present our measures of risk and efficiency loss. As a 
preview, in the base case with no reinsurance or risk corridors, we construct this 
distribution by drawing 10,000 random groups of 5,000 “enrollees” from a pool of 
potential exchange participants. The average cost for each of these draws represents a 
potential state of the world for the insurer, and we calculate our risk measures using this 
simulated cost distribution. We then apply reinsurance and risk corridors to the 
distribution and recalculate our risk measures under each policy to determine how each 
policy affects insurer risk. We also calculate our measures of efficiency loss under each 
policy to allow comparisons of the power of reinsurance and risk corridors to reduce 
insurer risk with as little efficiency loss as possible. 
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Section 4.1: Data on the Exchange Population and Health Care Spending 
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) is a large, nationally 
representative survey of the civilian non-institutionalized U.S. population with 
information on approximately 33,000 individuals annually.  We identify an Exchange-
eligible population following methods in McGuire et al. (2012).  Pooling MEPS data 
from Panels 9 (2004/5) through 14 (2009/10), we select a population of individuals and 
families eligible for enrollment in Exchanges based on income, insurance, and 
employment status. Specifically, we select adult, non-elderly individuals (aged 18-64) in 
households earning at least 138 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) and children in 
households with income of at least 205 percent of FPL.  Selection criteria into the 
Exchange population, as defined by the ACA, include individuals living in households in 
which an adult was: ever uninsured, a holder of a non-group insurance policy, self-
employed, employed by a small employer, or paying an out-of-pocket premium for their 
employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) plan that is deemed to be unaffordable. If an 
individual meets the selection criteria in at least one of the two survey years, she is part of 
the sample. The dataset comprises 44,210 “Exchange-eligible” individuals, 11,773 of 
whom have only one year of data and 32,437 of whom have two years of data, generating 
a total sample size of 76,647 person-years. 
The MEPS includes data on total expenditures on health care for each individual 
during each year. It also includes information such as diagnoses from all of the medical 
events that result in those expenditures (i.e. office visits, hospital stays, prescriptions 
filled, etc.). We use these diagnoses and expenditures to implement reinsurance and risk 
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corridors as we discuss in the following sections. We also use the costs to construct the 
insurer profit distribution using simulations discussed in Section 4.4. It is well-known 
that MEPS data understate health expenditures (Sing et al., 2002; Aizcorbe et al., 2012; 
Zuvekas and Olin, 2009).  Discrepancies are driven both by underreporting of healthcare 
utilization and under-representation of high-expenditure cases due to the exclusion of 
patients who are institutionalized or hospitalized longer than 45 days.  Zuvekas and Olin 
(2009) suggest that total expenditures be inflated by a factor of 1.09 for individuals with 
an inpatient claim and by a factor of 1.546 for all other individuals. We adopt this 
correction, inflating expenditures of the individuals in our sample as directed. 
Section 4.2: Reinsurance 
 Reinsurance reimburses insurers for some portion of the costs incurred by high 
cost enrollees. Our methods for modeling reinsurance mimic the methods used in our 
previous work (Zhu et al. 2014). More formally, let    be individual  ’s total annual cost 
to the insurer. Now let  ̂ be the reinsurance threshold above which costs are reimbursed. 
Finally, let   be the rate at which costs are reimbursed. The reinsurance payment received 
by the insurer when enrolling individual        is defined as follows: 
    
                     if     ̂
      ̂     if     ̂
 
For simplicity, we assume that plans’ paid claims are equal to total claims; in other 
words, we assume that the plan covers all health care costs incurred by an individual 
during a given year. We also assume that reinsurance is funded through a per capita 
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actuarially fair reinsurance fee collected for each Exchange enrollee.
77
 The fee, denoted 
   , is assumed to be equal to the average reinsurance payment for the entire population: 
    
 
 
∑   
 
 
 
This ensures that similar to risk corridors, reinsurance will be budget neutral. In practice, 
a reinsurance policy may have multiple thresholds with different reimbursement rates. 
For example, the reinsurance policy proposed for the Exchanges that we explore below 
reimburses 80% of costs between $60,000 and $250,000 and 85% of costs between 
$250,000 and $2,000,000.
78
 
Section 4.3: Measures of Risk 
 We use two measures of insurer risk. First, we use the standard deviation of the 
expected cost distribution, where risk is increasing in the standard deviation. This is 
similar to how the risk faced by a traditionally risk averse individual would be measured. 
Importantly, this measure captures both “upside” and “downside” risk, as both are 
undesirable to a traditionally risk averse insurer. Second, we use the “value at risk.” 
Value at risk is a measure of risk used in finance, and is defined as the Yth percentile of 
                                                        
77
 Note that this is different from how reinsurance will be funded in practice (described in section 2). We do 
this to allow for an “apples-to-apples” comparison of reinsurance and risk corridors by forcing them both to 
be “self-funding.”  
78 The true Exchange reinsurance policy actually only covers 80% of costs between $60,000 and 
$250,000. However, the policy stops at $250,000 because most insurers are expected to purchase 
private reinsurance in addition to the public reinsurance available in the Exchange. Private policies 
typically cover 85% of costs between $250,000 and $2,000,000. See Zhu et al. (2014) for a discussion 
of the public and private reinsurance policies. 
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the expected cost distribution. This measure allows us to characterize the probability of a 
large loss.  In our case, larger values of the value at risk imply higher risk. 
Section 4.4: Cost Distributions 
 We first construct the insurer’s cost distribution for the case of no reinsurance and 
no risk adjustment.  Because insurers do not know who will enroll in their plans nor the 
future realization of each individual’s cost distribution, ex ante they face a number of 
potential states of the world. They could enroll an unexpectedly healthy group of 
individuals, an unexpectedly sick group of individuals, or just an average group of 
individuals. The cost distribution,     , describes an insurer’s average cost per enrollee 
in each state and the probability of those states. In order to construct the cost distribution 
we first fix the size of the plan to be   enrollees. We then take  random samples of   
individuals from our sample of   Exchange-eligible individuals. For each random 
sample, we calculate the average expenditure of the   chosen individuals,   . In the case 
of no reinsurance, we define average cost as being equal to average expenditure for each 
sample,         We use these random samples to simulate the insurer’s average cost 
distribution which in this case is equal to the insurer’s average expenditure distribution. 
Given a large enough  this simulated cost distribution represents all of the states of the 
world an insurer would face in an exchange, from the possibility of only enrolling the 
sickest individuals to the possibility of only enrolling individuals who use no health care 
at all. It is this cost distribution that forms the basis of our measures of risk discussed 
above. 
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 In order to incorporate reinsurance, for each sample  we also calculate the 
average reinsurance payment,    , for the   individuals randomly chosen in resample , 
where     is calculated as defined above, based on the parameters of the specific 
reinsurance policy being simulated. We use these simulated values to construct the joint 
distribution of average expenditure and average reinsurance payments. We use this 
distribution to calculate the reinsurance fees used to finance these policies. We define the 
reinsurance fee,    , to be equal to the mean of the average reinsurance payment 
distribution:79 
    ∫             
We use the draws of expenditures and reinsurance payments plus the definition of 
reinsurance fees to calculate plan costs with and without reinsurance for each sample. 
Again, when there is no reinsurance, costs are equal to expenditures,   ̅   ̅ . With 
reinsurance, plan costs are equal to expenditures minus any reinsurance payments plus 
the reinsurance fee:              . Recall that reinsurance is constrained to be 
budget neutral. This implies that while in most cases      , the mean of the average 
cost distribution,  ̅          , will be the same with and without reinsurance. 
Section 4.5: Risk Corridors 
 Risk corridors transfer money to an insurer if the sum of covered health care costs 
of the insurer’s enrollees are greater than a fixed percent of a target. In the risk corridor 
                                                        
79 While our simulations result in a discrete cost distribution, in our notation we treat the 
distribution as though it is continuous because with enough draws, our discrete distribution will 
equal the continuous distribution in the limit. 
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policy proposed for the Exchanges, the target is defined as an insurer’s total premium 
revenues minus some combination of administrative costs and profits.  To simplify, we 
define the target as the mean of the average expenditure distribution.
80
 Thus, if an 
insurer’s realized average per capita cost is greater than the expected average 
expenditures (the target), the risk corridor will reimburse the insurer for a portion of its 
costs according to the risk corridor cost-sharing parameters.  
 More formally, let   continue to be the insurer’s average costs, defined for the 
cases with and without reinsurance above.  Let   be the mean of the plan’s average 
expenditure distribution and, thus, the target. Now we introduce three new parameters: 
  
 
 
, the percent of the target paid out in costs;  , the upper threshold; and  , the 
portion of costs reimbursed. Note that reinsurance fees are included in  . The risk 
corridor gives the insurer the following transfer if the insurer’s   is greater than  : 
                         if     
Now suppose that the risk corridor reimburses plans for 50% of costs above 108% of the 
target. In this case,        and if for a given plan        then the plan will receive a 
transfer of             .  
 Risk corridors can be funded through an actuarially fair uniform fee, denoted    , 
similar to the reinsurance and risk adjustment fees, or through an upside risk transfer. We 
refer to these as one-sided and two-sided risk corridors, respectively. For one-sided risk 
                                                        
80Again, only factors that involve uncertainty impact risk corridor payments and our risk measures. 
Administrative costs and profits affect the level of outcomes but not the other moments of the 
outcome distribution (i.e. variance), so they don’t matter for risk corridor payments or for our risk 
measures. This assumption could also by justified by assuming perfect competition and no 
administrative costs. 
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corridors, we define   to incorporate the risk corridor fee,    
     
 
, to enforce budget 
neutrality. We define the fee as being equal to the average expected transfer given the 
simulated distribution of  ,      where   is a function of expenditures and reinsurance 
payments: 
                     (1) 
Note that because the transfer is a function of   ,     is a function of   . Recall that    
is also a function of    . This implies that for each   there is an equilibrium value for 
    that causes (1) to hold. In practice, for each risk corridor policy we analyze, we find 
the value of     that causes transfers to be equal to     on average, enforcing budget 
neutrality. 
 For two-sided risk corridors, the risk corridor transfer looks the same but the fee 
changes. The fee is not charged to all plans. Instead, it is charged to plans whose realized 
costs are below a fixed percentage of the target. In other words, plans with unexpectedly 
low costs transfer money to the regulator while plans with unexpectedly high costs get 
transfers from the regulator. To formalize this we introduce an additional transfer. We 
define a new parameter, the lower threshold,          . The lower threshold is 
just the upper threshold reflected to the other side of the target. The new transfer is 
defined as 
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Note that if the profit distribution is symmetric, the two-sided risk corridor is budget 
neutral: The transfers cancel each other out in expectation.
81
 Similar to reinsurance, risk 
corridors can have multiple thresholds with different reimbursement rates between each 
threshold. For example, the proposed risk corridor policy for the Exchanges reimburses 
50% of costs between 103% and 108% of the target and 80% of costs beyond 108% of 
the target. In our simulations, we account for this non-linear reimbursement policy. 
Section 4.6: Measures of Efficiency Loss 
 As discussed in Section 3, in order to compare the efficiency loss of our simulated 
risk corridor and reinsurance policies we need to construct measures of ∑
   
    
( ̅    
  )  and 
∑
   
    
( ̅    
  ) . We start by assuming that the effect of a one unit increase in    on 
utilization is proportional to an individual’s costs relative to the average cost in the 
population: 
   
    
 
  
 ̅
   .    can easily be calculated for each individual. We now turn to 
the construction of  ̅  
   for each individual and policy. We begin with reinsurance. For 
simplicity, let reinsurance reimburse an insurer for all of an individual’s costs above the 
reinsurance threshold (i.e.    ). In this case  ̅    
     for all individuals whose costs 
exceed the reinsurance threshold and  ̅    
     for all other individuals. This implies that 
in our comparisons of efficiency loss under reinsurance and risk corridors, the 
appropriate measure to use for efficiency loss from reinsurance is 
                                                        
81 Because the insurer’s cost distribution is a distribution of sample means, the central limit theorem 
implies that the cost distribution should be approximately normal. In practice, because our simulated 
distributions are not constructed with an infinite number of draws, our simulated distributions are 
not quite symmetric. They are, however, very close to symmetric. 
  
141 
∑
   
    
( ̅    
  )
 
 ∑  ( ̅    
  )   
 
 
where   is equal to the portion of total costs in the population spent on individuals whose 
costs exceed the reinsurance threshold. The intuition for this measure is that under 
reinsurance, a plan’s incentive to invest in costly effort to restrain the spending of 
individuals whose costs exceed the reinsurance threshold goes to zero. Because the effect 
of reducing effort is proportional to an individual’s costs, the total efficiency loss should 
be proportional to the costs spent on individuals whose costs cross the reinsurance 
threshold. 
 Next, we move to risk corridors. Similar to reinsurance, let risk corridors 
reimburse an insurer for all costs above the risk corridor threshold. In this case       
     
for all individuals in the states of the world where the risk corridor threshold is crossed 
and       
    otherwise. This implies that for individual   the expected value of  ̅   
  is 
the proportion of states of the world in which individual   is enrolled in the plan that the 
risk corridor threshold is crossed:  ̅   
  ∑        
 
    . This implies that in our 
comparisons of efficiency loss under reinsurance and risk corridors, the appropriate 
measure to use for efficiency loss from risk corridors is 
∑
   
    
( ̅    
  )
 
 ∑  ( ̅    
  )
 
 ∑    
 
 
  
The intuition for this measure comes from the fact that risk corridors limit an insurer’s 
incentive to invest in costly effort to restrain the costs of individual   and the extent to 
which the policy affects the insurer’s incentives regarding a particular individual depends 
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on how often that individual is present in the plan when the plan crosses the risk corridor 
threshold. Note that    is likely to be larger for high cost individuals because an insurer is 
more likely to cross the risk corridor threshold when enrolling high cost individuals. 
For one-sided risk corridors, the threshold is only crossed when plans experience higher-
than-expected costs. With two-sided risk corridors, however, the threshold is crossed 
when plans experience either higher than expected costs or lower than expected costs. In 
each case, the plan is not responsible for any portion of the marginal dollar spent on an 
individual. In the case of higher than expected costs, the plan is reimbursed for the full 
dollar. In the case of lower than expected costs, on the other hand, the plan is charged a 
dollar for each dollar of savings it achieves. In both cases,     . This implies that 
  
         
    
         
.  
 One of the assumptions involved in the derivation of these measures is worth 
discussing here. As discussed above, in order to operationalize 
   
    
 we assume that the 
effect of a one unit increase in “effort” has a larger effect on utilization for high cost 
enrollees than low cost enrollees. Formally, we assume that 
   
   
 
  
 ̅
. Again, we think 
about “effort” as utilization management. This is likely to be more productive for high 
cost enrollees because there is so much more utilization that can be managed. On the 
other hand, utilization management is unlikely to have any effect on enrollees who 
already use little or no care. There is evidence for this in the literature (Commonwealth 
Fund 2012). 
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Section 5: Results  
We now discuss the results from the simulations.  First, we simulate insurer risk under 
current policies for the Exchanges. Second, we compare efficiency under reinsurance and 
risk corridors, showing that for a given level of risk-reduction, risk corridors always incur 
lower efficiency losses. Third, we discuss the optimality of two-sided vs. one-sided risk 
corridors. 
Section 5.1: Current Policy 
 As discussed in Section 2, during the first three years of the Exchanges existence, 
reinsurance and risk corridor policies will be in force. We simulate the effects of each of 
these policies on insurer risk as measured by the standard deviation of the profit 
distribution and the value at risk. We simulate each proposed policy on its own and 
combined in the full package of risk reducing policies. We adapt our general framework 
to the actual policies being implemented in the Exchanges. Both the ACA reinsurance 
and risk corridor policies are slightly more complicated than those modeled above in that 
they have multiple thresholds and the portion of costs reimbursed varies across 
thresholds. In the Exchanges risk corridor transfers are defined as follows: 
      
 if        
                            if             
                      if        
 
 
      
 if        
                            if             
                      if        
 
Similarly, reinsurance payments will be paid according to the following definition: 
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if                             
if 250,000          
if                            
 
 Table 3.2 contains our three risk measures (the standard deviation, 99
th
 percentile, 
and 95
th
 percentile of the cost distribution) under every combination of proposed policies 
for a small plan with        . Similar tables for a large (        ) can be found in 
the appendix. The results suggest that both risk corridors and reinsurance significantly 
reduce all measures of insurer risk. Interestingly, the risk reductions caused by risk 
corridors and reinsurance are quite similar, with reinsurance reducing the standard 
deviation slightly more than risk corridors and risk corridors usually decreasing the value 
at risk slightly more than reinsurance.  
 By comparing the first and last columns of the table, we can observe the effects of 
the current ACA policy for the Exchanges (reinsurance and risk corridors) on insurer risk. 
The policy dramatically decreases insurer risk, with a reduction of the standard deviation 
by more than a third and the value at risk measures by about $100, or close to one 
standard deviation of the cost distribution. Figure 3.2 shows the full distribution of the 
insurer’s expected costs under each combination of policies. The figure makes it clear 
that the policies tighten the distribution significantly, both on their own and when 
implemented together. 
 Figure 3.3 begins to describe how reinsurance and risk corridors differ. The cost 
distribution is divided into 20 equally sized groups according to the insurer’s draw from 
the distribution. For example, the first bars, labeled “0”, represent the states of the world 
in which the insurer draws a cost in the bottom 5% of the cost distribution. This implies 
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that the bars on the left represent cases where the insurer earns large profits and the bars 
on the right represent cases where the insurer incurs large losses. The blue bars represent 
the average reinsurance payment for the cases in a given group. The orange bars 
represent the average risk corridor transfer. The figure illustrates the fact that insurers 
receive reinsurance payments in virtually all states of the world, including states in the far 
left part of the cost distribution where the insurer is already earning large profits. 
However, insurers receive larger reinsurance payments in cases where they are incurring 
large losses. Risk corridors, on the other hand, only transfer money to insurers in cases 
where they are incurring large losses. They also transfer money away from insurers in 
cases where they are earning large profits. When it comes to risk, these tail-cases are the 
most important, so it appears that risk corridors should be able to reduce risk more 
efficiently than reinsurance. However, risk corridors affect insurer incentives to invest in 
costly effort for all individuals while reinsurance only affects insurer incentives for a few 
high cost individuals. Thus, there seems to be a tradeoff where risk corridors affect 
insurer incentives for all individuals but only in a few cases while reinsurance affects 
insurer incentives in all cases but only for a few individuals. In the next set of 
simulations, we use our measures of efficiency loss to quantify this tradeoff and 
determine which policy delivers greater risk reduction with less efficiency loss. 
Section 5.2: Risk Corridors vs. Reinsurance 
 We now compare efficiency loss under risk corridors and reinsurance. The 
purpose of this section is to quantitatively describe the principles we discussed in Section 
3. To do this, we use the simple definition of a risk corridor that we outline in the 
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methods section above. This definition sets    , so the corridor provides “full coverage 
after a deductible.” Similarly, we define reinsurance as a policy that reimburses plans for 
100% of an individual’s costs above some reinsurance threshold, i.e. we set    . To 
compare the effects of the two policies, we simulate a large number of cutoffs for both 
risk corridors and reinsurance. For reinsurance, we allow the cutoff to vary from $10,000 
to $250,000. For risk corridors, we allow the cutoff to vary from 101% to 130% of the 
target. We allow risk corridors to be either two-sided or one-sided. For each simulation, 
we calculate each of the risk measures and the measure of efficiency loss for that policy, 
as described in Section 4. We then compare the efficiency loss required to achieve a 
given level of each risk measure. 
 Figure 3.4 shows the results for all of the risk measures. The top panel shows the 
standard deviation of the cost distribution. The standard deviation is on the x-axis and the 
efficiency loss is proportional to the measures shown on the y-axis. This allows us to 
compare efficiency loss under reinsurance and risk corridors by finding a desired level of 
risk on the x-axis and then tracing upward to find the efficiency loss required to achieve 
that level of risk under each policy. For example, if a standard deviation of $85 is the 
desired level of risk, all policies will achieve this level with an efficiency loss 
proportional to 0.2. Interestingly, the figure shows that for all levels of risk, all three 
policies result in similar efficiency losses. This implies that for traditionally risk averse 
insurers, the choice of risk-reducing policy is unimportant; both policies can achieve 
similar amounts of risk reduction at a similar cost in terms of efficiency. 
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 The bottom panels of Figure 3.4 describe insurer risk using the value at risk 
measure: the 95
th
 and 99
th
 percentiles of the cost distribution. Again, the x-axis shows the 
risk measure and the value shown on the y-axis is proportional to the efficiency loss 
required in order to achieve the given level of risk under each policy. For these risk 
measures, risk corridors can always achieve a given level of risk reduction with a lower 
efficiency cost. This is not surprising given that risk corridors effectively eliminate the 
right tail of the cost distribution while reinsurance just shrinks it. The differences in 
efficiency loss between reinsurance and risk corridors are also non-trivial. For example, 
the efficiency loss from the reinsurance policy required to bring the 95
th
 percentile of the 
cost distribution down to $3,465 is more than twice (five times) as large as the loss from 
a two-sided (one-sided) risk corridor policy that achieves a similar amount of risk 
reduction.
 
 
It is also unsurprising that with respect to the value at risk, one-sided risk 
corridors are always able to achieve a given level of risk with less efficiency loss than 
two-sided risk corridors, given that two-sided risk corridors compensate the plan for the 
marginal dollar if its costs are higher than expected or lower than expected. In the case of 
the standard deviation of the cost distribution, there is a tradeoff between the higher 
efficiency loss from two-sided risk corridors and increased risk reduction because two-
sided risk corridors reduce the standard deviation from the left and right tails of the cost 
distribution, while one-sided risk corridors only affect the right tail. The fact that the 1-
sided and 2-sided risk corridor lines lie on top of one another in the standard deviation 
plot in Figure 3.4 suggests that these two competing factors cancel each other out, 
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resulting in equal risk reduction with equal efficiency loss for 1-sided and 2-sided 
corridors. This tradeoff does not exist, however, for the cases of the 99
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles of the cost distribution because these measures are unaffected by the left tail 
of the distribution.  
Section 6: Discussion 
The simulations illustrate the power of risk corridors to reduce insurer risk with a low 
incentive cost, especially relative to reinsurance. First, we find that the combination of 
risk reduction policies slated for implementation in the Exchanges dramatically reduces 
the amount of risk faced by insurers. Both reinsurance and risk corridors contribute to 
this dramatic decrease in risk, though the second set of simulations shows that the 
contribution of reinsurance likely comes at a much larger incentive cost than that of the 
risk corridors. While risk corridors and reinsurance result in similar efficiency loss for a 
given level of the standard deviation of the cost distribution, risk corridors are clearly the 
more efficient tool for reducing the risk of large losses. Additionally, taking all of the risk 
measures into account, one-sided risk corridors are always weakly superior to both 
reinsurance and two-sided risk corridors. This is because risk corridors eliminate only the 
extreme events that have the largest impact on insurer risk, and one-sided risk corridors 
eliminate the more important extreme events (e.g. large losses) without the additional 
efficiency costs resulting from two-sided risk corridors. Reinsurance, on the other hand, 
is a very imprecise tool for reducing insurer risk, and often results in transfers to plans 
that are already earning profits. 
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 Throughout the paper we have highlighted our results focusing on a small plan of 
around 5,000 enrollees. The appendix contains the results for a larger plan where the 
results are similar. However, the magnitude of the effects of both reinsurance and risk 
corridors on insurer risk are much smaller for the larger plan. This is due to the fact that 
larger plans face less risk. Due to the law of large numbers, risk diminishes as enrollment 
increases.  
The results for small and large plans can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
Instead of plan size, these results could be seen as describing the effects of insurer 
experience in the market. As an insurer participates in the market, its ability to forecast 
costs may improve, shrinking the variance of the cost distribution. In this case instead of 
results for small and large plans the results could be interpreted as representing novice 
and experienced insurers.  Insurer “risk” does not necessarily have to refer to the risk of 
enrolling high cost individuals. Risk could instead refer to political uncertainty where 
insurers are unsure about how the policy environment might change between the time 
when prices are set and when costs are incurred. Insurers in the Exchanges were in fact 
victims of this type of risk when policies were changed after prices were set to allow 
insurers to continue plans that did not meet the requirements of the Affordable Care Act 
through 2014. 
 We have shown that risk corridors are “better” at reducing insurer risk than 
reinsurance, where “better” is defined as achieving the same risk reduction with less 
efficiency loss. However, there are other measures of incentive costs for which this result 
will not hold.  For example, if we assume that a unit of effort reduces each individual’s 
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utilization by exactly the same amount, i.e. 
   
   
   where   is a constant that is identical 
for all individuals, reinsurance often performs better than risk corridors in terms of 
efficiency. However, we believe that our assumption that the effect of effort on utilization 
is proportional to an individual’s costs relative to the average cost in the population, 
   
   
   , is much more reasonable than assuming that a unit of utilization management 
would lower a high cost individual’s costs by the same amount in dollars as an individual 
using little or no care. 
 The superiority of risk corridors may not hold when considering other effects of 
the policies. For instance, the two policies have quite different implications for insurers’ 
incentives to engage in inefficient selection of low-risk enrollees. Reinsurance effectively 
redistributes costs from high cost individuals to low cost individuals. This weakens 
insurer incentives to select low cost individuals, because their costs are more similar to 
those of high cost individuals. Risk corridors, on the other hand, do not affect the 
heterogeneity of costs across the population of potential enrollees. Under risk corridors, 
high cost individuals are still much more costly to the plan than low cost individuals, so 
the plan will still engage in inefficient selection.
 82 
This suggests that when there is the 
potential for selection the optimal amount of reinsurance depends on the power of 
                                                        
82 Risk corridors can affect selection incentives if the contribution of low cost individuals to the 
variance of the distribution is different from the contribution of high cost individuals. If this is the 
case, then risk corridors do affect the incentives of risk-averse insurers to inefficiently select low cost 
individuals because they will seek to do so for two reasons: (1) to shift the mean of the cost 
distribution to be as small as possible and (2) to decrease the variance of the distribution as far as 
possible. Because risk corridors affect the variance of the distribution and the effects of selection 
efforts on the variance of the distribution, they can affect selection incentives. However, selection 
incentives via the variance of the distribution are likely to be second-order to the incentives via the 
mean of the distribution. 
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reinsurance to reduce selection incentives. Some evidence suggests that reinsurance is 
quite good at improving the fit of a payment system but has little effect on predictive 
ratios that describe plans’ incentives to inefficiently ration particular services (Zhu et al. 
2014). This suggests that while the optimal amount of reinsurance may be small, it is 
probably greater than zero. 
 Risk corridors and reinsurance may also differ in how they affect insurer pricing 
incentives. When individuals face large “switching costs” for moving from one plan to 
another, insurers may optimally choose to engage in “invest then harvest” strategies 
where they compete to be the “loss leader” in the first year of the operation of the market 
in order to gain market share (Ericson 2014). In subsequent years, insurers can then 
ratchet up the price of their policies because consumer switching costs cause price 
sensitivity to be quite low. Risk corridors may make such strategies more attractive to 
insurers by limiting the losses incurred by underpricing policies during the first year of 
enrollment. Two-sided risk corridors, on the other hand, may limit the attractiveness of 
these strategies by transferring money away from insurers earning large profits, reducing 
the surplus insurers can extract by ratcheting up prices in later years. 
 While we show that risk corridors can dramatically reduce insurer risk, they may 
have additional unintended consequences. While the implications of these unintended 
consequences are outside the scope of this paper, they present opportunities for future 
research. Additionally, while this paper lays out the conceptual framework behind the 
need for risk corridors, empirical evidence on their effects in practice is needed. Given 
that risk corridors have been implemented in Medicare Part D and are currently being 
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implemented in the Exchanges, there will be excellent opportunities for studying the 
effects of this policy in practice in the near future. 
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Figure 3.1: Insurer’s distribution of e pected costs 
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Figure 3.2: Insurer’s distribution of e pected costs under proposed policies 
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Figure 3.3: Average risk corridor and reinsurance payments in each quantile of insurer’s distribution of 
expected costs 
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Figure 3.4: Risk and efficiency loss under reinsurance and risk corridors 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of the Full Population 
Values in table are means unless otherwise noted N=76647 
Demographics 
 Age 0-18 0.16 
Age 19-34 0.33 
Age 35-44 0.19 
Age 45-64 0.32 
Male 0.51 
Married 0.49 
Race 
 White, non-Hispanic 0.5 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.14 
Hispanic 0.28 
Other 0.08 
Education 
 Less than high school 0.19 
High school 0.29 
Some college 0.15 
College degree 0.25 
Employment status 
 Continuously employed 0.64 
Continuously unemployed 0.11 
Income 
 Family income $69,103.88 
Medical 
 Total annual expenditures $3,103.48 
Insurance Status 
 Uninsured 0.46 
Non-group 0.04 
Expensive ESI 0.06 
Self Employed 0.005 
Medicaid 0.1 
Small Group ESI 0.27 
Health Status 
 Excellent 0.32 
Very good 0.32 
Good 0.27 
Fair 0.08 
Poor 0.02 
Notes: Statistics calculated for Exchange-eligible population constructed from panels 9-14 of 
the MEPS. We select adult, non-elderly individuals in households earning at least 138% of FPL 
and children in households with income of at least 205% of FPL. We include households 
where an adult is ever uninsured, a holder of a non-group insurance policy, self-employed, 
employed by a small employer, or paying an out-of-pocket premium for their employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESI) plan that is deemed to be unaffordable. If an individual 
meets the selection criteria in at least one of the two survey years, she is part of the sample. 
The dataset comprises 44,210 “Exchange-eligible” individuals, 11,773 of whom have only one 
year of data and 32,437 of whom have two years of data, generating a total sample size of 
76,647 person-years. 
 
  
  
158 
 
Table 3.2: Insurer Risk under Proposed Policies 
Risk Measure Base Case 
Reinsurance 
Only 
2-sided Risk 
Corridor Only 
Reinsurance and 
2-sided Risk 
Corridor 
Standard Deviation $138.00 $100.74 $104.89 $85.21 
95th Percentile of 
Cost Distn 
$3,559.65 $3,492.51 $3,491.99 $3,458.42 
99th Percentile of 
Cost Distn 
$3,670.62 $3,570.17 $3,523.46 $3,497.25 
Notes: Each column represents a different set of policies and each row represents a 
moment of the insurer’s cost distribution under those policies. The distribution cost 
distribution in the base case is approximated by taking 10,000 draws of 5,000 individuals 
from the population of exchange-eligible individuals we create from MEPS data. The cost 
distributions under reinsurance, risk corridors, and both reinsurance and risk corridors 
are approximated by starting with the base case distribution and then calculating the 
reinsurance and risk corridor transfers and fees according to the parameters proposed 
for implementation in the Exchanges.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Application to Exchanges 
As mentioned in the text, in the state Health Insurance Exchanges, plan payments are a 
function of relative risk scores instead of absolute risk scores. Plan  ’s relative risk score 
is equal to the average absolute risk score of all of plan  ’s enrollees divided by the 
average absolute risk score of all of the enrollees in the market. To formalize this for the 
case of two plans, let    be plan  ’s average absolute risk score and let   be the portion of 
individuals in the market enrolled in plan  . As above,         where   represents the 
“true risk” of plan  ’s enrollees and    is the plan-specific coding factor. Now define plan 
 ’s relative risk score as 
    
  
            
  
Now, in the exchanges a plan’s per capita payment is equal to         . If we let the 
market be large and we normalize   such that      , then we can characterize the 
implicit subsidy/transfer to plan   as 
    (
      
            
)   (
  
     
) 
Note that as the portion of individuals enrolled in plan   increases, the subsidy to plan 
  decreases. In other words, upcoding becomes less profitable as plan  ’s market share 
increases. The intuition for this result is simple. With a payment system based on a 
relative risk score, plan  ’s subsidy is based on the difference between plan  ’s coding 
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and average coding in the market. As plan  ’s market share increases, these two values 
converge and the subsidy decreases. 
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Appendix B: Institutional Detail on MA 
B.1 MA Payment formula 
To apply the model we develop in Section 3, let plan    be FFS Medicare and let plan   be 
MA. Unlike    in the model, payments to FFS Medicare are not risk-adjusted. The 
government just pays the bills of the patients in FFS Medicare; there is no capitation 
payment. Payments to MA plans, on the other hand, are based on a relative risk score that 
is a modified version of the risk score introduced in Section 3. The government’s stated 
goal is to pay MA plans   (the county benchmark or base rate) for enrolling an individual 
with an average FFS risk score and to increase or decrease that payment proportionally 
with expected cost. In order to accomplish this, the MA relative risk score is calculated as 
follows: 
   
   
  
  
 
    
∑   
   
     
 
  
  
 ̅   
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Plans are then paid a sum equal to the county benchmark multiplied by the relative risk 
score for enrolling individual  : 
  
      
     
For sake of exhibition, we also define an analogous FFS relative risk score: 
   
    
  
   
 
    
∑   
   
     
 
  
   
 ̅   
 
                                                        
83 Because  ̅    is not known at the beginning of the year when MA plans submit their bids (see 
below) CMS linearly extrapolates  ̅    using data from the 5 most recent years for which data is 
available. Here, we assume that this extrapolation is correct. Any error in the extrapolation would 
affect the implicit subsidy, with positive errors decreasing over payment and negative errors 
increasing overpayment. 
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The fixed risk score assumption would imply that any individual   would receive the 
same risk score in MA that she would receive in FFS:    
       
  . If there is 
“upcoding” in MA (i.e.   
         
          and      ), then  
 
   
   
  
  
 
    
∑   
   
     
 
      
  
       
   
      
 
    (   
      
   )       
 
In the upcoding case, the government is overpaying MA plans, and the overpayment is 
equal to     . Additionally, if there is heterogeneity in coding practices within MA (i.e. 
HMOs upcode while PFFS plans don’t), then the government is subsidizing some private 
plans more than others. Our main goal is to determine     and, thus, the average 
overpayment from the government due to upcoding.  
 
B.2 MA vs. FFS coding incentives 
As discussed in the text, in MA plan-specific coding factors are generated through profit 
maximization where profits are characterized as, 
   ∑{       [  (     (     ))     (  )        ]}
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For profit maximizing plans    will be equal to      
    
  . Thus, for MA,     
            . However, the process for generating the FFS coding factor,     , is 
quite different. Importantly, FFS is not profit maximizing and does not involve risk 
adjusted payments. While                     ,      and      are not set via profit 
maximization. Instead they are set by lawmakers to satisfy political incentives. The profit 
maximizing and politically incentivized   and   are likely to be quite different, producing 
different values of   for MA and FFS. In fact, there may be little incentive for lawmakers 
to do much of anything to affect     , so this will just be set by the incentives provided to 
physicians through their organizations, through the incentive to pass information from 
one physician to another, through the incentive to keep good records on patients in order 
to minimize future diagnostics, or, for the case of hospitals, through the DRG payment 
system. 
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Appendix C: Spillovers 
As discussed in the text, the source of coding differences between MA and FFS is 
unknown. If coding differences are due to MA plans selectively contracting with 
providers that code more aggressively or if all providers in a plan’s network only see 
patients enrolled in the plan, coding spillovers would be unlikely. However, providers 
often see patients from a mix of different health plans. Therefore, if a health plan 
managed to influence a provider’s coding or practice patterns, it could impact the risk 
scores of all individuals served by the provider, including those insured under different 
plans.
84
 This would be plausible if, for instance, providers tended to maintain similar 
practice and coding patterns across all of their patients regardless of insurer.  
In the context of our empirical example, it is common for physicians to treat both 
MA and traditional FFS Medicare patients, suggesting the possibility of these types of 
spillovers. Here, we show how spillovers affect our calculation of the subsidy caused by a 
risk adjusted payment system.  We allow spillovers to vary in two characteristics: 
completeness and direction. First, we assume that spillovers are “bidirectional,” meaning 
that coding practices spill from   to    and from    to  . To formalize this we define a 
“spillover factor” for an individual enrolled in plan   as an enrollment weighted average 
of plan  ’s coding factor and plan   ’s coding factor,  ̅              , where   is 
the proportion of the population enrolled in plan  . Second, we allow spillovers to be 
“incomplete,” meaning the risk score for individual   in plan   is a weighted average of 
the plan-specific coding factor and the spillover factor:   
               ̅, where 
                                                        
84 This would be unlikely if the coding of diagnoses were done at the health plan level, rather than the 
provider level. 
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  is a “completeness factor.” It is easy to show that when spillovers are complete (i.e. 
   ),   
    
  
 and    , i.e. there is no subsidy even with       . However, if we 
allow spillovers to be incomplete (i.e.    ) and we again normalize      ,    
    . In other words, the subsidy is decreasing in the completeness of the spillovers, and 
our approximation of the subsidy,       , represents an upper bound for the actual 
subsidy. 
In our empirical example, coding spillovers are likely to be quite incomplete. 
While plan payments in MA are a function of relative risk scores, the risk scores are 
relative to absolute FFS risk in the entire country. In many counties, there is little or no 
MA penetration, implying that providers in these counties will have little incentive to 
adopt coding practices incentivized by MA plans. This will cause     and      to be 
quite different even if spillovers are large in counties with high MA penetration. If 
payments were based on within-county MA absolute risk relative to within-county FFS 
absolute risk, spillovers could present a larger problem.  
With respect to our ability to identify     in the presence of coding spillovers, 
Figure C1 shows what happens to our graphical representation of coding differences 
when complete, bidirectional spillovers are present. The green lines represent the average 
risk score in FFS and MA when there are complete, bidirectional spillovers. Note that the 
FFS risk curve with spillovers is everywhere above the FFS risk curve without spillovers 
and the MA risk curve with spillovers is everywhere below the MA risk curve without 
spillovers. This is due to FFS coding pulling MA risk down and MA coding pulling FFS 
risk up. Also note that the total average risk curve is unchanged from the case with no 
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spillovers, implying that     is still identifiable from the slope of the total risk curve. As 
spillovers become more incomplete, the risk curves with spillovers will converge to the 
risk curves without spillovers. Therefore, while the possibility of coding spillovers 
presents a potential problem for estimating  , it does not present a problem for estimating 
the existence or direction of coding differences. 
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Appendix D: Web sources for CMS data 
Variable File URL 
MA 
penetration 
by county 
Monthly 
Enrollment 
by CPSC 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Monthly-Enrollment-
by-Contract-Plan-State-County.html 
MA risk 
scores by 
county  
Plan 
Payment 
Data for 
2006-2011 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-
Advantage/Plan-Payment/Plan-Payment-Data-
Items/CMS1256180.html?DLPage=1&DLSort=0&DLSort
Dir=ascending 
FFS 
enrollment 
by county 
Medicare 
FFS 2013 
county 
Web 
http://cms.hhs.gov/Medicare/Health-
Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/ffs2010
.zip 
 
FFS average 
risk scores 
by county 
Medicare 
FFS 2013 
county 
Web 
http://cms.hhs.gov/Medicare/Health-
Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/ffs2010
.zip 
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Appendix E: Derivation of efficiency loss measures 
In order to derive our measures of efficiency loss from reinsurance and risk corridors, we 
start by defining the setting in which insurers act. Let there be a population of   
individuals, indexed by  . Also let there be   potential states of the world, where a state of 
the world is defined as an allocation of individuals to a plan and, thus, a plan average 
cost. At the beginning of the period, before discovering the state of the world, the insurer 
chooses a utilization management “effort” level,   , for each of the   individuals. After 
choosing the effort levels, the plan draws an allocation of enrollees and discovers the 
average cost. The plans choose the effort levels to maximize the following expected 
profit function: 
 [ ]  ∑∑   [   (      )               ]
  
 
where     is the probability that if individual   is enrolled that she is enrolled in state   
(i.e.                       ),    represents individual  ’s utilization in dollars as a 
function of the plan’s level of effort,     represents plan revenues potentially as a function 
of utilization, and        represents the cost of effort. Profit maximization implies the 
following 
∑   
   
   
 
 ∑   
   
   
(
    
   
  )
 
    
With no reinsurance or risk corridors 
    
   
    
      . Both of these policies change 
    
   
 
to no longer be equal to zero for some individuals and states of the world. This results in 
profit maximizing insurers choosing a new set of   s in equilibrium, which alters 
utilization and welfare. We assume that efficiency is maximized when    
          This 
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implies that the efficiency loss from policy   can be described as a function of the 
individual’s expected value of    given that she is enrolled,  ̅   
  ∑        
 
 ,       
 ), 
where     
  represents 
    
   
 under policy  . Now, if we take a taylor expansion of       
 ) 
around     , we find that the total efficiency loss under policy   can be approximated 
as 
    ̅   
   
 
 
    
    
  ̅   
     
This implies that the average difference in efficiency loss under reinsurance and risk 
corridors can be approximated as: 
 
  
∑
    
    
( ̅     
    ̅     
  )
 
 
 
  
∑  ( ̅     
    ̅     
  )
 
  
Effectively, the difference in efficiency loss is equal to the weighted average of the 
difference of the squared expected values of    under each policy across the population. 
The weight can be further broken down as follows: 
   
    
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
    
   
 
   
    
 
Now, let’s assume that the relationship between the efficiency loss and a change in 
utilization is the same for everyone (i.e., 
   
   
 
  
  
 and 
    
   
  
   
   
     ). Let’s also assume 
that the response of cost to changes in    is constant so that 
   
    
  . This implies 
that the average difference in efficiency loss can be described as  
 
  
    
   
 ∑
   
    
( ̅     
    ̅     
  )
 
 
which is proportional to 
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Figure A1.1: Equilibrium search with Reinsurance 
 
 
  
Notes: Figure shows search for equilibrium in setting where sample individuals required to 
choose between Bronze and Platinum Plans and there is reinsurance. Light blue line is the 
45-degree line. Orange line represents incremental average cost (IAC) curve with no risk 
adjustment, blue line represents IAC with demographic risk adjustment, gray line 
represents IAC with prospective risk adjustment, gold line represents IAC with concurrent 
risk adjustment, and green line represents IAC with HHS-HCC risk adjustment. IAC with no 
and demographic risk adjustment is everywhere above 45-degree line implying complete 
market unraveling where everyone enrolls in Bronze plan. Prospective, concurrent, and 
HHS risk adjustment IACs cross 45-degree line, implying an interior equilibrium exists. 
Equilibrium is at lowest P where IAC crosses 45-degree line. Concurrent results in the 
lowest price differential. Prices, enrollment, and welfare can be found in Table 1.4. 
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Figure A1.2: Equilibrium search with age-based pricing 
 
 
  
Notes: Figure shows search for equilibrium in setting where sample individuals required to 
choose between Bronze and Platinum Plans and premiums are age-rated using the HHS age 
curve. Light blue line is the 45-degree line. Orange line represents incremental average cost 
(IAC) curve with no risk adjustment, blue line represents IAC with demographic risk 
adjustment, gray line represents IAC with prospective risk adjustment, gold line represents 
IAC with concurrent risk adjustment, and green line represents IAC with HHS-HCC risk 
adjustment. IAC with no and demographic risk adjustment is everywhere above 45-degree 
line implying complete market unraveling where everyone enrolls in Bronze plan. 
Prospective, concurrent, and HHS risk adjustment IACs cross 45-degree line, implying an 
interior equilibrium exists. Equilibrium is at lowest P where IAC crosses 45-degree line. 
Concurrent results in the lowest price differential. Prices, enrollment, and welfare can be 
found in Table 1.5. 
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Figure A1.3: Equilibrium search with reinsurance and age-based pricing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure shows search for equilibrium in setting where sample individuals required to 
choose between Bronze and Platinum Plans, premiums are age-rated using the HHS age 
curve, and there is reinsurance. Light blue line is the 45-degree line. Orange line represents 
incremental average cost (IAC) curve with no risk adjustment, blue line represents IAC with 
demographic risk adjustment, gray line represents IAC with prospective risk adjustment, 
gold line represents IAC with concurrent risk adjustment, and green line represents IAC 
with HHS-HCC risk adjustment. IAC with no and demographic risk adjustment is 
everywhere above 45-degree line implying complete market unraveling where everyone 
enrolls in Bronze plan. Prospective, concurrent, and HHS risk adjustment IACs cross 45-
degree line, implying an interior equilibrium exists. Equilibrium is at lowest P where IAC 
crosses 45-degree line. Concurrent results in the lowest price differential. Prices, 
enrollment, and welfare can be found in Table 1.5. 
  
174 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abaluck J and J Gruber. 2011. Choice inconsistencies among the elderly: Evidence from 
plan choice in the Medicare Part D program. American Economic Review, vol. 
101:1180-1210.  
AcademyHealth. 2007. Profiles in Coverage: Arizona Healthcare Group. 
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/SCI_AZPiC.pdf 
Afendulis C, Chernew M, and D Kessler. 2013. The effect of Medicare Advantage on 
hospital admissions and mortality. NBER Working Paper 19101. 
Aizcorbe A, Liebman E, Pack S, Cutler DM, Chernew ME, and AB Rosen. 2012. 
Measuring Health Care Costs of Individuals with Employer-Sponsored Health 
Insurance in the US: A Comparison of Survey and Claims Data.Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; 28: 43-
51.http://www.bea.gov/papers/pdf/Measuring%20health%20care%20costs%20of%20
individuals%20with%20employer-sponsored%20health%20insurance.pdf 
Akerlof G. 1970. The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 84:488-500. 
Arrow KJ. 1963. Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American 
Economic Review, 53(5): 941-973. 
Baicker K, Chernew M, and J Robbins. 2013. The spillover effects of Medicare Managed 
Care: Medicare Advantage and hospital utilization. NBER Working Paper 19010. 
Bovbjerg RR, Garrett AB, Clemans-Cope L, and P Masi. 2008. State Coverage 
Initiatives: Reinsurance in State Health Reform.  Reinsurance Institute Project of the 
Urban Institute.  Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, May 2008.  
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/SCI_Reinsurance08.pdf 
Boyarsky V, and R Parke. 2012. The Medicare Shared Savings Program and the Pioneer 
Accountable Care Organizations. Milliman Healthcare Reform Briefing Paper. 
http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/healthreform/medicare-shared-savings-
program.pdf 
Brown J, Duggan M, Kuziemko I, and W Woolston. 2011. How does risk selection 
respond to risk adjustment? Evidence from the Medicare Advantage program. NBER 
Working Paper 16977. 
Bulow, J. 2004. The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents. In: Jaffe AB, Lerner J, and S 
Stern, editors. Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 4. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2004: 145-187. 
  
175 
Bundorf MK, Levin J, and N Mahoney. 2012. Pricing and welfare in health plan choice. 
American Economic Review, vol. 102(7):3214-48. 
Cao Z and TG McGuire. 2002. Service-level selection by HMOs in Medicare. Journal of 
Health Economics, vol. 22(6):915-931. 
Christofides, S and AD Smith. 2001. DFA – The Value of Risk. Presented to the CAS 
2001 DFA Forum. http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/01spforum/01spf153.pdf 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2010. Announcement of calendar year (CY) 
2010 Medicare Advantage capitation rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D 
payment policies. Accessed on Oct 10, 2013 at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-
Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2010.pdf 
Cohen A, and L Einav. 2007. Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice. 
American Economic Review, vol. 97:745-788. 
Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health System. 2012. The 
Performance Improvement Imperative: Utilizing a Coordinated, Community-Based 
Approach to Enhance Care and Lower Costs for Chronically Ill Patients. 
Commonwealth Fund.  
Cutler DM and SJ Reber. 1998. Paying for health insurance: The trade-off between 
competition and adverse selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 113:433-
466. 
Dafny L. 2005. How do hospitals respond to price changes? American Economic Review, 
vol. 95(5):1525-1547. 
Dow WH, Fulton BD, and K Baicker. Reinsurance for High Health Costs: Benefits, 
Limitations, and Alternatives.  Forum for Health Econ Policy 2010; 13(2), article 7. 
HHS 2012 
Einav L and A Finkelstein. 2011. Selection in insurance markets: Theory and empirics in 
pictures. Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 25(1):115-38. 
Einav L, Finkelstein A, and MR Cullen. 2010. Estimating welfare in insurance markets 
using variation in prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 125(3):877-921. 
Ellis RP and TJ Layton. 2014. Risk selection and risk adjustment. In Anthony J. Culyer 
(ed) Encyclopedia of Health Economics, Elsevier Press. 
Ellis RP and TG McGuire. 1988. Insurance Principles and the Design of Prospective 
Payment Systems. Journal of Health Economics, 7(3): 215-237. 
  
176 
Ellis RP and TG McGuire. 2007. Predictability and predictiveness in health care 
spending. Journal of Health Economics, vol. 26:25-48. 
Ericson KM. 2014. Consumer Inertia and Firm Pricing in the Medicare Part D 
Prescription Drug Insurance Exchange. American Economic Journal: Economic 
Policy, 6(1): 38-64. 
Fama EF and MC Jensen. 1983. Agency Problems and Residual Claims. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26(2): 1983. 
Fang H, Keane M, and D Silverman. 2008. Sources of advantageous selection: Evidence 
from the Medigap insurance market. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 116(2):303-
50. 
Finkelstein A and K McGarry. 2006. Multiple dimensions of private information: 
Evidence from the long-term care insurance market. American Economic Review, vol. 
96:937-958. 
Frank RG, Glazer J, and TG McGuire. 2000. Measuring adverse selection in managed 
health care. Journal of Health Economics, vol. 19:829-54. 
Glazer J, McGuire TG, and J Shi. 2013. Risk Adjustment of Health Plan Payments to 
Correct Inefficient Plan Choice from Adverse Selection. Working Paper. 
Government Accountability Office. 2013. Substantial excess payments underscore need 
for CMS to imprve accuracy of risk score adjustments. Accessed on Oct 8, 2013 at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651712.pdf 
Gruber J. 1998. Health Insurance and the Labor Market. NBER Working Paper 6762. 
Geruso M. 2013. Selection in employer health plans: Homogeneous prices and 
heterogeneous preferences. Unpublished. 
Geruso M and TJ Layton. 2014. Risk selection, risk adjustment, and manipulable medical 
coding: Evidence from Medicare. Unpublished. 
Glazer J and TG McGuire. 2000. Optimal risk adjustment in markets with adverse 
selection: An application to managed care. American Economic Review, 90(4):1055-
1071. 
Glazer J and TG McGuire. 2002. Setting health plan premiums to ensure efficient quality 
in health care: Minimum variance optimal risk adjustment. Journal of Public 
Economics, vol. 84(2):153-173. 
Glazer J and TG McGuire. 2011. Gold and silver plans: Accommodating demand 
heterogeneity in managed competition. Journal of Health Economics, vol. 30:1011-9. 
  
177 
Glazer J, McGuire TG, and J Shi. 2013. Risk adjustment of health plan payment to 
correct inefficient plan choice from adverse selection. Unpublished. 
Hackmann MB, Kolstad JT, and AE Kowalski. 2013. Adverse Selection and an 
Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice. NBER Working Paper 19149. 
Hall A. 2011. Measuring the return on government spending on the Medicare Managed 
Care program. B.E. Journal of Economics Analysis & Policy, vol. 11(2) 
Hall BJ and JB Liebman. 1998. Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats? Quarterly 
Journal of Economic, 113(3): 653-691. 
Handel BR. 2013. Adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets: When 
nudging hurts. American Economic Review, vol. 103(7):2643-82. 
Handel BR, Hendel I, and MD Whinston. 2012. Equilibria in health exchanges: Adverse 
selection vs. reclassification risk. Unpublished. 
Handel BR and J Kolstad. 2013. Health insurance for “humans”: Information frictions, 
plan choice, and consumer welfare. Unpublished. 
Health and Human Services. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: HHS Notice of 
Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014; Final Rule. Federal Register, vol. 78, no. 
47. March 11, 2013. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-03-11/pdf/2013-
04902.pdf 
Kahane Y. 1979. The Theory of Insurance Risk Premiums – A Re-examination in the 
Light of Recent Developments in Capital Market Theory. ASTIN Bulletin 10, 223-
239. 
Keeler EB, Carter GM, and S Trude. 1988. Insurance Aspects of DRG Outlier Payments. 
Journal of Health Economics, 7(3): 193-214. 
Kaiser Family Foundation. 2013. Employer Health Benefits Survey. 
Kowalski A. 2013. Estimating the tradeoff between risk protection and moral hazard with 
a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance. Unpublished. 
Layton TJ. 2014. Imperfect risk adjustment, risk preferences, and sorting in competitive 
health insurance markets. Unpublished. 
Lustig J. 2011. Measuring welfare losses from adverse selection and imperfect 
competition in privatized Medicare. Unpublished. 
  
178 
McGuire TG, Glazer J, Newhouse JP, Normand SL, Shi J, Sinaiko AD, and S Zuvekas. 
2013. Integrating Risk Adjustment and Enrollee Premiums in Health Plan Payment. 
Journal of Health Economics, 32(6): 1263-1277. 
McGuire TG, Glazer J, Newhouse JP, Normand SL, Shi J, Sinaiko AD, and SH Zuvekas. 
2014. Assessing incentives for service-level selection in private health insurance 
exchanges. Journal of Health Economics, forthcoming. 
McWilliams JM, Hsu J, and JP Newhouse. 2012. New risk-adjustment system was 
associated with reduced favorable selection in Medicare Advantage. Health Affairs, 
vol. 31(12):2630-40. 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. 2012. Part D Payment System. 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_12_PartD.pdf 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. 2012. Report to Congress: Medicare payment 
policy. Accessed Oct 8, 2013 at http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/Mar12_Ch12.pdf 
Newhouse JP, Price M, Huange J, McWilliams M, and J Hsu. 2012. Steps to reduce 
favorable risk selection in Medicare Advantage largely succeeded, boding well for 
health insurance exchanges. Health Affairs, 31:2618-2628. 
Polyakova M. 2013. Regulation of insurance with adverse selection and switching costs: 
Evidence from Medicare Part D. Unpublished. 
Pope GC, Kautter J, Ellis RP, Ash AS, Ayanian JZ, Iezzoni LI, Ingber MJ, Levy JM, and 
J Robst. 2004. Risk adjustment of Medicare capitation payments using the CMS-HCC 
model. Health Care Financing Review, vol. 23(2):369-141. 
Rothschild M and J Stiglitz. 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An 
essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 90:629-649. 
Shi J. 2013. Efficiency in plan choice with risk adjustment and premium discrimination 
in health insurance exchanges. Unpublished. 
Silverman E and J Skinner. 2004. Medicare upcoding and hospital ownership. Journal of 
Health Economics, vol. 23(2):369-89. 
Sinaiko AD and RA Hirth. 2011 Consumers, health insurance, and dominated choice. 
Journal of Health Economics, vol. 30:450-457. 
Sing M., Banthin JS, Selden TM, Cowan CA, and SP Keehan. 2002. Reconciling Medical 
Expenditure Estimates from the MEPS and NHEA. Health Care Financing Review 
28:25-40. 
  
179 
Song Y, Skinner J, Bynum J, Sutherland J, Wennberg JE, and ES Fisher. 2010. Regional 
variations in diagnostic practices. New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 363(1):45-
53. 
Spinnewijn J. 2013. Heterogeneity, demand for insurance, and adverse selection. 
Unpublished. 
Swartz K. Reinsuring Health: Why More Middle-Class People are Uninsured and What 
Government Can Do.  New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006.  
Train K. 2009. Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Van de Ven WPMM and RP Ellis. 2000. Risk adjustment in competitive health plan 
markets. In: Culyer AJ and JP Newhouse (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics. 
North-Holland. 
Winkleman R, Pepper J, Holland P, Mehmud S, and J Woolman (Wakely Consulting 
Group; Boston, MA) 2012. Analysis of HHS Proposed Rules on Reinsurance, Risk 
Corridors, and Risk Adjustment.  State Health Reform Assistance Network, Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation. 2012 Aug. http://www.statenetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/State-Network-Wakely-Analysis-of-HHS-Final-Rules-On-
Reinsurance-Risk-Corridors-And-Risk-Adjustment.pdf 
Zeckhauser, R. 1970. Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff Between Risk 
Spreading and Appropriate Incentives. Journal of Economics Theory, 2(1): 10-26. 
Zhu JM, Layton TJ, Sinaiko AD, and TG McGuire. 2014. The power of reinsurance in 
health insurance exchanges to improve the fit of the payment system and reduce 
incentives for adverse selection. Inquiry, forthcoming. 
Zuvekas SH and GL Olin. 2009. Accuracy of Medicare Expenditures in the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey. Inquiry, 46: 92-108. 
 
  
   
CURRICULUM VITAE 
TIMOTHY J. LAYTON 
270 Bay State Rd, Room 304A 
Boston University, Department of Economics 
Boston MA 02215 USA  
Cell: (573) 353-1566      
Email: tlayton@bu.edu  
Web site: https://sites.google.com/site/timothyjlayton/ 
 
 
EDUCATION 
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2014 (expected) 
Dissertation Title: Risk Selection and Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health Insurance 
Markets 
Main advisor: Randall P. Ellis 
Dissertation Committee: Randall P. Ellis, Thomas G. McGuire, Keith M. Ericson  
 
B.A., Economics and Political Science, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, 2009 
 
FIELDS OF INTEREST  
Health Economics, Public Finance, Labor Economics, Econometrics 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Instructor, Introduction to Econometrics, Department of Economics, Boston University, 
Summer 2012 
Head Teaching Fellow, Introductory Micro and Macro Analysis, Department of 
Economics, Boston University, 2011-12 
Instructor, Economic Statistics, Department of Economics, Boston University, Summer 
2011 
Teaching Assistant, Development Economics, Department of Economics, Brigham Young 
University, Spring 2009 
 
WORK EXPERIENCE  
Research Assistant for Thomas McGuire, Harvard Medical School, 2012-Present 
Research Assistant for Randall Ellis, Boston University, 2012-Present 
Research Assistant for Marianne Baxter, Boston University, 2010 
Research Assistant for Michael Meurer and James Bessen, Boston University, 2009-10 
Research Assistant for Frank McIntyre, Brigham Young University, 2009 
 
FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS 
Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, 2013 
Summer Research Grant, Boston University, 2013 
Teaching Fellowship, Boston University, 2011-2012
  
   
 
PUBLICATIONS/SUBMITTED PAPERS  
“Risk Adjustment and Risk Selection,” (with Randall P. Ellis) forthcoming in Anthony J. 
Culyer (ed) Encyclopedia of Health Economics, Elsevier Press. 
“The Power of Reinsurance in Health Insurance Exchanges to Improve the Fit of the 
Payment System and Reduce Incentives for Adverse Selection,” (with Jane Zhu, Anna 
D. Sinaiko, and Thomas G. McGuire) forthcoming in Inquiry. 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS  
“Risk Selection, Risk Adjustment, and Manipulable Medical Coding: Evidence from 
Medicare” (with Michael Geruso) 
“Imperfect Risk Adjustment, Risk Preferences, and Sorting in Competitive Health 
Insurance Markets” 
“Risk Corridors and Reinsurance in Health Insurance Exchanges: Insurance for 
Insurers” (with Thomas McGuire and Anna Sinaiko) 
“Medicaid Expansion, Benefit Design, and State Health Insurance Exchange Risk Pools” 
(with Richard Frank and Thomas McGuire) 
“Does Alcohol Consumption Cause Crime? Evidence from Texas County Liquor 
Regulations” 
 
WORK IN PROGRESS  
 “Risk Adjustment and Market Unraveling with a Weak Mandate” 
 “The Effect of Medicare Advantage Quality-Based Payment on Quality of Care in 
Medicare” (with Andrew Ryan) 
“Optimal Health Plan Pricing in the Presence of Inertia” (with Julie Shi) 
“The Dependent Coverage Expansion and Selection” (with Emily Gee) 
 
CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS 
American Society of Health Economics Biennial Conference, University of Southern 
California, Los Angeles, CA, June 2014 (scheduled)  
3rd Annual Conference on Healthcare Markets, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL, 
May 2014 (scheduled) 
Harvard Medical School, Department of Health Care Policy, Boston, MA, Feb 2014 
Harvard Medical School, Department of Health Care Policy, Boston, MA, Nov 2013 
Southeastern Health Economics Study Group, Baltimore, MD Oct 2013 
Harvard Medical School, Department of Health Care Policy, Boston, MA, Apr 2013 
 
LANGUAGES  
Fluent in English and Spanish  
 
COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, SAS, MATLAB, LaTeX, Microsoft Office, DxCG 
OTHER: Cyclist, runner, married with 1 child 
CITIZENSHIP/VISA: USA 
